Roosevelt although despising colonialism, yielded to French pressure because he was compelled to respect an important ally like Britain's opposition to his trusteeship scheme. Following Roosevelt's death in April 1945 Truman took office, whose administration favoured the French position more, partly because of the problem posed by the USSR in Europe. The US wanted to please the French to gain a source of strength in Europe against the Soviets, who they felt were aggressively expansionist. Truman also saw the Vietnam War, along with revolutions in Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia as highlighting the "strength and explosiveness of nationalism in Southeast Asia" and not as civil wars but as communist expansion. The State Department's Far Eastern Office thought that the French would lose the war and subsequently Western influence in the region would be lost .
By 1947 Truman had formed assumptions about Ho, which dominated US policy for the next twenty years. Despite US diplomats being unable to find evidence of direct involvement between the Vietminh and USSR and warnings about Ho's popularity among the population, the Truman administration strongly believed that Moscow controlled Ho. The fall of China to communism in 1949 and their southward advances combined with the USSR's successful nuclear test and recognition of Vietnam in 1950 combined to increase US fears of the communist threat across the world, especially in Southeast Asia. Fears were also increased when the Chinese intervened in the Korean war. The US paranoia about Soviet manipulation of Ho's regime, it seems now, was misguided. Southeast Asian revolutions were not organised by the Kremlin and, although willing to receive help from the USSR and China, Ho's nationalism was too strong to let him forfeit the country's independence (ibid.).
Maintaining an illusion of neutrality, the US began, during the first three years of the war, to finance France covertly. In hindsight, it could be argued that it might have been more prudent for the US to give Ho the support he needed and had openly appealed to the Americans for. This way Ho would not have needed to seek support from the USSR and China and the US might have been able to influence Ho's policy-making (ibid.). In fact, Ho had said that Vietnam would be a "fertile field for American capital and enterprise" (Blum, 1972, p10) and was enthusiastic about US investment in the country. Ho's appeals were rejected and the US even refused to confirm receipt of them, let alone try to use it to try to arrange a settlement. It seems from this that the US were determined to suppress the Vietminh and wanted conflict, not peace. Ho was ultimately forced to seek support from the Soviets and China, confirming US fears, though what was received at this stage was limited. Truman considered the war to be a global issue affecting the rest of the world. The dominant idea in US foreign policy at the time was 'Domino Theory'. This was the idea that if one country fell to communism the rest would follow like a domino-topple. This meant that Indochina was of paramount importance, in the eyes of the US, to the rest of the 'free world', although in this case domino theory later proved to be incorrect. The US were worried about their strategic position in Asia should Vietnam 'fall' to communism, particularly if Japan were lost as it was a key Asian ally.
Another concern for the US was that guerrilla warfare tactics used by the Vietminh were proving effective against the conventional tactics of the French. The French armies despite many victories were slowly getting weakened. The Vietnamese people were at best indifferent, at worst hostile to their actions with Ho and his Vietminh increasing in popularity. The support which Ho so easily mobilised among the Vietnamese made it clear by this time that the Vietnam War couldn't be won through conventional means and the perceived inevitability of French failure was instrumental in the US deciding to involve itself in the war.
Roosevelt had felt that this was due to French mismanagement. However, there were also fears France would monopolise trade in the region if allowed to regain control. The State Department's Asian Experts warned Truman's administration to put pressure on France to accept Vietnamese nationalism, as it was unwise to be seen to support colonialism. Officials also recognised that the French solution had its flaws. France set up governments in the Southeast Asian countries, giving them the status of 'free states' within the French Union. Bao Dai, a former emperor of Annam, was to be the head of the Vietnamese government. The officials saw this as merely a token gesture and the new governments as powerless. Some foresaw the US being sucked into direct involvement, even at early stages.
Despite their foresight, in March 1950 the US committed to the French cause, offering economic and military assistance and ending their 'neutrality'. They began to support the Bao Dai government, contrasting with the principles the US claimed to be upholding. It was in no way democratic or representative of the people, mostly compiled from wealthy Europeans. From this point it became increasingly difficult for the Americans to retract their involvement.
The relationship between France and the US became strained as France resented US involvement. The Vietnamese also saw the US "more as a supporter of French colonialism than as a friend of the new nation". Initially, the US wanted France to have the main burden of the war as they realised the dangers of putting ground forces into Vietnam, but it was obvious to them that France could not cope and the primary responsibility would ultimately rest with the US. This became more apparent as France put increasing pressure on the US to give support.
Despite increasing levels of support, the Truman administration saw a worsening of the situation in Indochina since 1950. Eisenhower received this legacy with even more determination than his predecessor. Crisis at Dienbienphu, when Vietminh trapped 1200 French troops, created the opportunity to increase US military involvement. However the US preferred the idea of 'united action' by concerned countries to deal with the problem. Unfortunately, French collapse was too near for this and there was no support from Churchill in Britain who rejected US domino theory, also recognising that the war was not winnable. The US hesitation meant that the French were defeated by the Vietminh.
Negotiations followed in Geneva in which the US were extremely obstructive as they considered it wrong that they should have to negotiate with communists. It became obvious in these negotiations that they wanted a military solution to the war. However, with Soviet and Chinese help, a settlement was reached and laid down in the 1954 Geneva Accords, however the US refused to sign the agreement but agreed to comply with it. A temporary partition was agreed along the 17th parallel with the North being controlled by Ho's government and the south being given a US-picked anti-Communist government, headed by Ngo Dinh Diem.
Reunification was planned for 2 years later, following elections. This would allow the US to prepare as, if free elections were held quickly, Ho's popularity would guarantee a win and the US wished to prevent Ho's victory. The US started supporting Prime Minister Diem's government, claiming it to be democratic. In fact, it was extremely authoritarian, unpopular and ignored the requirement in the Geneva agreement for free elections in 1956, persecuting those who objected to this. Support of Diem shows more hypocrisy on the part of the US.
Diem's government was finally replaced following a military coup in 1963, the new rulers also supported by the US. They were finding it increasingly hard to argue that the war was a result of Chinese communist aggression and thus justify it, while getting sucked in deeper and deeper. It is at this point that Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defence said the US "could and should have withdrawn from South Vietnam", minimising casualties. The final US estimate for the number of Vietnamese military casualties is around 700,000 and the total Vietnamese casualties could be double this figure. Physical destruction was also immense causing problems for years to come.
Policy being dominated by domino theory meant each president dealing with the problem was equally reluctant to escape involvement and face the accusation that they lost the battle against communism and so dug the US in deeper. Considering the difficulty of getting back out, and the fact that many foresaw disaster shows that the major military involvement of the US in the Vietnam War, which resulted in so many destroyed lives was the result of panic and paranoia. However, it would have been virtually impossible to avoid any involvement in the war as the allies needed to decide on the future of Indochina after WW2. It would probably have been wiser for the US to support Ho's regime from the beginning and attempt to manipulate the situation to their own advantage, especially considering their later support of Diem's regime, which was very hypocritical and the fact that Ho needed their assistance badly. This is easily said with hindsight but the bi-polarity of the time resulted in understandable panic. The Geneva negotiations were badly handled and nation-wide elections held immediately would have allowed the US to pull out after the French defeat and would have been democratic, giving them no further justification for war.
