The nature of the disagreement between Structural and interpretive perspectives.

The nature of the disagreement between Structural and interpretive perspectives

The first thing to say here is that interpretive sociologists do not agree at all that sociology can be a science. In other words, they adopt an anti-positivist position. Now what does this mean?

Essentially, it boils down to this: a human being’s conduct in the social world cannot be explained as natural scientists try to explain the occurrence of natural phenomena. That is to say, human beings in the social world (in "society"), and what they do therein, is not a matter of searching out the causes of behaviour. For no such "causes" exist! Society is not a "thing", an objective phenomenon which causes us to conduct ourselves in a certain manner. On the contrary, society is made by us in our everyday interaction with our fellows. Since it is made by us everyday, society simply cannot be conceived (thought of by sociologists) as a "thing", a cause of our conduct. The idea that society is to behaviour as cause is to effect is a nonsense insists interpretive sociology. Indeed, such an idea fundamentally misunderstands the nature of what social life is all about.

Now for the second point. It can be introduced by consideration of this question: if our conduct in the social world cannot be explained as the natural scientist endeavours to account for the occurrence of natural phenomena, how is it to be accounted for?

In answer to this question, the interpretive sociologist says the following: we must, as sociologists, seek to understand our fellows as they go about the every day business of making sense of their social existence. Notice here that the talk of causes and effects ha disappeared. Instead, we have an emphasis upon how human beings, social actors as interpretive sociology terms them, produce/construct social realism in interaction with others. This emphasis, as we shall see now, has a radical implication.

To say that we must understand our fellows’ conduct in the social world, rather than seek to ’explain’ it in terms of causes producing their effects, is to say this:

Social reality (society) is what social actors make it. It is not a "thing" which acts upon us as an external force causing us to behave in this way or that. On the contrary, social reality is the outcome of the sense we make of our everyday interactions with other.

From this it shows that we should have a certain view of human beings as social creatures. They are actors; they have reasons for what they do; they always define their social world in terms of "meanings" which are central to their lives.

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Summary of Main Points

1. There are two major approaches – or orientations – in modern sociology; the structural sociologies (Marxism and Functionalism) and the interpretive/interactionist/social action sociologies (phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, the work of Weber).

2. Structural sociologies argue that a science of society is a possibility. The interpretive sociologies disagree. That is, the latter disagree with the claim that sociology can be a discipline which is modelled on the kinds of explanation of natural phenomena which the natural sciences employ.

Basically, explanations in the natural sciences are in terms of cause-and-effect. So the structural approach is claiming that human, social conduct ...

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Summary of Main Points

Basically, explanations in the natural sciences are in terms of cause-and-effect. So the structural approach is claiming that human, social conduct can be explained by treating society itself

The claim that human behaviour is the effect of something else (society – with its norms, or class structure, and so on) is positivist. That is, it is being claimed that there is no difference between humans’ action in the social world and the occurrence of natural phenomena (like storms, volcanoes, tides, nuclear fusion, and so on.)

It is also positivist in that it is being implicitly claimed that scientific method is the only means we have at our disposal of gaining knowledge of the social world.

4. Interpretivist sociologies, on the other hand, are anti-positivist. That is, they are completely against the idea that human conduct in the social world can be explained as the cause of something else (society itself). They are also anti-positivist is that they reject the idea that (natural) scientific method is the only means by which sociology can be granted a knowledge of social life.

Let us develop this latter point now. Interpretive sociologies reject the idea that there can be a science of society modelled on the forms of explanation that the natural sciences employ. But that does not mean to say that they thereby deny that we can have a knowledge of social life. Rather, the point here is that, since sociology deals with humans’ social action, the methods of the natural sciences are simply inappropriate to the study of that action. In other words, sociology must have its own, unique methods of study since it has a unique object of study, that is , social action itself.

5. So what are these unique methods by which sociology can give us a knowledge of social life. Briefly (we will be returning to this later), we must, as sociologists, seek to understand (rather than explain in terms of cause-and-effect) the social action/conduct of our fellows in the social world.

Why this emphasis on understanding? Because, for the interpretive sociologies, human beings are unique kinds of creatures: they have reasons for what they do; they have beliefs about the world which affect their social action; they conduct themselves in the social world in the light of how they interpret what is going on and in view of others’ responses to them, and so on. Thus, humans are social ACTORS; they are active makers of social reality, and not as the structural approaches asserts, merely the dumb, unthinking cogs in the giant machine of society.

Thus, if we want a knowledge of social life, we cannot explain social actors’ action in terms of cause-and-effect. Rather, we must seek out what the social actors themselves say they are up to. For it is what the make of the social world, and how they interact with others, which makes social life (society) the unique kind of object of study it is.

The main arguments for and against the view that Sociology is a Science:-

ARGUMENTS FOR:-

'Unity Science Hypothesis'

Claim: All sciences, whether 'natural' or social, share a common method. This claim has a number of aspects:-

1. Science causally explains: i.e. it identifies regular patterns between events ('positivism') OR identifies underlying causal connections between phenomena ('realism').

2. Objectivity: The scientist remains distant from his/her object of study, after all one can't enter into a communication or personal relation with the world of things. Social science should model itself on this subject/object relationship.

3. Value freedom: Science provides knowledge of facts: i.e. of what is not what ought to be. While most science can tell us the most efficient way of achieving our ends, it cannot tell us what those ends should be.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST:-

Humanist and Radical view.

Claim: There is a fundamental distinction between the natural and social sciences. The latter cannot, nor should they, aspire to value-free explanation:

1. Social science meaningfully interprets: regular patterns between events tell us nothing unless we can show that they have a meaning fir the social actors. The aim of Sociology is to reveal the meanings which actors attach to their actions.

2. Subjectivity: the relationship between the Sociologist and his/her subject matter is a relationship between subjects who can communicate and do share a common world. Social sciences are necessarily 'ego involving', and the ultimate test of the validity of their claims lies in our ability to convince the wider community.

3. There is no strict distinction between facts and values or means and ends: we cannot shirk ethical responsibility for social scientific research. To try to do so allows the agenda to be set by the powerful and influential on whose side we shall then tacitly be.

TWO TYPES OF CRITICISM:

1. Humanist: The humanist argument emphasises points 1-3 on the 'against' side, and this position is sometimes labelled with the German word for human sciences: the Geisteswissenschaften (literally 'the sciences of the spirit/mind). It stressed that human action has special qualities: it is meaningful, it follows rules (is 'rule governed'), involves choice, and is intentional. None of these qualities are shared by objects of the natural world. The special qualities of social action require a method quite distinct from that employed in the natural sciences. While we want to explain natural events, we want to understand social action. As social scientists we understand social action in very much the same way as we do citizens: by communicating, through empathy, and through argument. There is no radical break between social scientific and commonsensical accounts. In Britain these views are associated with the philosopher Peter Winch (The Idea Of a Social Science, 1958).

2. Radical: The radical critique of the 'unity of science hypothesis' tends to agree on points 1 - 2 above with the humanist view, but emphasises point three: there is no sharp fact/value distinction for social scientists because in dealing with, and necessarily living within, the social world we are in the realm of values, they enter our analysis at the most fundamental level: when we come to select the issues we examine. To maintain the pretence of a fact value distinction is automatically to side with those who set the social agenda in all other respects. In its most sophisticated form, this argument is associated with the German philosopher and sociologist Jurgen Habermas.

BUT WHAT IS A SCIENCE?

Both humanist and the radical critique assume that there is an objective natural science with which the social sciences can be contrasted. To complicate matters, this view has been undermined by arguments by some philosophers of science (particularly Thomas Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. 1970) to the effect that not even the natural sciences are as objective and cumulative as we assume.

SOME REMAINING QUESTIONS:

If you still are tempted by the humanist or radical critique, there still remains the questions: 'What then do the social sciences tell us that we do not already know?' 'Wherein lies their claims to offer us an account of the social world which is superior to our everyday understanding?'

Sociologists and Statistics

We often call upon statistics to give us valuable information into a range sociological issues and problems E.g. relating to :-

BUT- they are not foolproof and often have to be treated with great caution: