Was the cold war conflict precipitated by an expansionist soviet union or were U.S efforts to create a post-war world that reflected its own interests equally responsible?

The breakdown of the grand alliance so quickly and the end of the war is of essential importance to the traditionalists; the ‘sovietisation’of Europe after 1944 was simply the start of things to come, it was clear in 1944 that Stalin had plans on a global scale, and by stressing that the soviet union would adhere to a policy of ‘socialism in one country’ was further proof that Stalin had expansionist plans.  In some respects the external policy of Russia in 1914 and 1946 had similar features, Hugh Thomas declares that “in the former year, for example, Sazomov, the foreign minister of the tsar, envisaged an Eastern Central Europe, divided into small, nominally independent states, which were essentially Russian clients, not unlike that in Stalin's mind in 1946.”

Eastern Europe was a critical area after the war had ended, Stalin saw Poland as the ideal starting point for soviet expansionism as it was the biggest of the eastern states, Young calls Poland the “essential prize for Stalin”.  The Russian leader angered the British and American governments in July 1944 when he installed a communist administration in Lubin to run the country.  Romania soon followed as a soviet satellite; the abdication of king Michael left a political vacuum that was soon filled by the pro communist Gheorghe Gheorghier-Dej in 1952.  Of all the eastern states only Czechoslovakia had any real communist support; its leader, Edward Benes, signed a friendship treaty with Stalin in 1943.  However by 1948 the communist party had carried out a coup that led to the installation of a communist regime.

The division of Germany was another major obstacle in achieving peace, the four major powers agreed to the denazification, democratisation, disarmament and decartelisation of their individual zones.  Yet conflict still occurred and the formation of an East and West Germany became a political reality.

It is argued that in the preceding years before 1950 and the Korean War, there were other communist inspired acts that sent an imperialistic message to the west.  The Chinese civil war experienced intervention from both sides, the eventual communist inspired Mao Ze Dong set up a peoples republic. In 1946 there were two acts of supposed communist expansionism, the first was the Iran crisis in March; the second in August over the Black sea straits led to a worldwide condemnation of soviet policy towards smaller states for economic and military advantages.

In sum the traditional view argues that the buffer zone as advocated by Stalin was in fact a cover for a communist revolution as promised by the comitern nearly thirty years ago.  Douglas J Macdonald, in his work ‘communist bloc expansion in the early cold war’ states that “soviet bloc actions in Asia strongly suggest that had robust containment policies not been followed in Europe and the Middle East, the soviets would have tried to expand their influence into those areas also.” 

Russian ideology believed that the Anglo – American alliance was the reason for the cold war, “soviet leaders were prone to view Anglo – American structures as fundamentally hostile toward Russia”.  Which leads onto the next school of thought. Beginning in the mid 1960’s, largely in reaction to the Vietnam War, a revisionist school evolved amongst historians who proposed that the United States was primarily to blame for the cold war.  With the belief that the American policy makers were “driven by an unreasonable hostility to communism, largely generated by domestic, political and economic needs.”  Work by Daniel Yergen (shattered peace) aims to dispel the myth of soviet expansion and instead attempts to turn the attention onto the failures of the American government.  Yergen argues, “the war, which promised to bequeath a great power vacuum in Europe and at the same time erased all doubts about Russia's power and capabilities, made inevitable the emergence of the soviet union as a paramount and indispensable factor in the post-war international system, especially in Europe.” The revisionist school had many American members; its popularity may be explained due to anti American feeling over Vietnam, however it is worth noting that most of the non-communist nations shared this revisionist perception in the early years of the cold war, with unusual consensus. 

During this period there were a number of prominent groups who decided it was time to speak out in defence of the revisionist movement.  These varying, international groups found support easy to come by.  The British labour party and the French socialists were very forthcoming in their criticisms.  According to Macdonald this challenged those analysts who utilize cognitive theories of decision-making and domestic political explanations for American foreign policy, or in layman’s terms that threats were over exaggerated during the cold war.  The threat of a soviet bloc after the Czechoslovakian coup, together with the American and British paranoia led to fears being increased as a matter of propaganda and genuine fear.

A further argument follows that “the cold war was the strategic rationale behind the Marshall plan and the unprecedented American investment in Western Europe post war economic recovery.”  This asks an interesting question, the prior assumption of conflict in determining foreign policy would suggest that the united states set about to achieve an upper hand over the soviet union.  The lack of evidence means that an answer has not been found; however American policy makers were able to politically kill two birds with one stone.  In some respects the American government did intend to achieve the upper hand, but to ever admit to this would be political suicide even after the cold war has ended.

Finally the Truman doctrine issued in March 1947 pointed Washington into conflict with Moscow, other communist states, left wing sympathizers, nationalists and various kinds of progressives.   Given the fact that most non communist spectators of the cold war, concentrate the blame on the soviet union, recent critiques would seem to be correct in their statement that American policies give the erroneous impression that the fear of communist bloc expansion was largely, if not exclusively, in the minds of U.S decision makers.

As the historiography of the cold war progressed so did the evaluation of the origins of the cold war.  Towards the end of the 1980’s there were attempts to forge a post revisionist synthesis.  The post revisionists essentially accepted American European policy while distinguishing it from American third world policy; this allowed them to avoid having to defend the Vietnam war and other policies of which they disapproved.  Post revisionists like John Lewis Gaddis accepted marginal U.S responsibility for the cold war and were strongly critical of U.S interventions in the developing nations.  However they could still find the idea of a Soviet and Japanese threat a credible one.  Gaddis points out that the role of a post revisionist is to find a middle ground based on “mutual misperception, mutual reactivity, and shared responsibility between the superpowers.”  

The series of post war meetings that commenced with the London conference was the start of American overconfidence over their monopolisation of the atomic bomb, leaving the American policy makers with a lacklustre policy for the division of Germany, the threat of an imperialistic soviet government and the failure of Europe; “there was no organisation for the meeting, no agenda being prepared, and no American plan in form to present.” Post revisionists believed that it was a suspicious, rather than imperialistic Russian government that helped to start the cold war, due to the terms offered at the London conference.  The Russian government found it hard to belief the sincerity of the other allies.

Post revisionism is supported by the criticisms of American policies emanating from the dominant paradigm of the political science sub discipline of international relations, realism, which posits the non-ideological pursuit of power as the basis for international relations.  It is the competition over capabilities among nation states that determine policies; thus the origins of the cold war would be down to the paranoia experienced by both America and the Soviet Union.  The spread of communism posed little threat to capitalism because nationalism and self-interest, not ideology, are what drives states to act.  The threat of the soviet bloc did not really exist, and in fact the ‘buffer zone’ concept was nearer the truth.  There were only discrete states seeking individual versions of their national interests defined in terms of power. 

In conclusion the apportion of blame is the most important factor, to blame both sides is the easier option, in fairness there is nothing wrong with the post revisionist view, indeed this view must be looked upon as the more favourable to both parties; surely a lack of an admission of guilt must sit comfortably on the shoulders of the men in power both previously and today. The progression of history has thrown up more theories that try to explain the cold war; the realist theory, is an example of this and seems to be a continuation of the post revisionist theme with very little difference.

Yet the cold war, in my opinion cannot be so easily dismissed, there has to be a point in time where the apportion of blame can be handed out.  Understandably this point is hard to find.  Gaddis blames the United States for the cold war; “they had vast military and economic superiority over the soviet union.”  And therefore should have known better?

If the United States had such a large advantage over their supposed allies, then it can be argued that the Soviet Union saw this, and become so obsessed with achieving the same level that they inadvertently started a cold war?

The revisionist view fails to change the perceived image because it suffers from a lack of true evidence proving otherwise.  It is often the first explanation that holds the most truth; this is why the point in history that can be recognized as being the cause of the cold war is the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.  Whether or not the Bolshevik government knew this is debateable, however blessed with knowledge or not, the over throw of the Tsar would split the world.  It was only the intervention of the Second World War that prolonged the beginning of the cold war.  So to end it was an expansionist soviet union that plunged the world into a cold war.

Bibliography

• Rraler, Seweryn and Mandelbaum, Michael “ The Global Rivals, the Soviet – American contest for supremacy.”  (London 1989)
• Gaddis, John Lewis “the united states and the origins of the cold war1941 – 7” (Columbia university press 1972)
• Young, John W “cold war in Europe 1945-89, a political history” (Edward Arnold 1991)
• The longman companion to cold war and détente 1941 – 91 (longman 1993)
• Macdonald, Douglas J “communist bloc expansion in the early cold war.  Challenging realism, refuting revisionism” (International security vol 20 no 3 Winter 1995)
• Yergin, Daniel “Shattered Peace: the origins of the cold war and the national security state” (Andre Deutsch 1977)
• Walker, Martin “the cold war” (vintage 1993)

Internet Sources

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