As the battles continued, a british soldier, Gordan Corrigan, describes the various tactics and strategies developed by the British Army. Rather than the army attacking the Germans mindlessly without any strategies or techniques, the “Great War (1914-18) was in reality a revolution in the art of warfare” (S8) as it was “far from being simply a series of mindless frontal assaults by massed infantry” (S8). Although it had taken some time, 1918 had been the year of the British army’s success, with April being the recapturing of the old Battle of Ypres, and the 8th of August being the ‘Black Day of the German Army’ capturing 18,000 German troops as prisoner and killing or wounding 9,000. The BEF had become the main engine of this offensive as it was the greatest campaign in British history. “Tanks, mechanical transport, indirect fire by artillery, trench mortars, gas, portable machine-guns” (S8) were all “huge advances in technology” (S8) made by what the BEF had become - a formidable military machine. “All these innovations were seized and developed by the very generals” (S8), however, source 9 states that the British army’s superior officers were “dull, inflexible senior officers” who “were supposed to have been so resistant to change” (S8).
However, the British army “was not the most advanced and eager in new tactical ideas” (S9). For example, the Battle of the Somme attack, had been a disaster as they had “an ongoing history of small wars in which the mobility was emphasised” (S9). They fired over 100,000 shells a day (shrapnel) which did nothing, and in total used 1 million shells, however, fuse 106 should have been used for effectiveness. Seven days and seven nights, the men were left with no food or water, leaving them hysterical. The British gave the German’s warning that they were going to attack, by setting off the enormous mine explosion off, eight minutes earlier than it should have been. Overall, July 1st 1916 was the worst day in British history with 57,000 casualties and almost 20,000 dying. The British had no intelligence of the German defences and they had gone from a breakthrough, to attrition leaving the battle to be a total disaster even through “the British were also the furthest ahead in tank development” (S9), “it should have done much to bring about tactical change” (S9) which does not support how “tanks... - owe’s its development to the war” (S8), as source 9 shows that it did not do much to show any tactical change. “Dull, inflexible senior officers stood firmly in the way of real change” (S9) as in 1916, tactics such as flash spotters, microphones and artillery had been developed, however not used by Sir John French until Haig managed to embrace it when he had replaced him. However, even so, the Battle of the Somme, proved that “many lessons learnt at the Front either did not get back to the various senior Staffs or were not acted upon”(S9) as they had planned the battle for ages yet they still did not know about the deep German trench dugouts which spent 2 years to make and was 40 yards deep.
Overall, source 7 is from a memoir of Captain D. Kelly which was published in 1930, only 12 years after the war had ended. “Kelly had fought on the Somme in 1916” and also “describes am attack near Amiens on 1 September 1918.” Therefore, Kelly had been through the best and worst of the British tactics, and knew what the army’s tactics of attack were, and as this source is seen to be a positive source in viewing that the Great War had resulted in “a revolution in the art of warfare for the British Army” (S8), it can be seen as reliable and trustworthy. Source 8 is also reliable as it is an extract from the book “Mud, Blood and Poppycock” published in 2003 and it received a positive review from a historian Gary Sheffield proving that Gordan Corrigan’s book is a reliable account. The targets for his book are the beliefs that the British military justice system was unfair, however, this extract highlights that improvements were made by the British army. However, source 9, is from an Australian military historian and both his parents served during World War One. The book highlights how commanders such as Haig, were still allowed to retain their positions in the army even after being the ones to blame for the high casualties, for example, Haig’s army suffered almost 60,000 casualties on the Battle of the Somme on the 1st of July, yet was still in command for more fighting. This book is negative as well as the extract from it, therefore, it cannot be seen as fully reliable as it is from an Australian perspective and not a British.
In conclusion, I agree with the view that the Great War resulted in “a revolution in the art of warfare for the British Army” (S8), as both source 7 and source 8 are seen to be reliable and trustworthy sources, and both conclude that improvements were made by the British army. The Great War was almost an eye-opener for the commanders who were so reluctant to change in strategies and techniques used by the army. Source 7 is from a Captain who experienced both the best and the worst of the British tactics and his memoir was published in 1930, making the source more reliable than the others. 1918 was the year that the British army really did have “a revolution in the art of warfare”, concluding the Great War as a revolution for developing these tactics and techniques which changed the way the British ever commenced an attack again and led the German army to surrender.
Zahraa Gooljar