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Group level.
is the collective role of this small group of policymakers, their advisers and subordinated in the White House and Office of the secretary of defense –at that time they formed a neo-conservative decision making elite. They, as a group, decided that invasion of Iraq is the best for the U.S national security interests as well as the assumption that by changing regime of Iraq the major threat to Israel would be removed. (Viotti,Kauppi;83-87)
- International level.
The fourt theoretical approach explains the invasion from the power structure concept. The international level of analysis requires to examine the power of the country in a global concept, and when it comes to U.S – it hard to find an author that would doubt its strength.
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”The United Stated, then and now is the most important power in this unipolar international system in which just one superpower holds so dominant position. With no effective balance to block its power, the United Stated was able to act at will against Iraq” (Viotti,Kauppi;2007:84)
- American military power is currently greater than that of the next ten most powerful states combined, which some saw producing a situation without precedent in international history: a ‘unipolar moment’. After 9/11, the USA showed a willingness to employ its power- unilaterally if necessary- to defend what it saw as a vital interest. (Baylis, Smith, Owens;2011:120)
These statements just explains that the dominance of the U.S in world is so clear, that even thought they are not the only superpower of the world, they are strong enough to make such a decisions that would be against global norms or international law.
3. Defensive and offensive realism
Before turning to the critique points of the invasion of Iraq by Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, In this section I will explain the main ideas and differences of their the theories – Defensive and offensive realisms- The Basics, similarities and also the opinion of the Mearsheimer on where is the main difference between his and Waltz’s theories.
Security dilemma arises when "the state seeking to enhance their security through arms build-up, inadvertently activates a chain of events that ultimately reduce its security» (Taliafferro, 2000/2001:136). Considering the security dilemma, proponents of defensive realism consider it appropriate to seek the relative, rather than to the absolute superiority of force. The very presence of security dilemma, in their opinion, does not necessarily lead to increased confrontation in international relations.
On the other hand-offensive realists argues that anarchy is a constant stimulus for expansion, so that states seek to increase their power over the forces of other states, and resort to an expansion in cases where the benefits outweigh the costs of such policies (Taliafferro, 2000/2001,128-161) Therefore, "in conditions of anarchy and uncertainty, the state have to rely on military construction, and expansion of unilateral diplomacy» (Ibid.) In the security studies area the terms we are discussing – Offensive and defensive realism is relevantly new for the realism. (Baylis,Smith, Owens:2011:116)
4. The theories and personal opinions of Waltz and Mearsheimer
In this section there are summarized the main points that helps to answer the main questions of the work on theorists and theories critique of the U.S invasion of Iraq. In four subparagraphs we can see how the main assumptions of the theory violates the events of 2003 and also – the personal opinion from the interviews with both authors of the theories, in which they explain they personal experience on this question as well as their theories.
4.1 Offensive and Defensive realism vs. Invasion
The term of the offensive realism is relatively new, however the ideas were introduced long before the J. Mearsheimers book of 2001 ‘The tragedy of the great power politics’ – which is basically the main reading and explanation for this theory. He, himself claims that his theory is new, however he agrees and it does contain the nature of theories other realist theories such as Kenneth Waltz and E.H Carr.
It is vital to mention that the offensive and defensive theories do not represent opposite approaches, on the contrary – both theories are based on the same assumptions, however as Mearsheimers offensive realism followed Waltz’s theory – it does differ significantly.
In his theory, Mearsheimer emphasizes:
-that great powers seek to maximize their share of world power.
- In multipolar systems which contain an especially powerful state- in other words, a potential hegemony, – are especially prone to war. (Mearcheimer; 2001)
He also suggests that the relative power and not absolute power is most important to the states. He suggest that the leaders of the countries should pursue security policies that weaken their potential enemies and increase their power relative to all others.
The 20th century was a period of great international violence- both world wars, with more than 21 million of deaths, Russian civil war, Iran-Iraq wars and so on, J. Mearsheimer in his book, The Tragedy of Great power Politics claims: cycle of violence however will not stop with the new millennium, because of one reason that introduces the offensive realism theory –
“Hopes for peace will probably not be realized, because the great powers that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power as a result. Indeed, their ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power over others, because having a dominant power is the best means to ensure one’s survival. Strength ensures safety. And the greatest strength is the greatest insurance of safety ” (Mearcheimer; 2001:11)
J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt were against the Bush’s administration decision to invade Iraq. They argued that the Bush administration ‘inflated the threat’ by misleading the world with the information about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and it also links to the terrorists who might attack USA in the future.( (Baylis,Smith, Owens:2011 p 120)) The war with Iraq cost USA billions of dollars as well as the disruption of the military force. Unilateralism of The Bush administration concerned both offensive and defensive neo-realist because it hurts the absolute and relative power of the USA. (Baylis,Smith, Owens:2011:120)
As it was said – both theories lies on the same background of realism, and as Mearshmeir himself claimed:
“Indeed, many of the claims of the neo-conservatives who drove the United States to war contradicted basic realist logic, which is why almost every realist opposed the war...Virtually every prominent realist[...]opposed going into Iraq”
( International Relations vol20 (2006):113))
So as the Waltz, as well was one of those ‘basic realist’ so did his defensive realism were not applicable to the U.S invasion.
Defensive realism that supports the image of systematic constraints and socialization experiences shaping a prudent defensive use of power does not predict US behaviour; one of the explanations – the fact that US had not experienced the ‘trauma’ of war that socialized the Old Europe.(Fawn,Hinnesbusch;2006:324)
4.2 Mearcheimer vs. the Invasion
In the previous subparagraph it clearly stated that the main point of the offensive realism do not ‘agree’ with the action taken by the U.S against Iraq. It is clear that if the theory is violated by any of the event, that this means that the author of the theory will not agree with the decisions and causes which lead to (in this case) war. When talking about Mearcheimer and the ‘Iraqi question’ there is no need to make a conclusions based only on his main points of the offensive theory as he, himself in many literature and journal articles expresses his views directly on U.S – Iraq invasion. Two most relevant work, which ideas I will be summarizing in this pargraph - Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I) and Part II (2003) and a journal article “An Unnecessary War.” by Walt, Stephen M and Mearsheimer, John J.
In his interviews I mentioned above – the journal asked Mearsheimer a lot of question on U.S invasion and he provided a good critique together with his explanation of this action of Bush violating his theory. The most part of the interview is very relevant to the topic we are exploring, but I provide the brief summary of main points and his opinion.
The discussion on Iraq start with him claiming that he does not believe in unipolarity in modern world and brings example of the U.S – Iraq war – „ The mighty American military is stuck in a quagmire and I think it is likely to suffer a humiliating defeat in Iraq. That does not happen to real hegemons” ( International Relations vol20 (2006):113)
As I already highlighted – most of the discussion on the Iraq question in this interview explains the violation of Mearcheimers theory and beliefs. But below I provide you four more shortened quotations of his answers, that pretty much summarizes and help to understand Mearcheimer’s ideas:
- He explains that the Bush’s Administration assumed that it could reorder the Middle Eastand that Iraq was supposed to be the first of many great triumphs. The United States, however, does not have and will not have in our lifetime anywhere near enough soldiers to dominate the globe the way it dominates the western hemisphere.
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When the ‘IR’ asks him, what should the world learn from the example of the United States he answers clarly- „That is simple; don’t do it again! The decision to invade Iraq was predicated on arguments that made no sense to most realists. Indeed, many of the claims of the neo-conservatives who drove the United States to war contradicted basic realist logic, which is why almost every realist opposed the war. Of course, states occasionally act in non-strategic ways, which is why realism confronts anomalies from time to time. But when states violate realist precepts, they invariably get punished, often severely, for their errors.” (Ibid.)
And the next two answers is his opinion and critique of theoretical approach to this invasion:
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„I am an offensive realist who believes that war is a legitimate
instrument of statecraft and that states should maximize their relative power.
My main point[...]is that just because you think using force is sometimes justified does not mean that you think it is always justified. Realism does not mean that you favor every war your country contemplates fighting. He also stresses out that not only, him, but all the other realist as well are and were against this invasion, which “turned out to be disaster”
I also thought that although Saddam was a threat, he was not much of a threat, and thus he could easily be contained.” (as we will later see in materials on Waltz – he as well had a lot to say on Saddam not being a real threat)
And the last argument from the interview that will be provided as an evidence is Mearsheimer’s thoughts on misleading reasons of the war, which we already discussed in previous section of this work.
- “The story that you spun out for attacking Iraq is certainly more of a realist story than the one the Bush Administration told in the run-up to the war. But even a geopolitical argument built around oil could not have justified attacking Iraq, if for no other reason, because the United States could not win the war at any reasonable price. Moreover, the United States does not need a strategic base in Saudi Arabia or
Iraq to protect its oil interests in the region.”
(International Relations vol20 (2006))
As it is enough evidence on Mearshmeir’s critique on U.S behaviour, I would like to add that of his co-work with Walt and John “An Unnecessary War” only one more time emphasize on Mearshmeirs strong belief of failure of the all U.S government actions relating Iraq’s invasion. In this work Mearseimer analyses the Saddam Hussein’s actions and investment in military gains and security of Iraq, he argues that the war with Iraq is unnecessary because Saddam Hussein- even though – sometimes irrational, and maybe even dangerous for some, still – the possible cost of the war definitely excesses the benefits. Kenneth Waltz also spoke on the behaviour od Saddam Hussein and his opinion on invasion of Iraq in his interview.
4.3 Kenneth Waltz vs. Invasion
Waltz’s theory emphasizes on the importance of the structure of the international system and its role influencing the state behaviour.
In his interview of February 10, 2003 – Kenneth Waltz expressed his opinion on why is US invasion of Iraq is unreasonable from realist point of view, he also analyses actions and danger of Saddam Hussein and Iraq as an enemy in particular. He also never believed on Iraq developing the WMD. His quote was:
”Well, Iraq is so weak! Its gross domestic [product] is $15 billion. We're spending almost $400 billion on our military alone. I mean, it's a pitifully weak country. And we know that. So the question becomes: Might a country, such as Iraq, develop nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and then share them with terrorists? The first point to make about that is they can't use them, themselves.”
He, more than Mearsheimer ‘supports’ Saddams Hussein’s Politics and claims that he is no threat to U.S, on the contrary – already at that time in 2003. He seems to not believe the Bushes opinions and sees them just as wrong assumptions, or maybe even excuses, he even uses the words “I do rely on Saddam Hussein” which of course is an overstatement, just to highlight the idea.
5.Conclusion
As we can see by the all previous information provided – there are many reasonable arguments by both authors that we analyze in this essay contra U.S invasion of the Iraq, as the question we are trying to answer throughout this essay was – If the U.S decision to invade Iraq violates the offensive and defensive theories- I argue , that – it does, as an explanation, why is these theories not applicable to the decisions made by Bushes administration in 2003, I would like to offer some of these reason
- The Invasion of Iraq, was more of group level and individual level decision explained in paragraph 2, than a rational decision based on costs, benefits and gains for the international level. J.W. Bush held the great power at that moment, so did the country he is governing.
As a final proof of the main question and to conclude this I would like to provide the quote of Mearsheimer, which perfectly summarizes all the ideas provided above:
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“For sure, there is a temptation for me to say that every decision for war is rational and therefore it is impossible to find cases that contradict my theory. But that would be foolish for me to do, not simply because Iraq doesn’t fit my theory, but also because no social science theory can explain every case. There will always be some anomalies”
(International Relations vol20 (2006))
In other worlds,- The cases that the Invasion violated the main assumption of realist theories appeared just because the main reasons of the decisions to start the war with Iraq are irrational and influenced by many wrong factors, so as the case with the history and power of the US are, in some cases, unique, as it is more independent than, for example, Europe.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books:
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Baylis J, Smith S, Owens Patricia The Globalization of World Politics, 2011, New York, Oxford University Press. p 77-322
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Fawn R., Hinnebusch R, The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences 2006, Colorado; Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. p 7-12; 323-329
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Mearsheimer John J The tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York 2001 W.W Norton & Company Inc.
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Viotti Paul R, Kauppi V Mark International Relations and world Politics: Security, Economy, Identity 2009, New Jersey; Pearson Prentice Hall
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Waltz Kenneth Man, the State and War. New York, 1964 Columbia University Press
Journal articles:
- “Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I).” International Relations 20 (2006): 105-123 Copyright © 2006 SAGE Publications(London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi), Vol 20(2): 231–243
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Taliafferro J. W. Security seeking under anarchy. Defensive realism revisited // International security. 2000/2001. Vol. 25
- Walt, Stephen M and Mearsheimer, John J. “An Unnecessary War.” Foreign Policy January/February (2003): 51-59.
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: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
