Also, Stalin, at the end of the war, had retained his communist ideals and plans for neighbouring nations such as Poland. During the war he could not pursue such aims, as resources had to be directed to the war effort. Also, Germany was a threat that had yet to be eliminated and good relations with the USA and Britain had to be maintained. Therefore, some degree of consensus was paramount to allied success and Stalin knew that practical pursuance of communist ideology would irritate the USSR’s western allies.
The threat on the Soviet Union’s doorstep having been eliminated set the conditions in Eastern Europe such that Stalin knew that he could pursue the spreading of communism there in a way which would not have been possible before the war. Also, by the end of the War in Europe, Poland was left occupied by Red Army troops, hence the war had enabled Stalin to create a strong military presence in the nation and this would assist the fulfilment of Stalin’s communist ambitions. Again, the idea that less dependency had been created by the War’s end is important, as it enhanced the Soviet Union’s ability to pursue Communist aims, without worrying too much about how its western allies, primarily the USA, would respond. The USA did not take well to the Soviet Union’s approach to the situation in Poland; American discontent with the Soviets is apparent in the lack of compromise that occurred during negotiations over Poland’s new borders. The negotiations failed to produce a satisfactory compromise from the American point of view and the USA was angry at the Soviet lack of fulfilment of promises on “fair and free” elections in Poland. This situation is a prime example of ideological differences causing a rift between the two great powers. Hence, the lack of compromise between the two supports the claim of irreconcilable differences as the fault of a division. In fact, their differences in ideology were such that, on the subject of free elections in Poland, Stalin’s approach was merely an application of his ideology. Communism and Liberalism being polar opposites naturally would mean that Stalin’s interpretation of democracy would differ from America’s, hence the “irreconcilable differences”.
Furthermore, the ideas that the USSR had in mind for German reparations were met with complete opposition from the USA. The Soviet desire for their compensation from the Germans was to provide some sort of revenge, perhaps reflecting the scale of losses they faced in the war, which in terms of casualties, far outnumbered figures for any of the other allied forces. Hence, Stalin used this to justify his post-war aims towards Germany, which involved the “total” de-industrialisation of the nation, as well as the appointment of a prominent Russian Communist as a leader of the German government. Both aims strongly contradicted that the USA’s. Firstly, the USA wanted Germany to remain industrially operational, given the opportunities for trade. This was reflective of the American ideals for how economies should function; capitalism taught that optimum efficiency occurs with a free global market and more opportunities for trade in order to raise profits and provide higher standards of goods. Contrastingly, with Communism being base upon a state-delegated economy in order to provide, sufficiently and on an equal basis, everything that citizens of the nation should need, the Soviets would refute the benefits of maintaining Germany’s industry, as they had not interest in trading. Also, the USSR’s idea for appointing a Communist leader for German government went against the achievement of a liberal democracy, which is what the USA was hoping for. The situation regarding Germany thereby shows the contrasts between Soviet and American ideology, which could then be more strongly followed given that the end of the War in Europe created a more relaxed situation for the USSR and enhanced the position of the USA to a superpower. Hence, post-war aims of the two nations being so different, thus warranting the term “irreconcilable differences” was the basis for tension.
Additionally, the influence of the general public towards the government and the leaders of both nations is another factor to consider when understanding the divide between the USA and USSR in the aftermath of the allied victory in Europe and why it occurred. Most Americans were clearly anti-Communist, particularly “Middle America, the floating voters that politicians had to please in order to secure votes from. They were thereby opposed to the idea of a Communist leader in German government as this would mean the advancement of Communist power in Europe. The US government therefore had to be wary of public opinion in the decisions it chose to undertake in terms of foreign affairs. In the USSR, given the huge scale of loss, in terms of human life and cities that were ruined from attempted German takeovers, there was a sense of revenge, which was apparent in the USSR’s reparation aims. Hence, it can be said that the opinions of the public contributed to the aims that the leaders of each nation chose to follow. Although, it cannot be said that the public pushed the government of either nation to act as it did, the fact that much of the population felt strongly and in a particular way about what should be done, is something that either government would not have ignored. In the case of the USA, the democratically elected leaders should follow an agenda reflective of public opinion in order to secure votes at the next election. For the USSR, if there was strong public support for harsh reparations and a greater Soviet presence in surrounding nations then this would have reinforced Stalin’s own ideals. Nonetheless, given the details that exist of the Soviet Communist regime, in terms of the police state and so forth, this is debatable.
Also, even though there were some divides between the USSR and the USA after the victory in Europe, the division was not as grave as to cause untenable relations between them. The War in the Pacific had not yet been concluded and so a practical relationship needed to be maintained. Given the victory in the Pacific later on, such a relationship arguably was kept up. Although Germany had been defeated, the two nations still shared Japan as a common enemy, so some degree of interdependence still existed. The USSR was using resources sent by the USA, including arms, war materials and technology as a part of lend-lease. The USA likewise could not go it alone, given that, up to this point (immediately after the end of the war in Europe), there no confirmation that a weapon such as the atomic bomb would actually work. In fact, the nuclear bomb was only in its development stages and did not yet exist. Hence, the USA was dependant on the USSR to help provide victory in the Pacific, a war it was desperate to see the end of. Therefore, the divides between the two could not be so pronounced as to interfere with the upholding of a workable relationship, due to mutual dependency until victory in the Pacific was obtained.
Another point to consider is the aims and ideas of individual leaders. Franklin D. Roosevelt held the belief that good relations with the USSR should be maintained, not only to secure a Pacific victory, but to be pragmatic and reasonable. This was apparent in the way that he, at Yalta, tried to appease Soviet demands to ensure cooperation and harmony. Truman contrastingly was more hard-line and sought a tougher approach. Furthermore, Stalin was also driven significantly so by National Security in terms of his post-war aims. The USA interprets this as expansionism and it may well have been to some extent, but nonetheless it would be fair to say that Stalin was strongly concerned with creating a buffer zone in order to protect the USSR from a western attack or invasion.
To conclude, I accept the view that the USA and the USSR were already divided due to irreconcilable differences at the end of the Second World War to a certain extent. The two had different ideologies and this of course was reflected in their actions. The circumstances created by the Second World War and the allied victory in Europe, in strengthen America as a Superpower and expanding its area of interties, as well as reducing, to some effect, interdependence between the nations to enable the USSR to become freer to pursue its interests, such as how it behaved in relation to Poland. Nonetheless, some if these tension did arise as a result of misinterpretation by both nations of the other side’s motives in light of their behaviour. Furthermore, given that the two nations had a common enemy binding their interest together, the sense of interdependence meant that divisions were not so pronounced as to threaten this.
by
tp94 (student)
