Why is the Common Agricultural Policy so difficult to reform?

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Ross Lucas                           GV244 Essay 3

Why is the Common Agricultural Policy so difficult to reform?

The political stakes attached to CAP reform are high, with several groups having a vested interest in its future. The CAP was the first supranational policy of the EU, and some countries still hold a romantic attachment to rural culture, although now only 5% of the EU workforce is comprised of farmers, a figure which shrinks every year.  Yet this minority holds enough power to preserve CAP subsidies, against the interests of taxpayers and consumers.  There are several reasons for this, the predominant one being that “there is greater institutional presence and activity in the agricultural field than in any other” .  This applies to both the national and European level.  Indeed the size and organisation of the EU farm lobby is greater than any comparative group, with potential countervailing forces being much smaller and less organised than the farm lobby.  This essay will focus on three particular areas that make CAP difficult to reform; the susceptibility of national governments to pressure from the domestic agricultural community, the institutional bias in the EU towards agricultural interests and the asymmetry of interests towards CAP between consumers and farmers.

Despite its obvious decline the farming population in the EU remains significant.  In France it is the fourth largest occupational group, and similar patterns are found in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy.  Also taking active farmers, retired farmers, spouses of farmers, voting age children of farmers, and former farmers now in other occupations as constituting the combined agricultural contribution, then farmers as a percentage of the electorate rises to over 17% in France, and approaches that level in other EU states with large agricultural sectors.  The farm lobby also gains support from non-farmers and corporations with a stake in the agricultural economy.  With agrobusiness as a whole now nearly as big as farming itself, this provides a source of urban support for farmers.  Also the rural constituencies farmers come from are generally allotted more per capita elected representatives than urban regions.  Furthermore farmers are more politically active than other sectors of the population, up to a 5% higher voter turnout in France.  Therefore although the actual percentage of the workforce in farming is small, the voice of farmers as a political force is substantial, and something governments cannot ignore.  This power allows farmer’s organisations to lean on national governments by threatening to remove electoral support if unpopular changes are made to CAP.  National governments are consequently reluctant to implement proposed reforms to CAP not approved by the domestic agricultural community.

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There are important implications of this dominant position of agriculture at the national level.  It is here that member states formulate reform proposals that will be presented to the Agricultural Council in Brussels.  Farmer’s organisations can pressure governments to take particular lines on policies and to veto unpopular deals in the Council.  They are also able to disrupt CAP reforms by refusing to cooperate with the policy by not implementing it at the local level, making programs unworkable.  For example the set aside scheme in the 1992 reform has been called “almost unworkable in the extra-supervision of farmers that it ...

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This essay is of a high standard and would likely receive a mark in the upper classifications (60-65+), depending on its adherence to the module outline and the expectations of the marker. It is well written, focuses tightly on the question, has a rigorous and logical internal structure which is signposted throughout, and makes a number of subtle points that I would associate with strong critical analysis. There are a small number of aspects that could perhaps be improved upon. The first is that the essay is somewhat myopic in focussing quite exclusively on the 'iron triangle' of EU institutions. Two other explanations for the difficulty in reforming the CAP that are often mooted are institutional inertia and path dependency, and a lack of convincing external pressures for change. These arguments often come to the fore when reform processes are examined (such as the McSharry reforms or Agenda 2000). Indeed, I think the primary way the argument could have been significantly strengthened would be to consider these reforms as points at which change has occurred, and to examine the nature of this change. What prompted these reforms? Are the pressures that pre-empted these reforms there usually, or were there exceptional circumstances? Raising the issue of change would allow for a brief examination of the counterfactual, and hopefully shed more light on why change occurs so rarely. Discussing the reforms would also help tick the 'independent knowledge' box. As it is, the author shows substantial subject familiarity, but the bibliography is a bit thin, and the critical engagement with the literature stands out as being weaker than the rest of the essay. Showing greater awareness of the analytical arguments of other authors, and engaging with them more directly, would have been helpful in elevating this essay from 'very good' to 'excellent'.