This paper will demonstrate that McMahon and the British government clearly did not grant Palestine to be part of the Arab state.

When McMahon identified the borders and exclusions from what was to become an Arab state, it is evident that the controversy arose from his use of the word ‘district’ or ‘wilayahs.’  In McMahon’s second letter, he states, “The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus…....cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.”3  A closer look at the Ottoman map shows that all areas west of Damascus, Horns, and Hama are divided into other districts4 and thus should not be included, as McMahon had intended.  The Arabs argue that the districts of Damascus should include Palestine- yet that is not vaild.  Toynbee contends that McMahon’s ‘wilayahs’ meant the Ottoman ‘vilayet of Damascus’- which doesn’t include Palestine.5  Yet if McMahon’s use of the term ‘wilayahs’ means ‘environs’ as the Arabs believe, it still excludes Palestine6. Therefore, the basis for the Arab and Hussein’s argument that Palestine was included in McMahon is unfounded.  

In order to understand why both the British and Arabs failed to mention Palestine in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, one must look at the Palestinian state as well.  Palestine had a significant Jewish population making it a not completely an Arab state.  McMahon indirectly mentions that all regions without a vast majority of Arab citizens, should be excluded from the Arab state.7 Thus the Arab’s should have deduced that since Palestine was not completely Arab, it should have consequently been excluded.  In addition, Smith argues that Hussein himself excludes Palestine because it is not purely an Arab state- a prerequisite to becoming part of the Arab state.8   In this context, there is supplementary support to British belief that the region of Palestine was not to be included in the new Arab state.  

The debate concerning what the border of the new Arab state would occupy, seemed to be a secondary issue in the correspondence.  Initially, McMahon dismissed the idea of talking about borders while the First World War was still proceding.9  This seemed to be a valid reasoning since at that time many areas in question were still under Turkish control.  Yet, through the insistence of Hussein, general borders were discussed and McMahon never precisely defined what the entire area would be.  As well, McMahon had no option but to be very vague on the specific areas because  France, an ally, also had control and a sphere of influence in that region.10 This ensured that the British did not promise the Arabs any land that they were unable to give.  Friedman comments that the particular area that the French did control was ‘Sanjak of Jerusalem’-to which Palestine was a part of.11 Henceforth, the British could not have promised Palestine and this area thus should have been understood to be excluded in the formation of the Arab state.

In the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, it seems that Hussein is more concerned with the Arab independence rather than particulars on borders.  Hussein’s only desire was that the boundaries of the Arab state lie in the Arab sphere of influence.  Friedman claims that to the Arabs, the most vital areas were Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus, not Palestine.12   In the correspondence, Hussein makes a point of specifying that when the Arab state is formed, internal affairs will not have any outside influence, especially British.13 Thus proving that he was more concerned with a free independent state.  In Hussein’s initial letter to McMahon, he starts by proclaiming that it is the Arab time to unite and accomplish their own freedom.  Under the guidance and aid of the British state, an Arab state will be formed for the benefit of the people.  His own desire to be the ruler is evident in his second letter where he states that, “…I am myself with all my might carrying out things in my country all things in conformity with Islamic Law, all things which tend to benefit the rest if the kingdom and I shall continue to do so until it pleases God to order otherwise.”12  Hussein’s demands for money, goods, and arms in exchange for his agreement to lead the rebellion, clearly confirms that he had an ulterior, more personal agenda.  Thus proving that Hussein used the British to gain power and become the leader of the independent Arab state and neglected to completely specify all boundaries of the proposed state.

Hussein made a grave error in not specifying exactly what the proposed borders were to be for the independent Arab state.  However, it is critical to realize that the correspondence was just that- a correspondence.  McMahon and the British government did not clearly promise anything to the Arabs.  The McMahon-Hussein letters were not legally binding agreements- merely informal agreements.  The British involvement was limited to adhering to Arab request for weapons and money.  In addition, the only promise the British gave the Arabs was the guarantee of protection of the Arab Holy lands.13  It is unmistakably evident that McMahon stated that the British will ‘agree to’ or ‘exclude’ certain area’s that may be a part of the Arab state and did not use, for example, ‘guarantee’ or ‘promise.’  The correspondence essentially asks the British government for support and acceptance of selected proposed areas into the Arab state; Only if the proposed areas would be acceptable to the British state.  The correspondence does not specifically address or grant any particular areas to the Arab state, the Arabs just ask for cooperation.

In conclusion, the evidence presented in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence unmistakably supports the British claim of Palestine’s exclusion in the Arab state.  The mere fact that Hussein does not specifically mention Palestine in the correspondence confirms that it was of little significance to him.  In addition, the term used, ‘districts’ or ‘wilayahs,’ is misinterpreted by the Arabs during the correspondence to have ulterior meaning from what McMahon had intended.  However, interpreting the term, using the two meanings of the word, result in them both excluding Palestine.  The McMahon-Hussein correspondence was not a legally binding agreement, but an understanding and cooperation between two nations.  Furthermore, McMahon indirectly stated that non-exclusive Arab states were not to be a part of the Arab state, yet Palestine itself was not exclusively an Arab state and thus should have be interpreted as excluded.  Finally, the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, without any doubt, did not grant or promise Palestine to be part of the Arab independent state.

Notes

1. J.N. Moore, ed,. The Arab-Isreali Conflict: III,  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 71.
2. Moore, 74
3. Moore, 73.
4. Moore, 79.
5. Arnold Toynbee,  “The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence: Comments and A Reply”, Journal of Contemporary History Vol,5. No.4 (1970), 103
6. Toynbee, 103.
7. Moore, 73
8. Charles D. Smith, “The Invention of A Tradition: The Question of Zionist Right to Palestine During World War I,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol.22. No.6 (1993) 106.
9. Moore, 71.
10. Moore, 75.
11. Isaiah Friedman, “The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the Question of Palestine,” Journal of Contemporary History Vol, 5. No.2 (1970), 93.
12. Friedman, 82.
13. Moore, 73.
14. Friedman, 98.

Bibliography

1. Friedman, I., “The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the Question of Palestine,” Journal of Contemporary History Vol, 5. No.2 (1970).

2. Moore, J.N., ed., The Arab-Israeli Conflict: III,  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

3. Smith, C.D., “The Invention of A Tradition: The Question of Zionist Right to Palestine During World War I,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol.22. No.6 (1993)

4.  Toynbee, A., “The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence: Comments and A Reply”, Journal of Contemporary History Vol, 5. No.4 (1970).