US policy of Containment:
American foreign policy was centered on the policy of containment. Containment was the strategy of confining communism in particular, as it was the United States’ primary concern in the Cold War era. George F. Keenan, who introduced the policy, saw containment as having specific goals. Firstly, it was to restore the balance of power by encouraging self-confidence in nations threatened by Soviet expansionism. Secondly, it was to reduce the Soviet’s ability of projecting power outside the USSR by exploiting tensions in the international communist society. Lastly, its most ambitious goal was to modify the Soviet conception of international relations. Keenan’s containment, however, differed from the containment applied by the US later on. With the communist Soviet Union and communist China, the US felt greatly threatened by the two and felt it was imperative that communism would not spread to other regions in Asia. However, the aim of the policy of containment was modified from just simply containing communism to limiting any regional or global power from becoming prominent. This was because spheres of influence was an important concept during the Cold War and it was seen as a direct threat to American power and security. The US viewed India as a middle power and its policy of containment was aimed at stabilizing India’s power as well as focusing it towards its own requirements. The objective behind containment was to create a balance of power favorable to the US and by containing China, the Soviet Union, and India, the US was hoping to achieve equilibrium in the Asian region.
Vietnam War and its impact on Indo-US relations
In the mid 60’s, the seemingly strong relations between the USSR and China broke down therefore altering international order. China isolated herself but it increasingly felt threatened by its strong Soviet neighbor and chose to then support the US as part of a security strategy. The US accepted China’s new stance because it helped in reducing Soviet influence in the region. At this crucial time, India was having trouble with Bangla refugees from Pakistan and depended on US support, however, the US was concentrating its efforts on outweighing Soviet influence and completely ignored India’s need for attention. Moreover, an alliance between Pakistan, China, and the US was formed and the US was giving military aid to Pakistan in a time of high tensions and perhaps war between India and Pakistan, further aggravating India. Nevertheless, it was the stance of both the US and India that really created rifts in the US-Indo relationship. The US heavily intervened in Vietnam to assert its power in the region. It needed international support, especially from Third World Countries, of which India occupied a prominent position, to quell opposition in the US. India felt the US’ interventionist actions were unjustified even though they claimed it was their obligation and what was expected of them. In a visit to Moscow in 1966, Indira Gandhi and Leonid Brezhnev issued a joint communiqué stating their parallel beliefs. President Johnson reacted bitterly to Indira Gandhi’s open condemnation of American action in Vietnam by delaying shipments of wheat to India. India’s anti-American policy could be contributed to the fact that India was retaliating somewhat for the US’ diplomatic and military support to Pakistan over the Kashmiri issue. Some historians, such as Mohite, view the Vietnam War as a crucial and roughest period in Indo-US relations.
The Bangladesh War and its effects on Indo-US relations
In the early 1970’s, there was struggle within Pakistan over the leadership of the country. The overwhelming results of Sheikh Mujibhur Rehman (East Pakistan) over Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (West Pakistan) resulted in vast amounts of violence, as Bhutto wouldn’t accept the results. Shiekh ordered for genocide in order to suppress the opposition from West Pakistan. The internal instability in Pakistan created an economic burden for India because of the immense number of refugees. The cost to India amounted to $200 million, more than a war with Pakistan ($70 million). Gandhi therefore urged the US to suspend all military aid to Pakistan as weapons supplied by the US were used against the Bengalis. In addition, she protested against the violation of human rights and the use of violence. She expressed her dissatisfaction with Nixon for continuing the arms flow to Pakistan after the events in Bangladesh. The Nixon administration had to discontinue the supply of arms to Pakistan, as it did, to maintain America’s claim to moral and human values since these were elements of US foreign policy. The US may have intentionally not supported India because it was seeking to diminish Soviet influence in the region and would achieve this by allowing India to suffer economically, and eliminating Pakistan’s rival and the Soviet Union’s ally. US efforts to emerge as hegemonic power in Asia were apparent through its cynical policy and attitude regarding India thus damaging the relations further. Moreover, relations between India and the US continued its downward decline as the US chose to remain neutral in an event of a Pakistan-India war with possible Chinese intervention. Gandhi saw only one possible way out, to advance India’s friendly relationship with the Soviet Union and thus signed a “Twenty year treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation” on August 9th, 1971. Therefore essentially there were two partnerships that resulted because of the various complications in Indo-US affairs, that of India and the Soviet Union, and that of China, Pakistan, and America. The US increasingly followed a model of “those who are not with us are against us” because it wouldn’t accept India’s cordial relations with the USSR and sought to take every action possible to pressurize India. Nixon ordered the Navy to position the nuclear powered USS Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal and this incident is described as “a climactic moment in Indian-American relationship,” by historian John Irwin since the more aggressive actions the US took, the weaker the relationship with India got, and the stronger India’s relationship with the USSR became. The US’ policy was aimed against communism, however, it’s clear alignment with China proved that it’s policies were perhaps unclear. The same can be argued against India, however, Gandhi didn’t commit India to supporting the Soviet Union militarily if a conflict arose, thus labeling the relationship between India and the Soviet Union as more of a harmonious one whereas the US supported both China and Pakistan militarily. India did stick by its policy of non-alignment to a great extent.
India’s role and policy on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament:
India’s foreign policy was centered on moral values and non-violence. In an effort to spread its philosophy of non-violence disarmament became an integral part of Indian foreign policy. India believed that disarmament was a means to accomplish some of its general goals such as peace and equality, economic progress, and development. It was a belief that economic progress could be achieved by a reduction of military budgets as that would not only serve to the cause of disarmament and lessen the arms race but it would also re-allocate resources towards more productive uses, especially in developing countries. A chief goal of India’s was the development of underdeveloped countries, and so Gandhi viewed disarmament as an effective means by which to achieve two of its main goals, disarmament and economic progress since the re-allocation of resources would lead to a more productive economy and thus bridge the gap between rich and poor countries. The encouragement of both collateral and confidence building was seen as essential in order for countries to disarm effectively especially if nations were to consider cutting military expenditure. Furthermore, India believed in complete and not partial disarmament and thus found “ the reduction of armament” unsatisfactory. To India disarmament meant the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, the compliance of all countries, and the removal of national military forces with the exception of domestic police or militia. However, after the crisis of 1962 with China, India increasingly was threatened and thus modified its idea on disarmament of forces shifting its focus to military budget cuts and the reduction of nuclear threat. India’s position on the issue hence became somewhat ambiguous. Nevertheless, India considered nuclear weapons as the central problem of disarmament. It was India’s policy to assess issues according to their merits and therefore supported plans, proposals, or ideals on the basis of what was most likely to help in eliminate the causes of war. On the other hand, India opposed proposals that dealt solely with nuclear disarmament, as they preferred a simultaneous approach to nuclear weapons and disarmament. In addition to the threat of nuclear weapons, India regarded the aspect concerning biological and chemical weapons as they viewed such weapons’ existence as a force that would exacerbate international tensions. Therefore, India supported the Geneva Protocol (1925), the General Assembly resolution 2162 and 26038, and the BW Convention, which was signed on July 15, 1973. Gandhi advocated non-proliferation, however, because of China’s acquisition of nuclear arms, India’s security was threatened, and thus she started reviewing India’s stance on non-proliferation.
After the Second World War, India’s policy on nuclear non-proliferation went through a drastic transformation, as they would no longer promote it. This was largely due to the discriminatory aspects of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which promoted disarmament but bestowed no responsibility on the super powers to disarm. The NPT wasn’t acceptable to India in its present form as it was seen as a tool used by nuclear powers to segregate the world into those with the nuclear weapons and those without them. India therefore sought to develop its own nuclear programme and emphatically pointed out the significance of science and technology, in attaining self-sufficiency and maintaining independence in international security relations. Gandhi repeatedly asserted India’s rationale behind developing a nuclear programme while promoting non-proliferation, by reiterating that nuclear weapons were only being developed by India for peaceful purposes only. India demonstrated its mastering of nuclear technology the first time it exploded a PNE in 1974, and was the first time it detonated a nuclear device underground. To India, “it represents our resolve to develop our indigenous resources of energy for the benefit of our people through our own efforts.” The testing was carried out due to domestic pressures and security concerns. However, this created a stir in the international community when India received mixed reactions from Japan, France, Canada, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and the US. The non-aligned countries however did not express either satisfaction or dissatisfaction but did express their pride and happiness at India’s success in the field. After the testing of a nuclear device at Pokharan, the US and Western community put pressure on India to accept international controls and safeguards on its nuclear plants but it was the US that relentlessly attempted to coerce India into accepting international controls and safeguards on all of its nuclear installations.
US role and policy on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament:
Initially the US was receptive to India’s demands of disarmament though it was against their national interests because it would affect their capabilities globally. Both the US and Soviet Union progressed on the issue simultaneously as otherwise each would feel threatened by the other’s power. Both powers moved gradually towards complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of the disarmament process. The US and Soviet Union proposed the NPT but as India chose not to recognize it, the US felt threatened. After the testing at Pokharan, US officials claimed that India was trying to “build its own independent center of power, and to have ambition to be the system builder for the region.” The US felt susceptible as India was undoubtedly the strongest power in South Asia and the only other mainland Asian power that could act as a counterweight to China, the US’ ally. US policy makers claimed that India was offsetting the balance in the region, directly affecting its allies, China and Pakistan, and that it was heightening tensions between India and Pakistan. Therefore the US terminated supplies of enriched uranium to Tarapur asserting that it would seriously hinder US efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation in South Asia. The US policy on nuclear non-proliferation was seen as highly biased by the Indian officials. This is because the US was adamant in trying to impose restrictions on India’s rights to build a nuclear programme by first adopting a Non-Proliferation Act (NPA) in 1978 requiring India to allow international inspection and safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. It was a condition necessary for the continuation of US support but was in direct violation of the 1963 agreement with India; hence the US had to re-frame its policy requiring a range of safeguards as a requirement for nuclear cooperation. The Indians deemed this as bigotry because China was able to benefit from US cooperation without having to comply with any of the conditions the US was forcing upon them. It was blatant to the Indian government that the US policies on the Tarapur issue were not based on moral or legal factors but rather on strategic concerns in the South Asian region.
Mattoo and Bajpai. The Foreign Policy, Peace and Security Series. Har-Anand Publications, 2002, New Delhi.
Emeka Ohajunwa. India-US Security Relations 1947-1990. Chankya Publications, 1992. New Delhi.
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“India and Disarmament: An Anthology of selected writings and speeches.”External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 1988. New Delhi. “Mankind today is at the crossroads of nuclear peace and nuclear war. There can be no doubt that we should take the road to nuclear peace. But the first step in this direction is not yet in sight. It is vitally important, therefore, for the nuclear weapon powers to undertake as soon as possible meaningful negotiations on a series of measures leading to nuclear disarmament. The present draft treaty acknowledges the need for such negotiations, but unfortunately, the non-participation by some nuclear weapon powers will make it only partially effective, and what is more, the other nuclear weapon powers insist on their right to continue to manufacture more nuclear weapons. This is a situation which cannot be viewed with equanimity by non-nuclear countries, especially as they are called upon to undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons for their own defence.” Indira Gandhi, April 5th, 1968.
Emeka Ohajunwa. India-US Security Relations 1947-1990: Disarmament and Nuclear Proliferation. Chankya Publications, 1992. New Delhi.
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