Muir and a younger member of the club, the lawyer Will Colby, led the fight for Hetch Hetchy. Before long, however, there was dissension within the Club. Many of the organization’s members, including the Club’s vice-president, were in favor of the dam and reservoir, because they believed it served a public good which the Club had no right to oppose. The increasingly vocal minority in the Club which supported the dam and opposed the Club’s leaders discouraged Muir greatly, who was, at 69, now an old man. Muir offered to resign his position as president as well as his membership in the Club, but was convinced by Colby to stay on. As a solution, Colby and Muir formed another organization: the Society for the Preservation of National Parks. This group was essentially the Sierra Club without the dissident faction. The organization did succeed in alleviating the tensions somewhat within the Sierra Club, as well as expanded the Hetch Hetchy campaign nationally. Unfortunately for Muir and Colby however, the peace did not last long. Although internally the offshoot organization had helped soothe concerns, the news media continued to lump the newly created Society with the Sierra Club. The San Francisco Call was most outspoken in its criticism of the Club, saying that it was championing a “policy antagonistic to the city,” and was doing the city “incalculable harm.” The media had pulled the Sierra Club back into the issue, and forced the Club’s hand. In 1909, the board of directors released a referendum for the Club’s members, asking them to vote on the Hetch Hetchy matter. 589 members voted to oppose the reservoir, 161 voted to support it – and fifty members resigned when they learned of the final tally. The loss of members was of course not an ideal situation for Muir and Colby; however, it did effectively eliminate strife within the Club for the time being. The Club thereafter redoubled its efforts to stop the Hetch Hetchy project. Strategies used at this time were quite traditional. Colby coordinated a “massive public letter-writing campaign”, aimed to turn national public opinion against the dam and reservoir. One senator estimated he received over five thousand letters opposing the dam. Along with the letters, thousands of pamphlets were printed, detailing the argument in opposition to the project. The rhetoric used in these pamphlets is indicative of the Club’s political strategy at the time, one that would change over the course of the century. Written predominantly by Muir himself, the tone in the Sierra Club printings was dramatic and emotional. Calling proponents of the dam “temple destroyers”, and “curiously like the devil…devising the destruction of the first garden”, Muir brought forth his most stirring rhetorical style. The tenor of Muir’s writing “was appropriate for an age that tended to see political issues in moral terms”, which echoes Clemens’ claim that social movements’ organizational repertoires utilize “the language of culture” prevalent at the time. The efforts were for naught, however. A bill approving the use of Hetch Hetchy as a reservoir by San Francisco was signed into law in 1913. The organization’s rhetorical strategy was later criticized for focusing too much on simply aesthetics, rather than pragmatic benefits or harms. In an interview decades later, Colby admitted that the campaign’s argument was “entirely about preserving the beauty” of the valley.
The loss of Hetch Hetchy was a blow to Muir and his Club. Muir died one year later, in 1914. It is impossible to know how much the prolonged battle for Hetch Hetchy weighed on him or if it influenced his passing. The Sierra Club had thought it was winning the battle: it succeeded in inciting “widespread opposition across the country” and putting enormous pressure on politicians. Even when the bill squeezed through the House and Senate, there was still optimism it would be vetoed by then-President Woodrow Wilson. The defeat in the battle for Hetch Hetchy was not a complete loss, however. It had provided a massive amount of publicity on the national level for the Club, and helped raise the organization’s legitimacy in the public’s eye as well as the government’s. The Sierra Club had also learned valuable lessons in its first prolonged political conflict. First of all, it learned the importance of maintaining a unified stance. Internal strife had destabilized the Club’s efforts early on, and provided fodder for the media to attack the Club with. It also learned the difficulty of achieving unity. Further, the Club gained valuable experience in the campaign, almost prevailing against the political institution even as an “amateur organization”. The affair also finalized the split between Pinchot’s utilitarian conservationists, and Muir’s protectionists. The lessons learned and the precedents set by the battle over Hetch Hetchy would influence the Club for decades to come.
Although the Club clashed with the federal government during the Hetch Hetchy controversy, this did not end cooperation between the two entities. In fact, for most of its history, the Club’s success had come from the “personal connections and insider status of Club leaders.” Because environmentalism was still a relatively new concept, the small number of activists in the field walked in the same social circles and maintained personal relationships. The Sierra Club, even though it fought against it for Hetch Hetchy, generally maintained its traditional deferent and non-confrontational attitude towards the government. The practice of offering alternative locations for controversial development projects that the Club opposed was an example of this cooperationist approach, and also an example of Michels’ government co-option – alternative locations were a more centrist position than the Club’s original objective. The Club’s closest government ally was the US Forest Service, and it reestablished this partnership after Pinchot left the agency in 1910. The Forest Service mostly utilized the Sierra Club as a complementary force inside of Washington, asking the Club to show third-party support for various policies. Essentially, the Club was a “friendly lobby” for the Forest Service to “defend their own prerogatives with.” The Forest Service wasn’t really “using” the Club, because the arrangement was mutually beneficial. While the government got third-party support, the Club achieved increased legitimacy before Congress and the President. The connections and status gained while dealing with the Forest Service would later benefit the Club as it began “supporting and supplementing the policy” of the newly created National Park Service in the 1920s. No serious confrontations took place in the period between Hetch Hetchy and the end of the Second World War. The Club’s political actions at this time against reflect Clemens’ assertion concerning cultural norms. As Morag-Levine writes, concerning the Sierra Club in the early 20th century:
[The strategy was] very much in keeping with the era’s conception of conservationist organizations as consultant to the government on how to balance development and conservation.
Without much confrontation or major issues for the Club to devote itself to politically, the organization concentrated more on recreational pursuits. This would not last, however. By the century’s halfway point, the Sierra Club would again find itself in the middle of battles with the government.
Increased political involvement came under the leadership of David Brower, the Club’s next great leader. Brower was appointed the Club’s first executive director in 1952, a paid position that marked the group’s transformation into a modern, “professionally staffed organization.” Brower had been appointed the editor of the Sierra Club Bulletin in 1946 and immediately started a shift in the Club’s focus, moving away from the “hiking and recreation” that dominated the 1930s and 40s and towards “a greater attention to wilderness protection.” Brower’s first test came in 1950, when the United States Bureau of Reclamation announced plans to build a dam on the Green River in Dinosaur National Monument, Utah. The dam was to be for hydroelectric power. Conservationists, including the Sierra Club, came out in opposition to the plan. The main argument against the proposed dam at Dinosaur was that it would set a “dangerous precedent”, effectively making it acceptable to build dams in national parks. The Bureau later promised that Dinosaur would be a one-time exception, but the Club did not believe it. Brower launched a campaign against the dam, the Sierra Club’s “biggest campaign since Hetch Hetchy.” The first part of the campaign consisted of showing Dinosaur’s wealth, in an effort to attract the sympathy of the populace. The Club sponsored and led several trips down the river and through Dinosaur, and within five years of the dam’s proposal, the number of visitors to the park had sextupled. Two high-profile columns in the Saturday Evening Post and Reader’s Digest, which greatly increased the Dinosaur movement’s publicity, also assisted the cause. The Club also pushed out two major media productions: a book called This Is Dinosaur, published in less than three months by Club ally Alfred Knopf, and a film entitle Wilderness River Trail, which became an “invaluable visual aid.” By 1954, when hearings began in the House, letters to Congressmen were 80 to 1 against the dam. The fight was not over, however. The western states were lobbying hard for the proposal, and the Bureau of Reclamation, impervious to public opinion, continued to strongly support the dam.
The second part of the Sierra Club’s campaign strategy was new for the group. The Club rallied several witnesses to testify at the congressional hearings in 1954. Among those was Brower, who had “never testified before a congressional committee.” Brower was magnificent. Starting with a vivid description of his own trips to the beautiful canyon, Brower then compared the Dinosaur situation with the Hetch Hetchy debacle four decades earlier. Using a series of slides, Brower showed the results of the dam which the Club and John Muir had fought so desperately against. Telling the Committee that by “heeding the lesson” of Hetch Hetchy, “a far more disastrous stumble in Dinosaur” could be avoided, Brower presented dramatic photos which showed the transformation of the valley from a beautiful wilderness sanctuary into a “repellent mess of [a] reservoir.” After detailing the aesthetic harms that the project would bring, Brower, heeding himself the lessons of the Hetch Hetchy campaign, turned to a more pragmatic argument. The Bureau of Reclamation’s reason for choosing Dinosaur over other possible dam sites was that it would evaporate far less acre-feet annually. Recalculating the Bureau’s figures using simple arithmetic, Brower demonstrated to the Committee that this was not at all the case. In fact, Brower contended, the difference in evaporation levels between Dinosaur and other sites (significantly, sites not within federal parks) was insignificant. Brower’s figures were correct. The Bureau had miscalculated, resulting in a public embarrassment for the agency, and an “unexpected and dramatic triumph” for the Sierra Club. The dam at Dinosaur National Monument was never built.
Brower’s public challenge of the Bureau’s authority and expertise exemplified the change in the Sierra Club’s attitude as a social movement. Whereas throughout the 20th century the Club had been mostly dormant, or had acted as an ally of the US Forest Service and National Park Service, the confrontation over Dinosaur marked a “sharp departure from the organization’s longstanding deferential stance.” In the years following the Dinosaur victory, however, dissent within the Club again arose. Many on the Board of Directors did not like Brower’s increased combativeness, and feared that too many political campaigns would result in the revocation of the Club’s tax-deductible status. What resulted was a directive issued by the Board, described by Brower as the “Gag Rule.” The resolution, titled “Relations with Government Agencies” read:
The Sierra Club stresses its belief that it should offer cooperation with public officers in development of plans and policies in their initial stages…[and that] no statement should be used that…criticizes the motives, integrity, or competence of an official or bureau.
The policy did not succeed in cooling Brower’s rhetoric. In fact, Brower became more active, publishing books and other printed materials which worked towards his agendas. Finally, when Brower began to spend Club money on projects without the Board’s approval, the line was drawn. Brower was forced to submit his resignation in May 1969, ending his seventeen years as Executive Director.
The 1970s brought with them a new chapter in Sierra Club history. The seventies marked the true beginning of the modern environmental movement and the celebration of first Earth Day. Momentum towards the event had been growing throughout the 1960s, with the public’s realization that perhaps habits needed to be changed. An oil spill in Califronia, a river in Cleveland catching on fire, and the visible dirtiness of the air in most cities provided a clear and compelling picture for the country to see. As a Sierra Club manual titled Ecotactics, published in 1970, put it, “we have suddenly discovered that man may be breeding and poisoning himself out of existence.” The Earth Day celebration, organized by the grassroots efforts of hundreds of thousands of independent groups across the country, was an immediate success. It helped legitimate the environmental movement at a time when most politicians did not believe it to be a viable issue. The masses that came out on Earth Day showed those politicians that there was political capital available in the environment.
The rise of the environmentalism movement was reflected in the Sierra Club. Throughout the 20th century, it was safe to estimate that “three-quarters of the members joined for the outings programs and only a quarter for the conservation program.” In the seventies, the reciprocal was true. In order to meet the needs of its new members, and also to avoid the co-option of its strategies, the Club went through a drastic change in its stated mission. Having traditionally been concerned with the protection of the wilderness, the focus of the modern environmental movement did not necessarily fit with the Club’s purpose. However, the Board of Directors made the decision to commit the Club to the newly defined environmental agenda. They drafted an “Environmental Bill of Rights”, tackling issues of air and water pollution, as well as energy conservation. The Sierra Club had evolved. That evolution had to bring additions to their organizational repertoire, which came in the form of litigation.
The Club’s first major legal battle was over the matter of Mineral King Valley. Mineral King, near the Sequoia National Park in California, was first targeted as a possible site for a ski resort in the late 1940s. At the time, the Club’s official position was a grudging acceptance of the ski resort proposal. When the Forest Service failed to find a viable suitor for the land, the issue was tabled. In the mid-sixties, however, famed filmmaker Walt Disney resurrected the Mineral King issue when he submitted a ski resort bid to the Forest Service. Having heard rumors of Disney’s plan, Sierra Club members began scouting the area and collecting environmental information on the valley. Before long, word got out that Disney was planning not just a ski resort, but a massive ski resort with “restaurants, swimming pools, a horse corral, a golf course, and tennis courts”, and enough lifts to handle 20,000 skiers. Knowing that the massive project would undeniably destroy Mineral King, the Sierra Club was moved into action. The Club hoped that the Forest Service would put a stop to the plans by denying the Walt Disney Company permission to build a road through the wilderness of Mineral King due to existing environmental protections. However, the road was eventually approved. Mike McCloskey, a new leader in the Club and a lawyer, envisioned the radical measure of legal action to stop the ski resort. The lawsuit would attack the resort on three different levels. First, the Forest Service planned to circumvent the number of acres it was legally allowed to lend to Disney by using procedural loopholes which clearly flew in the face of the law’s intentions. Secondly, the proposed road at Mineral King would be used for services not allowable under Park Service regulations. Lastly, while Mineral King was not a national park or monument, it was a national game refuge, and McCloskey believed that constructing such a large and intrusive project in the game refuge was illegal. In 1969, when it seemed that Disney had surpassed all procedural roadblocks to the project, the Sierra Club’s lawyers filed suit in United States District Court, asking for an injunction. The injunction was necessary, said the Club, because otherwise “irreparable” damage would occur as soon as Disney started building. The injunction was granted, but then overturned by the Court of Appeals based on insufficient standing. In law, “standing” is the stake the party has in the issue. More specifically, the party must show that it would incur some sort of injury if the court were to rule against them. The Club maintained that since its stated purpose was the protection and preservation of the mountains, wilderness, and nature of the West, it should be given standing as “a representative of the public.” The Court of Appeals disagreed, as did the Supreme Court when it heard the case in 1972.
It was not the end of the road, however. Although the 4-3 decision ruled against the Sierra Club, in actuality the decision was very promising. The Supreme Court had declined granting the Club standing because the Club’s claims were too broad. As the Department of the Interior (the case’s defendant) argued, allowing the Sierra Club standing in the case would set the precedent of allowing “anyone who asserts an interest in a controversy to have standing.” However, the Court made it clear that the Club should try again by amending the suit to include specific harms to the organization itself, and not simply attempt to portray the Club as the guardian of cause. The case, Sierra Club v. Morton, also received a very interesting dissent from Justice William Douglas, who argued that “environmental objects [should have the right to] sue for their own preservation,” essentially declaring that the Mineral King itself should be allowed standing (obviously it would be litigated for by a third party, i.e. the Sierra Club). After receiving the Court’s decision, the Club amended their suit as recommended by Court, detailing how the Club’s interests in Mineral King would be damaged by the Disney resort. Re-filed in District Court, an injunction was again placed on construction of the ski resort, and finally in 1978, even though the case was technically unresolved, there was closure. That year, Congress added Mineral King to the boundaries of Sequoia National Park, completely ending the possibility of a ski resort, and preserving the pristine nature of Mineral King. The Mineral King lawsuit was a novel strategy, one that had almost no precedent and ended up as a “massive victory” for environmentalists. The decision to add litigation to the Club’s organizational repertoire could very well stem from the success of civil rights litigation in the 1950s, a theory which would reinforce Clemens’ claim that “familiar organizational forms deployed in unfamiliar ways” can be an effective way to enact social change. Sierra Club v. Morton “redefined the Sierra Club’s identity,” and “cast it as a major environmental law player” for the future. During the Mineral King campaign, another important development took place: the formation of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. This group was a separate legal entity from the Sierra Club itself, although they were closely associated. The Mineral King process had alerted the Club that environmental issues could go before the courts and that it was important to be ready for such occasions. According to one of the founders of the Defense Fund, the idea to create an independent organization to deal with legal issues was inspired by “the NAACP, Inc. Fund”, a similar organization to the proposed Defense Fund. This “borrowing” of organizational repertoire again supports Clemens’ thesis. The independent Defense Fund was created out of financial considerations (tax status), but also because of the ongoing internal debate about the role of the Club. Older members still were hesitant to change the role of the Club in such an explicitly political direction. The independent organization, therefore, would be free of the constraints of the somewhat conservative Board of Directors. This continued a long history of internal maneuverings due to conflicts of ideologies. The Defense Fund would eventually change its name to “EarthJustice” in 1997, although it still litigates extensively for the Sierra Club.
The Sierra Club of the late 19th century is very different from the Club of today. The group was founded to protect national parks and to encourage the enjoyment of nature. Today, it is a major player in Washington, having branched out nationally and spread its influence across the country. John Muir founded the Sierra Club to protect and preserve nature’s beauty, and although he would have been hard pressed to foresee the Club’s current form, it is safe to say he would have supported their switch to a more confrontational, rather than deferential, style when dealing with the government. Muir had fought hard and lost the battle for Hetch Hetchy in pursuing that political activist philosophy. The longevity and relevance of Muir’s Club is impressive. To see how the Club has been able to stay viable for so long, we have applied Clemens’ theory of organizational repertoire. The Club started its environmental repertoire with a deferential advisee relationship to the federal environmental agencies, which relied on insider and personal connections to enact social change. Before long, they took a more active stance, presenting witnesses in front of Congress and managing public opinion using various forms of media. Finally, the Club started utilizing litigation as an instrument to achieve its policy goals. Litigation is now one of the Sierra Club’s most relied-on avenues. Many of the Club’s strategies were adapted based on the cultural norms of the times, or else appropriated from another organization’s repertoire. Throughout this evolution, there was dissent in the Club, from more conservative factions who disapproved of political involvement. This internal strife was good, however. It kept the Club from become vapid and succumbing to the “iron law of oligarchy.” The Sierra Club has held sway over environmental issues for more than a century, and figures to maintain its influence in the future by consistently adapting its organizational repertoire.
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