One of the most significant mistakes made by U.S. leadership during the conflict was the decision to wage limited war, or a low-intensity conflict. Such a strategy is characterized by limited action against the enemy as opposed to full, intense fighting. Rolling Thunder was an air campaign exemplifying limited war. Its goal was to bomb North Vietnamese targets to support the escalation of U.S. troops in Vietnam by reducing NVA infiltration to the South. Rolling Thunder was largely a failure due to the North Vietnamese cooperation and resilience in precautions and repair (McNab and Wiest 143). Also, since North Vietnam was not highly industrialized, bombing did not severely affect the North. Furthermore, the infrastructure of the North remained strong as the North constantly rebuilt. Generally, the underestimation of the enemy by U.S. leadership made Rolling Thunder a failure.
However, perhaps the most damaging effect of the limited war was the creation of a war of attrition (Hunt and Schultz 43), where each side did not make significantly large strategic or territorial gains. The famous search-and-destroy missions were meant to solely eliminate communists from the Southern population (Kolko 102). Since the U.S. did not hold territory but operated from central bases, the VC and NVA were allowed to return to their areas. The centralized Americans were easy prey for the versatile enemy. Also, the fact that the U.S. did not hold ground made pacification of the population, which involved removing VC and preventing infiltration, difficult. The U.S. did inflict heavy casualties on the VC and NVA. However, the North did not surrender, for the casualties did not have the psychological effect that the Americans presumed they would. In addition, the ability of U.S. forces to inflict losses was greatly restrained by the enemy’s ability to retreat to Cambodia and Laos (Thompson and Frizzell 42). The American leadership was reluctant to enter those countries for fear of a high-intensity conflict. In addition, VC infiltration increased in 1965, further compounding the problem (Pentagon).
Some historians argue that it was not the government’s inappropriate decisions that lost Vietnam, but rather the public’s lack of support and trust for the conflict. The basis of this viewpoint is that if the public would have had greater support for the government, the war could have ended differently. For example, if public support had been high, draftee morale would consequently also have been high. This support would have allowed the government to wage total war, including fully invading Cambodia and Laos. Overall, such approval would have allowed the U.S. to decisively cripple the North through total war.
Many factors caused public support to decline as the conflict proceeded. One of the foremost public grievances was the large troop commitment in Southeast Asia. The military was also forced to resort to the draft, creating more public opposition. However, probably the most significant factor that turned people against the war was the government secrecy. The government misled the populace about the progress of the war. When Daniel Ellsburg released the Pentagon Papers to the public, large protest ensued. The public was angered to learn the true nature of the war, which was detailed by the papers. For example, the papers revealed the existence of covert and search-and-destroy missions. In addition, the people were appalled that the U.S. was not doing as well as the government had stated.
Eventually, the government, under public pressure at home and high casualties in Vietnam, decided to withdraw troops from the conflict. This process was termed Vietnamization. Its object was to gradually prepare the ARVN in the South to fight alone while withdrawing U.S. troops from the region. Nixon stated that the U.S. was not humiliating itself by withdrawing, for withdrawal was believed to be an optimum way to end the conflict. In addition, Nixon discussed the low public support at home and its effect on the prolongation of the war. This argument is presented when he stated, “The more divided we are at home, the less likely for the enemy to negotiate at Paris.” (Nixon) However, a major flaw of Vietnamization was the inability of the South to have military and political superiority over the North. In fact, the large commitment of U.S. forces was necessary to halt the South’s losing trend at the end of 1965 (Pentagon). In the end, however, the South was not able to hold and Saigon fell.
The United States failed to achieve its objectives in Vietnam. Political, military, and social problems plagued the United States during its involvement in Vietnam. Politically, the South did not have sufficient influence over its people to ensure population security and to keep communists out of the Southern population (Hunt and Schultz 87). Militarily, the U.S. did not have an appropriate strategy to counter guerilla warfare, as seen when the Americans fought a war of attrition. Socially, public support was low at home. In summary, the entity most at fault for losing in Vietnam is the United States government, for public support does not have a significant effect on government policy. The U.S. leadership was too greatly affected by dissenting public opinion. Because of fear that escalation would cause public outrage, the military waged limited war, an inappropriate strategy to counter guerilla warfare. An apocryphal quote from the Continental Congress states “a leader owes his people his judgment.” In Vietnam, many failures in leadership occurred. The government failed to fully utilize its judgment, thus losing the war in Vietnam.
