The Argentines had four submarines at the outbreak of the war but had lost one when South Georgia was recaptured in April. The remaining subs faced having to get close enough to within torpedo range of a fleet, whose objective was anti-submarine, and had the best training and weapons to defend against this type of threat. Still, the Argentine submarines did sail and apparently launched torpedoes, although they did no harm to the British aircraft carriers. The Argentine submarine threat, although providing a constant problem to British generals, were destined to remain only a cause of thought to Admiral Woodward.
The launching of an exocet was attempted on several occasions but the problem of the radar guided missiles meant that they could not be targeted onto the carriers and had to rely on the pilot identifying the radar blips. This meant that although all five airborne Exocets were launched during the war, they were never launched directly against a British warship, and instead hit ships surrounding the carriers. After the loss of Sheffield, the whole task force fired decoys whenever threatened by the Exocets, and had therefore protected themselves. Only two ships were sunk by the 5 airborne Exocets Argentina had in the war.
As already stated the Argentine aircraft carrier was confined to base after the loss of the General Belgrano, and her aircraft were moved to the mainland meaning they had to from a long range (which was a problem itself due to fuel). Only on the 30 May, did four fighters accompany the ships on a mission to attack the British carriers. This was the mission that used the last of the exocet missile held by the Argentinean forces. sadly for the Argentines despite using extra planning and refuelling twice, they unexpectedly ran into other British ships and the exocet was mistakenly launched against the British ship, the Avenger, which was then attacked by the remaining planes losing two aircraft without getting hit. The fact that the Argentines could not sink the carriers did not mean that the war was lost at 1st, but that the only way left to win it was by stopping a landing until supplies in the British ships ran low. The Falklands are not very hospitable places, with the weather being either very wet or very cold in winter. The main settlements provided the only shelter from the weather for the troops.
It was always going to be impossible to guard against landings in every possible site, although there were bases all around the coast and at several other possible landing sites. An army which consists of amphibious vehicles is the weakest, and with no hope of stopping the landings or engaging immediately, there should have been an Argentine counter-attack as soon after the British forces came ashore at San Carlos. Menedez ordered a counter attack against the landed British forces on D-Day, but it was cancelled due to lack of transport. This lack of mobility was therefore very important to both sides. The Falkland Islands had bad terrain to cross, and the British had air domination, meaning the Argentineans could not risk moving troops forward by helicopter except from at night. By the end of the first day the opportunity to counterattack had gone, the British forces had dug in around San Carlos. The Argentine air force was told to remove the British, but this was asking a lot for the pilots to fly into a bay surrounded by British troops and warships, whilst also avoiding conflict with the British jets of which were also on constant patrol.
It was always going to be a tough task though the difficulty did not prevent the pilots from flying. Unfortunately for the Argentine airforce, they flew so low and released their bombs so late that most of them failed to explode and ships hit, often remained in action. Nevertheless the war did expose the problems of which modern armoury and defence systems have in combat, they have severe limitations and technical problems in other situations. Once the British were ashore and had sufficient supplies to advance, the war was moving away from the capabilities of the Argentine airforce and towards the army. The Argentineans had more troops than the British forces, but had a large amount of non-fighting troops such as cooks, and mechanics. Out of the regular fighting units, most were conscripts with very little training and experience. They arrived dug in and waited in conditions that were caused harsh living conditions, therefore causing morale to fall. The rain and cold, coupled with hunger and vermin warned the conscripts of the war to come, not only this but the extra misery of British shelling and bombing. Although the troops were not told about the progress of the war rumours spread through the ranks that the British had landed and captured back the island. When British artillery moved within range, and the soldiers began to be pounded from land as well as by sea, they must have realised things weren't going well. When the British land forces did engage their opponents in battle, the Argentines were overcome by superb close artillery support and skilful infantry tactics. At key points in almost all the battles when the British attacks were held up or began to stall, the momentum was regained by heroic NCO's who by eliminating key areas of opposition allowed the rest of the British forces to advance. With the Argentineans expelled from all the defensive mountains around Stanley, the war was effectively over. Menedez had no heart for a street battle in the Falklands capital and even though the Argentines still outnumbered the British, chose to surrender his remaining forces. It is all to easy when analysing the war to attribute a victory to one battle or one weapon. In the Falklands War it would be easy to do this by overemphasising the stunning performance of the Sea Harrier with its sidewinder missiles, but the truth of the matter is that in every area of the war, the Argentineans were outclassed in terms of technology and leadership. Having said that it was not a foregone conclusion and the bravery of the Argentine pilots could have turned the tables if there bombs had exploded. Once ashore the British were allowed to build up their strength and then took every Argentine position with skill and tactics. The fact that the Argentineans had more men was negated by the fact that they had to defend and so had to divide their forces, allowing the British to overwhelm them objective by objective. In conclusion the Falklands War was not a British victory because the Argentines fought badly, although their poor leadership and training did contribute, but because it was the British who controlled the war and decided that when they wanted to fight they would be victorious.
