The failure of the Schlieffen Plan - Stalemate.

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The failure of the Schlieffen Plan - Stalemate

Schlieffen Plan - total victory against France in six weeks; ten divisions in east in holding operation

  • Schlieffen, Chief of German General Staff 1890-1905, conceived & developed plan;
  • Forces concentrated on right wing for a gigantic wheel; left wing reduced to slenderest possible.
  • Extreme right pass south of Paris & cross Seine through Rouen → press French back towards Moselle, where hammered in rear on anvil formed by Lorraine fortresses & Swiss frontier.
  • Swinging mass, pivoting on fortified Metz, was to consist of 53 divisions - revolving door
  • Counted on intervention of British expeditionary force of 100,000 in conjunction with the French.
  • Advocated using Landwehr & Ersatz troops in operations & fusing resources of nation into army.
  • His dying words were: ‘It must come to a fight. Only make the right wing strong.’
  • CRAIG: From a technical point of view, the plan was brilliant; from others it was disastrous.

The Moltke revisions - Moltke the younger, successor to Schlieffen, lacked predecessor’s courage

  • Whittled away essence of plan: Of 9 divisions available 1905-14, 8 allotted to left wing.
  • Rather than crossing ‘Maastricht Appendix’, decided Liege must be taken immediately.
  • August 1914: 2 army corps taken from French Theatre in order to reinforce the Eastern Front.

Plan 17 - frontal offensive launched with bare equality of force against German fortified frontier zone.

  • German army estimated at maximum of 68 infantry divisions. Deployed 83 (Landwehr & Ersatz)
  • When rival armies concentrating, French Intelligence counted only 45 active German divisions.
  • size of German sweep through Belgium utterly misjudged - expected to go through the Ardennes
  • Thrust by the First and Second Armies towards the Saar into Lorraine.
  • Third army opposite Metz & Fifth army facing Ardennes, to take up offensive between Metz & Thionville, or, If Germans came through Luxembourg & Belgium, to strike at flank.
  • Fourth Army was held in strategic reserve near the centre.

1914: German railway system under military supervision - 1870-1914: lines to western frontier 9 → 13

  • August 6th: 550 trains/day crossing Rhine bridges; 12th August: 7 German armies, 1,500,000 ready.
  • Deployment completed by August 17th: friction of war revealed weaknesses.
  • Belgian resistance cloaked weight of main German columns and misled the Allies’ Intelligence.
  • August 7th, French advance began, movement into Upper Alsace as a distraction
  • Pressure of disasters elsewhere compelled its being dispatched Westwards.
  • August 14th - Main thrust into Lorraine by French 1st & 2nd - 19 divisions. Shattered by 20th.
  • Damaged Schlieffen plan: Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria’s 6th Army did not retreat
  • German Crown Prince’s 5th Army defied orders to retreat. French pushed back to fortifications
  • 4th & 3rd Armies moved into Ardennes & pushed back by German 4th & 5th Armies.
  • French 5th - 10 divisions - & British - 4 divisions - moved into 1st, 2nd & 3rd German - 34 divisions; Due to premature attack of German 2nd, Allies fell back in time to escape German trap.

  • Marne - 6-9 Sept. - Gap in German line forced retreat to River Aisne - defeat of Schlieffen plan
  • August 26, battle of Le Cateau, hard right with British, Kluck I Army decided to turn East of Paris hoping to smash army of Lanzarec engaged in bitter fighting with Bulow’s II army at Guise
  • LIDDELL HART: so much grit had worked its way into the German machine that a slight jar would suffice to cause its breakdown.  This was supplied in the battle of the Marne.
  • 3 September: Opening on Kluck’s right flank perceived by Galieni, military governor of Paris
  • 5 September: Manoury VI Army fell on Kluck; 6 September order for general Allied offensive given.  
  • British headed for gap between I & II Armies as Kluck removed forward & left flank guards
  • 9 September, Bülow ordered retreat of his force - spread rapidly to rest of the German Armies.  
  • CRAIG: Defeat marked definitive failure of Schlieffen plan & turned war in west into a struggle for which the German officer corps, raised in the tradition of mobile war, was not prepared.
  • Thomson & Carr: 1914 battle of the Marne was decisive because it denied Germany quick victory

  • Ypres - October & November 1914 - Liddell Hart: With the repulse of the German attempt to break through, the trench barrier was consolidated from the Swiss frontier to the sea.  The power of modern defense had triumphed over attack, and stalemate ensued

The nature of trench warfare

  • Trench warfare: development and tactics - emerged in September 1914. Intended to be used as a breathing space - for an army forced to fall back from an unsound position.
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  • January 1915, Western Front ran for over 750 kms. Much unsuitable for a large-scale offensive.
  • The Officers and their men. Officers separated by status and privilege
  • Officers had separate brothels and cinemas, separate treatment of shell shock.
  • Discipline and punishment
  • new recruits lack of understanding of army discipline resulted in periods of unrest.
  • Crimes such as looting invariably rose after casualties.
  • Disturbances at Shoreham, England in September 1917 prompted by scale of rations, higher pay of Canadians and cancellation of leave trains to Brighton in order to save fuel.
  • British courts-marshal dealt with more ...

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