This dilemma is in contrast to the parliamentary system where a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister will lead to a definite change in government policy, and thus keep the people appeased. Therefore, in terms of stability it seems the flexibility of the parliamentary system actually makes it more conducive to a stable society. Despite this, the parliamentary approach to government should not be seen as perfect for maintaining stability. Whilst the flexibility of parliamentary government does allow for change to be made and thus stability to be maintained, the concept of a no confidence vote also can lead to instability as it harms the likelihood of continuous policy being implemented. However despite this weakness, the ability of parliamentary government to adapt more freely to the changing political environment makes it an approach that is more stable than the presidential approach. This stability is reinforced further by Cheibub & Limongi (2002, p.151) who reveal that “between 1946 and 1999, one in every 23 presidential regimes died, whereas only one in every 58 parliamentary regimes died”. Therefore as these statistics show, the flexibility of the parliamentary approach clearly makes it more conducive to stability. Therefore in the set of circumstances where a state is seeking stability, a parliamentary form of government is more appropriate than the presidential form.
The issue of fixed-terms and rigidity that occurs in the presidential system is one that also leads to further problems in another key area of government. This issue is the extent to which all of society can be deemed directly represented in the system. This is crucial to assess in any approach which claims to be democratic. Firstly in order for the majority of people to be represented there is a necessity that a multiparty system that consists of more than two parties exists. I believe that this is the only way to accommodate for the plurality of attitudes that exist in modern society due to the fact that a two party system only ever offers one alternative to those who are in power. One of the key reasons that the presidential approach fails to be truly democratic is that it is generally incompatible with a multiparty system. The clearest example of this is in Brazil where the multiparty presidential system led to a situation where President Lula Da Silva’s party held just 16% of the seats (Raile, Pereira & Power, 2006, p.7). This is clearly a system where the government is going to be ineffective as the President is going to be at disagreement with the majority of the legislature. Mainwaring (1993, p.198) also addressed this issue by arguing “the combination of a multiparty system and presidentialism is especially inimical to democracy”. Therefore the failure of the presidential approach to accommodate for a multiparty system means that in the circumstances where a state desires increased input from its population, the parliamentary approach is more appropriate.
On the other hand Mainwaring (1993, p.223) has argued multipartism is less problematic in parliamentary regime since this approach has “more coalition-building mechanisms that facilitate multiparty democracy”. However, it should be noted that the multiparty system which is common in parliamentary government carries the risk of smaller parties attempting to use the warning of leaving an alliance to further their agendas and thus wielding disproportionate power. This flaw is one that is reinforced by Lijphart (1977, p.114) who argues that such weaknesses can lead to instability as was shown in the French Fourth Republic where the average Cabinet lasted only seven months before being dissolved. Despite this weakness, the fact that smaller parties can even have a say in politics makes the parliamentary approach more democratic as it ensure more views are represented. In a state which encompasses many ethnicities or linguistic groups the parliamentary approach is successful in ensuring no one group dictates the agenda. Therefore in the circumstances where a state wants to ensure that to a large extent people are represented, parliamentary government is a more appropriate approach than the presidential form of government.
Another issue linked to representativeness is accountability. This is an important concept particularly in states with a history of corruption or bad policy making because it allows the people to allocate blame to an individual or party for policy failures. Whilst Shugart & Carey (1992, pp.44–46) have stressed that presidential systems hold the advantages of accountability and transparency which is deficient in parliamentary systems, this judgment is not wholly true. Rather than being completely transparent, in the presidential system the separation of powers instead makes individuals in the system less accountable. As Linz (Bara and Pennington, 2009, p.137) asserts “accountability becomes blurred as both institutions claim credit for policy successes and offload the blame for policy failures”. Therefore whilst the checks and balances that are prominent in the presidential form of government ensure that the President is accountable to the legislature and vice versa, it crucially does not make the system as a whole accountable to the public as it is not clear who is control of what decisions. This is in contrast to the parliamentary system where it is clear who is in power and similarly because the executive proposes policies, it is clear which policy belongs to which party. Moreover, Shugart & Carey (ibid) fail to accommodate for that fact that the parliamentary system can still have the checks and balances which are attributed to the presidential system in the form of an upper house and shadow Cabinet. Therefore in the circumstances where a state wants increased accountability to the public, the parliamentary system is one that is clearly more appropriate.
The constant checking in the presidential system is an issue which is relevant to another important set of political circumstances, that is, the need for fast and effective decisions. This is an issue which may be prominent for states in times of crisis when decisive policy needs to be implemented. However, it is another issue in which the presidential system once again fails to be appropriate. Bara and Pennington (2009, p.137) have correctly distinguished how “divided legitimacy in presidential systems…can paralyse decision-making, offering no democratic basis on which to resolve conflict”. It has been argued by Moe and Caldwell (1994, p.177) that such a division of legitimacy ensures that the dangers that arise from the existence of a majority party are avoided. However, this is an issue which can simply be rectified in the parliamentary system with the existence of an upper house. Moreover the existence of individual legislators and thus lack of co-operative politics in the presidential system make the presidential system highly decentralised. This has led Cheibub and Limongi (2002, p.152) to assert that “presidential regimes…are characterized by weak political parties and frequent stalemates between the President and Congress”. Therefore the presidential system is clearly not appropriate in circumstances where quick policy needs to be implemented.
On the other hand, the benefits of the parliamentary system in accommodating for fast and effective policy implementation are clear. If a party has the mandate granted to them by the public to act, then to a large extent, as long as MPs vote along party lines then policies can be rapidly introduced. This is particularly important in times of crisis where the deliberation and increased debate that occurs in the presidential system is bypassed in favour of the enforcement of policy. Therefore this can help to address short term issues that may arise. In an attempt to counter the issue of deadlock in the presidential approach it has been argued by Cheibub and Limongi (2002, p.156) that whilst “one in every 26 presidential democracies dies when there is deadlock” there is little difference in the parliamentary system where “one in every 31 dies when there is deadlock”. However this argument is misplaced because it fails to acknowledge the increased frequency in the presidential approach within which a government faces deadlock due to the separation of powers that exists. This is contrary to the parliamentary approach where deadlock is more likely to be avoided. This is a point raised by Linz (1990, p.68) who argues that the relative ease with which a vote of no confidence can be implemented in the parliamentary system ensures deadlock is encountered far less than in the presidential approach to government. Therefore, in the set of circumstances where a state needs fast and effective implementation of new policies, the parliamentary approach to government is clearly more appropriate.
As this essay has shown through the analysis of a number of circumstances, the parliamentary approach to government is significantly more appropriate than the presidential approach. In terms of stability, the flexibility of the parliamentary approach ensures it can adapt to the changing political environment and thus remain table. In terms of representativeness, the close relationship between the parliamentary system and the existence of multiple parties ensures that all voices in society are heard. In terms of accountability, the increased political clarity which arises from the executive being drawn from the legislature in the parliamentary system make it superior. Similarly in the case of fast and effective implementation of policy the ability of the parliamentary system to avoid deadlock makes it more appropriate. Whilst it may seem that to undermine the presidential form of government is to disregard states such as America as a successful political actor, in reality it shows that the political system in which states operate is only one of many factors which can influence a states success. However in the case of choosing between the parliamentary and presidential forms of government, this essay has shown that the overwhelming strengths of the parliamentary approach and weaknesses of the presidential system make the parliamentary system a more appropriate form of government.
Bilbiography
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