Some terrorists seek to acquire radiological materials for use in a radiological dispersal device, also known as a “dirty bomb”. Many people question why such weapons are used in the same category as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, for:
“even the most dangerous radiological materials (cobalt-60 or cesium-137) would likely be limited to dozens of deaths and hundreds of injured if a sufficient amount of material were acquired and dispersed.” (US Department of State Website)
Nevertheless, terrorists could potentially chose to use radiological material as a weapon, particularly over nuclear weapons, as it is significantly easier to procure. Radioactive materials can be readily available in industry, for instance it can be used in devices such as X-ray machines and well-logging devices, which is likely to make them appealing to terrorists as the materials needed to produce them are easy to find.
Nuclear weapons are the final ones left in the discussion of CBRN weapons. They are the only weapons which, if detonated correctly, are guaranteed to cause severe destruction and chaos, as seen through their use in World War Two in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The former city was the most affected by the nuclear bomb, where “140,000 people who were in the city that morning died, some in an agonising instant, others many months later” (McCurry 2009). Even though the weapons cause such horrifying levels of devastation, the general assumption is that nuclear weapons are simply too difficult to be made by terrorists due to the expense and the technology required. Nevertheless, Zimmerman and Lewis are among a number of scholars who believe that large terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda, are capable of creating such a weapon:
“With enriched uranium, a handful of military supplies available on the Internet, and a small team of terrorists, [Osama bin Laden] could assemble a nuclear bomb in a matter of months” (Zimmerman & Lewis 2006: 33).
This essay will continue with a discussion of how likely terrorists are to use the weapons discussed above. It is difficult to group each weapon together under one heading because each has its own advantages and disadvantages. Nuclear weapons, for example, are difficult to make but are almost guaranteed to cause severe destruction, whereas radiological weapons are far easier and cheaper to assemble and deploy but are unlikely to yield the same results. Nevertheless, where possible, the discussion shall continue by looking at CBRN weapons as a whole bracket, rather than each different faction separately. Scholars have for a number of years come up with a number of reasons to suggest that terrorists are likely to use CBRN weapons. This section shall thus proceed with a discussion of several of the main reasons provided in the literature of why we should assume that terrorists will go to such lengths to cause severe destruction and move away from conventional weapons. These theorists and their assumptions belong to what has been called the alarmist school (Falkenrath et al 1998: 27), and they believe that future terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction is a virtual certainty.
A strong argument which states that terrorists are likely to use CBRN weapons comes from al-Qaeda’s interest in them. Al-Qaeda is the largest and most prominent terrorist organisation in the world, which means their behaviour is likely to be indicative of terrorist groups in general. There are a number of examples of where members of al-Qaeda have sought to use weapons of mass destruction, with the most prominent example being Osama bin Laden’s purchase of weapons-grade uranium from a former Sudanese government minister for $1.5 million. However, the uranium turned out to be dud and thus bin Laden failed to assemble his nuclear bomb (Zimmerman and Lewis 2006: 33). And it is not only nuclear weapons which have been in the agenda of al-Qaeda. In 1998 during an interview with Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai, bin Laden was asked whether al Qaeda was in a position to develop chemical weapons. Bin Laden replied, “In answer, I would say that acquiring weapons for the defence of Muslims is a religious duty” (see Hoffman 2006: 276). Al-Qaeda actively sought to develop a variety of biological weaponry (ibid 276), and at least one al-Qaeda agent has been arrested for attempting to develop a “dirty bomb”, in the hope of spreading radioactive material throughout an American city (Weinberg 2005: 165). Thus, we see by looking closely at the workings of al-Qaeda, that terrorists have sought to cause mass destruction and invoke terror by attempting to use each of the CBRN weapons, and this can be taken as a reflection of terrorist groups in general.
Another argument that attempts to prove that terrorists using CBRN weapons is likely comes from Pluta and Zimmerman. They comment on how, since the early 90’s, the maximum violence in acts of international terrorism has steadily increased, from the bombing of the World Trade Centre in 1994 which left 220 dead, to the tragedy of September 11th 2001. Because of this they, along with many other analysts, conclude that a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction is likely to be “only a matter of time” (Pluta and Zimmerman 2006: 55).
In addition to this, the question has been posed several times about what would happen if a country which was already a nuclear power were to fall under the control of a terrorist regime (Weinberg 2008: 165). And the current political situation in Pakistan, with the Taliban taking over, is likely to make their use of the nuclear weapons more likely. A clear account of this is found in the Guardian:
“It is dangerously delusional to carry on pretending that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are perfectly safe when the custodian of those weapons, the president of Pakistan, is vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and when the country itself is on the brink of collapse” (Komireddi: Guardian Online)
Clearly, if a nuclear state is being governed by terrorist, especially when it is a potential risk to terrorist attacks itself, then the risk that the country will use its weapons is significantly higher.
What is important to note here is that terrorists using CBRN weapons do not always have to use them in order to cause large scale mass destruction. For example, the Anthrax attacks between October and November 2001 invoked the Attorney General John Askcroft to say, “When people send anthrax through the mail to hurt people and invoke terror, it is a terrorist act” (Weinberg 2008: 188). This makes the argument about the likelihood of terrorists using such weapons much stronger, for terrorists do not even need large amounts of the weapons in question to cause terror, which means that even small terrorist organisations or independent terrorists appealing for their lone cause, are likely to use them.
These arguments seem valid and appropriate, particularly considering the current worldwide political climate regarding issues, such as the taking over of Pakistan, by the Taliban, a self-proclaimed nuclear state. Nevertheless, there is another school of thought called the complacency school, from which scholars believe that CBRN weapons are not likely to be used by terrorists and instead believe that the alarmist school is comprised of over exaggerations (Falkenrath et al: 27). Scholars of this kind argue that authorities have significantly inflated the threat of terrorist using weapons of mass destruction to a hysterical level and are wasting huge amounts of resources (Spencer 2006: 19). This essay shall proceed with a discussion of a number of these arguments.
One of the key hypotheses in this debate is that terrorists lack the capabilities to make CBRN weapons. Richard Betts explains that, “some have tried to use weapons of mass destruction, only to see them fizzle” (Betts 1998: 29). Gregory Koblenz, talking specifically about biological weapons, explaining how, “to date, the very small number of terrorist groups that have had the motivation to use biological weapons on a large scale have been unable to develop the capability to do so” (Koblentz 2003: 103).
In addition to this, Weinberg explains how, “The barriers to terrorist organizations employing such weapons with the potential to kill thousands are technical rather than moral” (Weinberg 2005: 165). Essentially, terrorist groups are satisfied with the means they currently use in order to induce fear, and it is likely that the complications and expenses of creating CBRN weapons is too much for them to tackle. Al-Qaeda, for example, made use of three human bombs in the form of airplanes, which caused maximum destruction at a relatively low cost. Robin Frost suggests that terrorists, “probably see little reason to turn to unknown, possibly unpredictable and certainly dangerous tactics when the older tactics have proved themselves to be simple, reliable and cheap” (Frost 2005: 7)
Another argument against the likelihood of terrorists using CBRN weapons regards the fact that nuclear states are not, in fact, likely to provide terrorists with unconventional weapons as is offers them, “few tactical advantages” (Byman 2008: 169). Byman provides a contextual argument as to why terrorists are not to be sponsored by nuclear states, using Iran, one of the most active sponsors of terrorism, as his case study. He describes how Iran is unlikely to transfer chemical, biological or nuclear weapons to terrorist groups for several reasons. The first is that terrorist groups are able to operate effectively with existing methods and weapons. Secondly, he argues that Iran has become more cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years because Tehran is aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorist would incur U.S. wrath and international condemnation. His article argues that, although Iran has the capability to transfer chemical or biological weapons or agents to its proxies, it has not thus far and therefore is likely that it will not in the future (ibid: 179).
What we can gather from the analysis thus far is that there are clearly very strong arguments for and against the likelihood of terrorists using CBRN weapons. Nevertheless, assessing which of the two schools of thought is more likely needs a deeper look into a widely used concept within the scholarly literature on terrorism, regarding the concept of “new terrorism”. It is a concept used by many academics, referring to the new form of terrorism which is practiced in the world today. “New terrorism” advocates believe that that there are various inherent differences about terrorism in today’s society than in terrorism before the mid-90’s. These differences include a fanatical religious motivation, the excessive indiscriminate use of violence together with the possible use of WMD’s. In addition to this they are seen to have increasing independence from state sponsors, a new network structure and addition help from communications technology than the older terrorists had. They are seen to be more likely to come in the form of amateur terrorists who only come together in ad hoc groupings (Spencer 2006: 9-13). If one is to believe that “new terrorism” is a totally original phenomenon that has taken over entirely from “old terrorism”, then it would be fair and valid to conclude this essay with the idea that terrorists are thus likely to use CBRN weapons. However, the concept of “new terrorism” had been questioned by many scholars on the subject, who have come to believe it is an invalid term. The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines “new” as, “not existing before; made, introduced, or discovered recently or now for the first time” (New Oxford Dictionary of English 1998: 1247). However, this is clearly not the case with regards to terrorism. For example, “the willingness of ‘new terrorists’ to use more indiscriminate violence is more a continuation of an existing trend than an all-new phenomenon.” (Spencer 2006: 24). Essentially the point that is being made is that people cannot just assume that terrorists will use CBRN weapons due to the fact that “new terrorism” has supposedly taken over, because many of the trends underlying it can be identified in terrorism years ago. Therefore, those who use ‘new terrorism’ as a way to prove that CBRN weapons are on the increase are incorrect
Before this essay concludes, it is important to be aware of many of the limitations to the argument, and to the subject of terrorism in general. Firstly, terrorism as a term is extremely difficult to define and some authors such as Walter Laqueur even believe that “a comprehensive definition of terrorism…does not exist nor will it be found in the foreseeable future” (Spencer 2006: 2). Secondly, there have been so very few cases of terrorist using, or even attempting to use WMD’s that it makes predicting and finding patterns extremely difficult. Therefore, the question of whether weapons of mass destruction are likely to be used by terrorist is merely a matter of theoretical assumption and opinion.
In conclusion, there are clearly many arguments regarding whether or not terrorists are likely to use CBRN weapons, which all have high levels of validity. The problem with such predictions, however, is that terrorist action is very hard to second guess. It is likely that, if a scholar agrees with the concept of “new terrorism”, then they are likely to have a more pessimistic view on terrorists using unconventional weapons. This essay proclaims the term invalid, and therefore does not see the likelihood of unconventional attacks by terrorists as likely. Instead, it provides several reasons why terrorists potentially could use CBRN weapons, and a number of reasons why they potentially will not use such weapons, but it also admits that such attacks are near impossible to predict and therefore no valid assessment can be made as to how likely these attacks are. Only time will tell.
Word count: 3,000
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