Despite all the tension that was mounting, between 1870 and 1890, European foreign affairs managed to not reach any climax or anywhere near a breaking point. Although it can be said that there was an industrial competition between Germany and Britain, it was not aimed intentionally to cause panic in Britain. Germany’s industrial emphasis can be seen as heightening in this period as a result of their unification; now they had the means of exploiting materials as well as manufacturing it. Part of the reason that during this period, Germany was not seen as an aggressor is due to its Chancellor, Bismarck, who was conscious of the importance of pursuing a peaceful foreign policy and abstained form excessive Imperialism. Berlin, in 1894-95, was the centre for the diplomatic partition of Africa, with Bismarck heading up the talks between the powers. Germany’s approach to other countries, and its foreign policy underwent a dramatic change in 1890, when Bismarck was dismissed from office and Caprivi was instated to the position. In 1988, an event that was to be a vital condition for the First World War occurred. Kaiser Wilhelm Ⅱ came to the German throne. He was an erratic, unpredictable character who was pro- autocratic, and had a passion to build a navy for Germany. Under his directions, Caprivi sought a policy known as the “New Course” that went against everything Bismarck had previously worked for. This included the crucial decision to not renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, a fatal decision that led to the Franco-Russian agreements being possible. “Weltpolitik”, Germany’s new, aggressive foreign policy led to a number of incidents in the years leading up to the war that caused resentment directed towards Germany, particularly as it looked to be meddling in colonial issues. “Weltpolitik” also put an emphasis on the German navy, or the lack of one. He Naval Acts of 1898 and 1900 concentrated on building up a navy, and in 1906, the third naval act saw the need to make ships the same class as the “Dreadnought”, the British naval fleet launched that year. This was viewed warily by Britain, who, as the leading naval power was determined to maintain its position. “The German fleet is designed for a possible conflict with Britain” one British Admiralty observed in 1904.
Until now, Britain had not played an active role in European affairs, following a policy of “Splendid Isolation” that concentrated more on its colonial affairs and internal affairs, however, but by 1902, perhaps as its colonies and home, Britain, was affected by European relations, broke out of its isolationism by aligning with Japan in 1902.
These long-term causes for war, which do, by all means explain why there should be resentment behind a war, does not explain why the war broke out a particular time, or why the Powers allied as it did. At this stage, although to many, war seemed inevitable and only a matter of time, improved communications and relations between the Great Powers was not impossible, as the cordiality in early 1914 shows. However, although there was now feelings of animosity that may have affected international relations, they only really serve to illustrate the reasons for resentment. In themselves, the long-term causes are not sufficient to war over, or to cause a war of such large scale. None of them show that any one country had the aim of starting a war, although some, like Germany may have been prepared to go to war to achieve their means. Also, the Alliance system, which is often pointed out to be the Powers planning to go to war, have been overstated. Much of the “alliances” were merely understandings, sometimes even omitting any military related issues, that may have sought only better relations. The Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904, for example, was simply an understanding. Without military obligations. Even the most apparently aggressive Dual Alliance (1879) between Germany and Austria-Hungary was more of a defensive alliance.
There were, however, events in the last decade or so that may have been an objective for wanting war. The Boer War that ended in 1902 was a big catastrophe for Britain and they were angered that the Germans had aided the Boer cause. The First Moroccan Crisis and the Agadir Crisis saw Germany being humiliated, Britain and France again angered by Germany, but their alliance to each other, though tested, remained steady. Another important short term problem was Russia’s problems that prevented it from playing a Great Power role. This was partly caused by the defeat of the Russians at the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. It was a blow to Russian pride to be defeated by an “inferior” country, and also, Russia’s losses were significant. Russia concentrated on improving its military to include faster mobilisation and better strategies. Russia was not without sufficient internal problems as the Revolution in 1905 indicates.
The Balkans were also an area which the Powers watched closely after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria Hungary. The Balkan wars 1912, 1913) showed the want of independence by several states and the new statues of Serbia. It surmounted tension between the Great Powers, however, as Serbia’s new found strength was a blow to Austria-Hungary and a victory to Russia. Many felt that the Balkans would be the start of a large European War.
There were undeniable amounts of animosity and an atmosphere of preparing for war in Europe in the years leading up to 1914, as the conscriptions of many European countries show. However, although war seemed a possibility, it was not inevitable, as the improved relations in the early part of 1914 prove. It was only after the July Crisis in which the momentum of the events were so that it would have proved difficult for many countries to remain objective during a time of much public opinion to the contrary and Germanys aggressive approach.
The delay of Austria-Hungary to retaliate to the assassination of the heir to their throne was a crucial event. Had they retaliated immediately, many countries would have sympathized with them and the Powers may not have intervened at all. However, Austria-Hungary needed the Hungarian Minister to approve, Germany to assure them their support, and then waited until the French President and Prime Minister were out of Russia before issuing Serbia with an ultimatum. When Russia showed intent to help its ally, and mobilized, after issuing them a ultimatum, Germany declared war on Russia, and then on France. When Germany violated Belgian neutrality, Britain, under the terms of its 1889 treaty with Belgium, declared war.
Was there a motive for war before this? Some historians, including Fischer, feel that Germany had aimed for, if not planned a war. Fischer found certain documents, known as the September Memorandum, written by Bethmann Hollweg dated 9/9/1914, a statement of war aims. Fischer believes that the army bills of 1912 and 1913 were designed to equip Germany for a major war. Although Fischer has many critics, and historians have thought of different explanations for the documents, if he were correct, and Germany had had “a drive for war”, it would change the view that Europe “stumbled into war”.
Europe was certainly preparing for a war by August 1914. Some even looked forward to it, inspired by Jingoism and by the years if resentment of other countries. However, war was not inevitable. The improved relations between Britain, France and Germany in early 1914 show this. Even after the July Crisis, no country went to war unwittingly or unintentionally. By this time, it is clear that most countries wanted war, perhaps to sort out internal problems or to end all the surmounting tension “by Christmas”. Even after the July Crisis, war did not have to be an option as there was no formal military obligation to do so, nor were the Balkan problems so significant that the Powers have to go to war over hostility and possible war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Many even see Britain defending Belgian neutrality as a means of joining the war. Although it can be seen as some countries, such as France, had no other choice but to defend itself when Germany declared war on them, they still knew the implication of siding with Russia and by introducing conscription, they showed that they were prepared. I don’t think that the nations of Europe “stumbled into war” as they did know what they were doing, many wanted it, and they had other alternatives to avoid war, but most headed straight for it.
