Strategy in Cortes' conquest of Mexico

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Kurt Wintje

HIST 386R

Prof. Brown

11/27/07

                Strategy in Cortés’ Conquest of Mexico

Informed primarily by Spanish accounts, the traditional historical view of Cortés’ victory over the Aztec Empire is that of the inherently superior and better-armed Spanish defeating the numerically superior, but technologically and morally inferior Aztecs forces. Inga Clendinnen, for one, explains the Spanish conquest in cultural terms. According to Clendinnen, the Aztecs were defeated because their traditional societal view on the nature of warfare and its modes of termination made them incapable of defeating the Spanish forces led by the innovative and cunning Cortés. However, the recent availability of Aztec and other native accounts of the conquest call these interpretations into question. Concurrently, a new wave of contemporary Aztec scholars argue that the motivations for Aztec imperialism are complex and multifaceted, but political and economic concerns dominated, just like any other empire. Therefore, it is best to examine the Aztec Empire just as one would the Roman Empire, or any other imperial system. Viewed through this lens, it will be argued that Cortés’ successful employment of military strategy and techniques were the critical determinant in the battle for the Aztec Empire. Other historical interpretations overlooked the role of strategy in the Aztec response to Cortés, but it will be argued that Cortés, as well as the Aztecs, conducted war within an overarching strategic plan.

As leader of the Aztec Empire, Montezuma’s primary objective in the region was to consolidate and further expand his power base by bringing rival factions under Aztec control and compel the payment of tribute. The Aztecs used conquering wars, where Aztec warriors attacked and quickly overwhelmed the enemy and forced them into submission, but so called “flower wars” to achieve this end as well. Clendinnen and others have misinterpreted the “flower wars” as merely serving ritualistic aims, while other scholars described it as a training ground for Aztec soldiers. Hassig argues these “flower wars” were in fact a type of imperial war with important strategic objectives. The Aztecs often engaged in “flower wars” with their strongest opponents, while reserving conquering wars for vulnerable targets. The Aztecs often directed their conquering wars against those weaker foes which happened to border the Aztecs’ strongest “flower war” opponents. Once the stronger enemy was completely surronded and deprived of potential allies, as well as room to retreat, the “flower war” escalated to a full fledge war of conquest, with the Aztecs chipping away at the enemy’s periphery until the noose completely tightened. Montezuma had been following this strategy in the extended “flower wars” with the Tlaxcallan Confederacy, which at the time of Cortés’ arrival in 1519 was completely surronded by the Aztec Empire. 

Although Montezuma’s allies warned Cortés against crossing into Tlaxcallan territory, he deliberately did so on his way to the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan. Cortés’ battles with the Tlaxcallans were his first preview of Mesoamerican warfare, and also served as a preview as to what might be in store for him when he finally confronted Montezuma. In his letter to the Spanish emperor, Cortés suggests that he was able to end fighting with the Tlaxcallans by persuading them to join him in an alliance against Montezuma. The Tlaxcallans, already encircled by the Aztecs and facing all but certain subjugation, assented to Cortés’ offer because they recognized that the Spaniards possessed the ability to do what they could not: consistently break through enemy lines. With this alliance, Cortés exploited the Tlaxcallans dire military situation at the hands of the Aztecs, and strategically, the alliance with the Tlaxcallan Confederacy proved to be a decisive factor on Cortés’ behalf in the ensuing battle with the Aztecs. The alliance significantly increased the total numbers in Cortés’ forces and established a strategic pattern of brokering alliances with Montezuma’s enemies and allies. The Tlaxcallans proved not just to be warm bodies in Cortés’ army, but a well trained and highly motivated fighting force. 

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While Cortés was forging an alliance with his worst enemy, Montezuma was still in the process of sizing up the Spaniard. He sent messengers to Cortés to assess his power as well as to dissuade Cortés from coming to Tenochtitlan. Most historians agree that Montezuma’s hesitancy in acting against Cortés and his men contributed to the eventual defeat of the Aztecs.  Had Montezuma acted decisive and early, his thousands of well trained and disciplined warriors could have soon neutralized Cortés’ relatively tiny army. Scholars have dedicated much research into attempting to explain Montezuma’s hesitancy. Arguably, Montezuma should have been aware of ...

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