the former republics and certainly end the rapprochement between East
and West. Therefore, Russian integration into global institutions is
not only vital to continue the economic and social reforms, it also
stabilises the Russian polity. As Wallander points out: institutions
can play a powerful role in domestic power struggles; defining
interests themselves by supporting the policy positions of
individuals or groups within governments. (Wallander:p.61)
To sum up briefly: the Russian leadership is aware that
military power alone is no guarantee of Great Power status. To
prevent Russia from being marginalised and to push it towards the
centre of global developments, economic reforms are necessary. For
these reforms to succeed massive investment and technical expertise
is needed from the industrialised West and the financial institutions
controlled by the G7 nations. The main aim of Yeltsin (and most of
his government) is to link Russia with the West by way of the
'four D's': "democratisation, de-globalisation, de-ideologisation and
de-militarisation." (Timmerman:p.175)
THE CIS: INDEPENDENCE IN A NEW WORLD ORDER
To some of the former republics of the USSR, the collapse of the
Union came as a relief, to others a dis-orientating shock. The
western republic's such as the Ukraine and the Baltic states, are set
firmly on the path towards European integration, the long-term goal
being membership of the European Community. In addition to the
dispute between Russia and the Ukraine over the Black Sea fleet, Kiev
feels its relations with the Central Asian republics is more a burden
than anything else, and that its continuing association with the CIS
may well tie it to Asia forever. Therefore, the Ukraine, and perhaps
Belorussia as well, will move firmly towards Europe and away from the
CIS, following many of the policies being pursued by Russia:
integration into the global economy, plus financial and technical
assistance to move towards a market economy and a civil society.
The much less developed Central Asian republics are turning
towards their religious and ethnic cousins in the Turkic and Islamic
worlds. Turkey in particular is interested in a strong presence in
this area and devotes much diplomatic energy in pursuing the former
Soviet republics in an attempt to prise them away from Russia . In
June 1992, it held a conference proposing a Black Sea zone of
economic co-operation which included delegations from Armenia and
Azerbaijan, who managed to bury the hatchet for a while. In addition,
multinational oil companies are being attracted to the area to supply
much needed investment and funds needed to build up state structures
in these semi- traditional societies. However, it must be recognised
that for virtually all the former republics, the questions of
internal economic and civil order, as well as the relations with one
another, either collectively or bilaterally, are more important than
foreign policy in the world outside of the CIS. These internal
problems must be solved before they can move, or operate, on the
world stage. In this respect, we will now examine the relations
between the CIS members: concentrating on the most pressing problems
facing this group of states; security, nationalism, and ethnicity.
THE INTERNAL FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY ISSUES OF THE CIS
After the treaty of Brest, concluded between the three Slavic states
on 8 December 1991, the successor states of the USSR started to treat
one another as foreign countries. Russia had no qualms in regarding
itself as the legitimate successor to the Soviet Union and immediately
claimed the USSR's seat on the UN Security Council, and acquired all
Soviet embassies, the Central Bank, plus Soviet gold reserves in the
process. However, the issue which initially caused alarm among the
successor states, and which has yet to be satisfactorily resolved,
was the tendency to treat the common strategic armed forces as 'de
facto' Russian armed forces. Since 80% of the officers are Russian,
and given the extent of possible inter-ethnic disputes, many of the
former republics regard the United Armed Forces to be a potential
Russian interventionist force. Hence the drive towards formalising
the division of the armed forces and the setting-up of national
guards. The recent settlement, giving the Russian Federation 50% of
Soviet weaponry with the rest being divided among the other CIS
states proportionate to their influence, did not include the Black
Sea Fleet or nuclear weapons. The persistent haggling between
Ukraine and Russia over control of the powerful Black Sea fleet has
emphasised the strategic importance of the Crimea and contributed to
the deterioration in relations betweeen the two strongest states in
the CIS.
However, it is the control and destruction of strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons which remains of vital importance: not only
to Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan; who all have strategic
nuclear missiles on their soil; but to the West as well. In order to
fulfil bilateral international commitments, and prevent the
proliferation of potential nuclear powers, Russia is patiently trying
to regain control of all its nuclear weapons but is hindered in this
policy by the distrust of Kazakhstan and the Ukraine. These states
regard nuclear weapons as useful bargaining levers and an effective
deterrent against Russia, which has potential territorial claims
against both Ukraine and Kazakhstan, whose territories together
contain over sixteen million ethnic Russians living in areas
adjacent to the Russian Republic. In this respect Russia believes it
has legitimate security interests in protecting its foreign nationals
and in preventing instability that might bring massive
waves of refugees flooding over its borders. The Russian military
also justifies its presence in nominally independent states by
pointing to its perceived vital national interests: in protecting and
securing strategic military bases, such as the Skrunda radar site in
Latvia. And in denying outside powers access to previously secure
border regions which might threaten Russia itself.
Therefore, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has led to the
proliferation of nuclear control; the division of powerful armed
forces into national units; and dozens of potential ethnic
flashpoints. Russia, the only state in the entire region with the
ability to solve disputes and enforce solutions, teeters on the brink
of social and economic collapse; and is suspected by many of the
successor states of harbouring imperialist ambitions.
PROBLEMS OF NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY
One of the most serious and difficult questions confronting Russians
today is not how they will survive economic reform but rather whether
they can accept the independence of the other successor states as
legitimate. Because of the expansionist nature of both the czarist
and communist state, its national consciousness has been centred on
the empire and not on the Russian nation. " The Russians have never
before been forced to define precisely who is a Russian and what the
proper limits of Russian territory should be." (Goble:p.81) This
attitude permeates all levels of Russian society and was aptly summed
up by Galina Sidorava, an advisor to foreign secretary Kozyrev, when
he remarked: " There is a psychological barrier preventing us from
treating other CIS members as absolutely independent."
(Timmerman:p.167) The loss of empire and superpower status is felt
keenly by powerful sections of the old nomenklatura and soviet
military heirarchy, who, given propitious circumstances, would
attempt to re-establish Russian military hegemony over the old
empire. However, many of the former republics rejoice openly at the
release of long suppressed patriotic feelings, resulting in
nationalist outbursts and assertive behaviour. While not dismissing
the relevance, or importance, of national and ethnic strife in areas
with no direct Russian interest; such as the disputed territory of
Nagorno-Karabakh involving Armenia and Azerbaijan; it is the
treatment of ethnic Russian minorities and the strength of 'Great
Russian Chauvinism' which is the final arbiter in the future
stability and security of the CIS area.
Altogether, some 26m Russians live 'abroad' in other ex-Soviet
republics: a body of people used to being the privilged majority in a
multi-ethnic empire. The relatively greater importance of nationality
over citizenship in Soviet times convinces many of these Russians now
living abroad that they in fact remain citizens of the USSR. Over
half of the 26m Russians live in the Ukraine, where discrimination so
far has not been a problem. However, in the Baltic states huge Russian
minorities are being progressively disenfranchised. In Central Asia,
with a combined Russian population of over 10m, fear of resurgent
Islam and civil war is causing a stampede from the region. In Georgia
and Moldava fighting is continuing involving secessionist movements
and Russian minorities. In addition, the Russian parliament is
questioning the legality of the transfer of the Crimea, where
Russians form the clear majority, to Ukranian jurisdiction in 1954;
and has called on Ukraine's parliament to do the same. Leonid
Kravchuk has denounced what he sees as 'Russia's imperialist disease'
and refused to discuss the matter. "Borders are increasingly seen as
artificial, leading many to conclude that repression, aggression, or
migration will eventually be the only option." (Goble:p.83)
As such tensions increase, they loom larger in Russia's
domestic politics. No government, especially the faction ridden
elites of Moscow, could be indifferent to the problems of so many of
its people abroad. An increasing number of nationalist-minded
Russians argue that the Russian government must make itself
responsible for all Russians, wherever they live in the former USSR.
Among these is Russia's vice-president, Alexander Rutskoi. In a
television interview in 1992 he gave warning that: "Any state must be
aware of the inevitability of punishment for what is perpetrated
against Russian citizens." (Economist:21-7-92,p.42) Many powerful
figures in the Russian military support these views and have already
actively intervened in Georgia and Moldava. A policy of imposing
spheres of influence, through military means, is being actively
pursued. In the Baltic republics, the military wishes to protect
ethnic Russians; in the Trans-Caucasian republics it claims to
protect strategic bases on the Black Sea, while in Central Asia it is
supposedly fighting Islamic fundamentalism. All of these measures are
rationalised by the presence of Russian minorities and forcing the
government on to the defensive, thus jeopardising the reforms and
increasing the chances of a return to authoritarian rule. Territorial
claims by Russia have already prompted Ukraine and Kazakhstan to hang
on to their nuclear weapons. An increase in Russian chauvinism, in
protecting its minorities, or a pronounced swing to the right in
Moscow; could drive the new states to seek weapons systems or outside
powers for allies, thus exacerbating an already precarious situation.
Alternatively, the substantial non-Russian minority within the the
Russian federation (a fifth of the population) could be encouraged to
rebel in defence of their ethnic cousins.
Therefore, it can clearly be seen that an aggressive Russian
policy toward the new states will encourage them to militarise, to
seek control over nuclear weapons, and to acquire outside allies,
thus undermining Russis's own security. The foreign policy makers of
the successor states must realise that it is in their own interests
to acommodate certain Russian interests and check any movement
towards aggressive nationalism in their own states. " To recognise
that Russians see themselves as having 'lost' while others have
gained, and that this sense of loss will inevitably lead to
rhetorical excesses that, given a responsible policy by others, will
not lead to action." (Goble:p.85) To acknowledge that Russia remains
the overwhelming power in the region, and has legitimate geopolitical
concerns in many areas, will strengthen the hand of Moscows reform-
minded liberals in these very difficult times and lead to a positive
increase in security for all states.
CONCLUSIONS
At the moment, the situation in the CIS and Russia remains in a state
of flux and transition; events rather than deliberate policy continue
to predominate. In many ways foreign relations and security issues
are governed by domestic necessity and shifting political alignments,
which rapidly change and prompt frequent shifts in policy direction
and a consequent reassessment of security strategy. However, since
1985, and the introduction of Gorbachev's 'new thinking', there has
been a consistent foreign policy goal which has gradually
subordinated all other considerations to its attainment: the
integration into the community of civilised states in order to effect
systemic change and regenerate the power of the USSR/CIS. Under the
government of Boris Yeltsin this tendency has become ever more
pronounced. Its continuing success will determine whether Yeltsin, or
other reforming liberals within the context of Russian politics, will
be able to solve the military, territorial and ethnic problems left
over from the demise of the Soviet Union, peaceably. Russia is by
far the most important and powerful state within the CIS; for many
years to come all other states will have to shape their foreign
policy and security considerations according to this reality.
If Russia continues to receive adequate amounts of aid from the
Western institutions, liberal reforms will continue: the nationalist
hard-liners will be slowly isolated and their power bases eroded. The
settlement of border disputes and the protection of Russian
minorities can be achieved through the provisions of the CSCE and the
auspices of the UN. The reduction of tension in the area would allow
Russia and the other successor states to further concentrate on
domestic reforms; bilateral treaties; and a new community organised
in accordance with regional conditions. A community and bilateral
treaty network based on co-operation not coercion. Therefore, we must
conclude that the paramount issue in foreign policy and security
confronting Russia and the CIS is continued integration into the
'civilised community of nations' as the best means of peaceably solving
national disputes, ethnic strife, and arresting economic decline.
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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 1992 VOL 41
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