To what extent was popular pressure an important factor indetermining the progress of the campaign for parliamentary reform in the period1780-1885?

In the summer of 1866, a major demonstration took place, in conjunction with protests took place in major towns such as Bristol and Birmingham, and there was violence in Hyde Park during July. The Sheffield Out rages in late 1866 and 1867 saw groups of workers, try to blow up a house of a fellow worker who failed to support their cause. Increasing economic distress, symbolised by high interest rates, meat prices and unemployment brought another hunger of politics to the people. Again forwarding the opinion onto ministers that a measure of reform must be taken to prevent the ever present upheaval and even revolution. The Reform Union and Reform League were set up in 1864 and 1865 respectively to press for franchise changes; the latter in particular had prominent financial backing from many middle class supporters making it worthy body within Parliament. Through this extra parliamentary pressure, the predominant mood of the working class was clear enough, even if the Reform League provided the organisation, combined with the other reasons mentioned, reasons for reform to instigate the passing of a Reform Bill in 1867.

Popular pressure alone however did not determine the progress of the campaign for reform and only in conjunction with other elements was successful Reform. A great amount of popular pressure was not guaranteed to bring about a surge forward for the reformist movement. Pressure-pre1832 brought about no progress as there was an absence of the other elements that were essential if the campaign was to progress. Similarly the Chartist movements in 1838, 1842 and 1848 which incorporated some of the most ruthless working class demonstrations of the entire period, was distinctly unsuccessful. Despite the serious violence of the Newport rising 1839 and riots in Preston and Manchester, the parliament did not appear for one moment to consider reform again due to the absence of other factors.

Such other elements included the fear of revolution felt by the governing elite, and just how impending social upheaval appeared to be. Although popular pressure served to justify these fears and further disseminate them, it would not necessarily create the atmosphere in which an extent of reform was deemed wise. For example in the 1790’s and the late 1810’s, Parliament did not perceive the threat of revolution to be especially overpowering and could easily be dampened by legislation. As the reform got underway many feared the explosion of the middle class anger if their hopes and demands were not met. A similar fear was present in 1867 when an expansion of skilled trades such as engineering and modern shipbuilding facilitated a rapidly expanded working class that could combine with existing reformists to form a powerful group for the government to contend with if reform was not enacted in the near future. Enfranchising the working class would bind them more closely to the middle class, promoting class harmony and thus weakening the threat of more revolutionary realignment. Removing this notability and propriety by initiating exclusive reform would weaken the threat of the far left, thus preventing the build up of potentially revolutionary unrest. Importantly, when more respectable classes expressed a strong desire for reform, the threat of total upheaval was perceived to be of greater imminence and in need of redress; more than any physical realisation of popular pressure would induce otherwise.

Linked with this theme is the notion of reforming to conserve the social and political status quo. No architect of any reform acts was suggesting by its implementation that the ruling classes should cease to rule. McCauley set the tone in 1831 when he advocates his ‘reform that you may preserve’ and this became a significant factor throughout the period. The Whigs passed their reform act in 1832 so as to satisfy the reforming sentiment and consequently prevent any further changes that may disrupt the current political make up. It is of note that a feeling of easiness amongst the ruling elite preceded each enactment of reform.

The possibility of securing political advantage was also a key factor that determined the progress of reform. When a political party had been in office for a long period of time, carefully designed reform and redistribution offered a means to redress the balance in their favour. For Derby and Disraeli in 1867, if their minority Conservative administration were to succeed in the highly contraversal legislation which had tripped up the more ‘liberal’, it would be a huge boost to their party’s play for power and waning morale. The 1885 Re-distribution act presented an opportunity for the Whigs to impose a firmer majority and their 1884 franchise act encouraged working men in the countries who might bolster their support. Reform was a platform from which political advantage could be secured, a man is most likely to support the party which gave him the vote.

Although the campaign for parliamentary reform could not progress without other dependant factors, popular pressure served to speed up such advancement. It underlined the fear of revolution and provided the much needed justification to many politicians for the need for reform. Popular pressure itself was not always entirely genuine as there are similarities between popular pressure and economic depression. Popular pressure frequently however created little visible results whatsoever and in the early period sent the campaign into turmoil. It must be remembered that reform was not a response to panic. Reform was carefully planned so that its elite architects benefited just as much, if not more so then those that it appeared to benefit.