Why did Stalin become Soviet leader by 1929?

Simon Brown L6LJ History - Stalinist Russia

From 1924 to 1929, Stalin rose to power from the most unlikely of backgrounds. The rise to power is considered to be very complex but ultimately it is apparent that after Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin’s great ambition and true character began to shine through but was realised too late by the other personalities vying for power also. What was initially intended by Lenin to be ‘collective leadership’ after his death, ended in the emergence of what was to be a fearsome, totalitarian dictator.

In January 1924, Lenin died leaving a political vacuum. Rivalry was rife among the seven members of the Politbuerau. Lenin wanted collective leadership once he died in which all seven would work together to lead the Soviet revolution of Russia. It became increasingly apparent, however, that this was not to happen. Stalin was seen as a boring, anonymous, ‘grey blur’ of a bureaucrat and one that did not pose much great threat to the other six members of the Politbuerau vying for power. Where Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev were all idealist, extreme left wing communists, Tomsky, Bukharin and Rykov were at the opposite of the spectrum. Stalin, however, appeared to have been in the centre. He used this position to gradually push out the other six members whenever the opportunity arose. This use of opportunism was to be an important part in Stalin’s campaign securing power. Trotsky made one too many errors which led to his early downfall even though he was initially favoured by Lenin and appeared to be the strongest candidate for achieving the power they all wanted. Trotsky criticised Lenin’s New Economic Policy for its ‘betrayal of communism’ (an ill-fated move as speaking ill of the dead, especially the Soviet’s worshipped ruler, was considered betrayal in itself), and also verged close to trying to factionalise the party (split it up, going against Lenin’s rule ‘On Party Unity’. This effectively caused Zinoviev and Kamenev to disassociate themselves from him, leaving the left wing outnumbered against the right. They also, however, criticised the idea of ‘Socialism in One Country’, the idea that communism in Russia had to settle before spreading the ideals across the world, alike Marx’s initial prophecy. The left-wingers believed in a ‘Permanent Revolution’ following the Marxist ideal and spreading communism immediately. This was defeated by a vote in the 1925 Party Congress and so Kamenev and Zinoviev were immediately demoted. Three members of the Politbuerau, the Leftists, were out of the political rat race and so Stalin turned against the Rightists. He demanded the NEP was to be replaced by rapid industrialisation, the right-wingers, however, wanted the NEP to continue but were swept aside by votes in 1929.

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Looking at the series of events ending with the defeat of Rightists in 1929 it becomes clear Stalin was not the boring, ‘grey blur’ that he was initially described as. Stalin’s character was driven and ambitious to the point of ruthlessness. Liberal historians saw him as a deceiving manipulator compared to the ‘effective administrator’ label given by structuralist historians. To a point, he was a mix of both. He used the party bureaucracy to gain power as in 1922, once he became Party General Secretary, he began to appoint new members who would eventual owe loyalty to him. By extending his patronage network he could rid opposition by votes when the occasion arose. This was his shrewd and effective administration, which later proved to be extremely beneficial when it came to outvoting the Leftists and Rightists in 1925 and 1929 respectively. Stalin’s ruthlessness and ambition proved effective by 1924 as he emerged from the chaos that prevailed in Russia up to that time.

In the events leading up to 1922, Russia was under great strain from various sources. Russia was still coping with the after effects of the First World War, of which they pulled out to settle the civil war that was rife within the country. A communist Russia was beginning to take shape as Tsarism collapsed but for some time left much political uncertainty and unrest. All of these also greatly affected Russia’s economy, which was also in chaos, mimicking the chaos personified in the country itself. By 1922, and more clearly in 1924, however, Stalin emerged from this chaos as an ambitious man with strong leadership, admittedly in the form of ruthlessness, and strong control. He appeared to be a man with great vision and also possessed a common appeal that the other intellectual personalities vying for power did not have. Stalin’s unlikely background was not one like Trotsky’s wealthy Jewish past. He was the son of a cobbler from peasant stock and because of this upbringing in Georgia (an unlikely home state of a future totalitarian dictator) he developed a deep sense of class hatred. These feelings were like that of many peasants and workers in Russia and so gave common ground between Stalin and the people, boosting his popularity across the whole board.

Ultimately, therefore, one of the main reasons for Stalin becoming Soviet leader by 1929 was his personality and character. His work with such jobs as Party General Secretary was extremely shrewd and calculated, all geared to aiding Stalin gaining power. This control and apparent ‘strength’ as a politician of sorts shone through the cloudy chaos left by civil war and a failing economy to allow him to achieve more ground into helping his cause. This and his ‘common’ background in sharp contrast to the educated/intellectual and seemingly arrogant personas of the other ‘leadership contenders’ provided in-touch appeal to many of the people that counted in making the communist revolution stick - the peasants and workers. Overall the initial description in 1924 of which Stalin was a ‘grey blur’ was effectively misjudged. Stalin’s effective administration, however, was also assisted in itself by the opportunities that arose. Stalin made great use of the mistakes of others, reaping the rewards time and time again.

Stalin was an opportunist. This is clear from the start of his campaign in 1924 when Lenin died. Although not at all favoured by Lenin in any way (Lenin believed Stalin to be boring and not ‘up to the job’ of being the supreme leader of the Communist Party), Stalin took advantage of Trotsky’s lack of attendance at Lenin’s funeral by delivering the Oration, appearing in public as the chief mourner. If Trotsky attended he was much more likely to have taken that post of delivering the Oration as throughout Lenin’s life, Trotsky appeared to be much more his ‘right hand man’. Although not the most favoured, Trotsky was still the most prominent man to take over from Lenin after his death. Ultimately, however, Stalin took advantage of Trotsky’s mismanagement and appeared, to the public at least, to be Lenin’s natural successor. Much of Stalin’s opportunism, however, is due to Trotsky’s mismanagement of events. It can be seen as either Trotsky himself being a reason for Stalin’s rise to power, or Stalin’s management of Trotsky’s political gaffes.

Trotsky was the most prominent character of the seven members of the Politbuerau. Initially he seemed as the natural successor to Lenin’s rule even though he wasn’t as much an intimate of Lenin as Bukharin or Kamenev but through a series of ill-fated blunders on his own part, he saw his prestige from his leadership of the Red Army dissolve into nothing. Compared to that of Stalin’s character, Trotsky had several advantages and disadvantages. He had superior intellect and a wealthy background much more expected of a leader. Despite this, however, he was not popular purely on social grounds, perhaps something Stalin had (although limited on the basis he was still seen as ‘boring’). This unpopularity among other members was vastly due to his arrogance and indifference to the party. This again shows how Stalin’s character and persona was a main reason for becoming Soviet leader. Compared to Trotsky, Stalin had a great advantage. This was only converted, however, once Stalin used the key part of his personality - his opportunism.

Not only did Trotsky fail to attend the funeral of Lenin, he openly criticised Stalin and his loyal bureaucrats. Stalin therefore used this opportunity to use Lenin’s rule ‘On Party Unity’ to claim Trotsky was attempting to split the party. This continued to show others Trotsky’s total disregard for Lenin but that Stalin was still a loyal follower to Lenin’s legacy. The final ‘nail in the coffin’ was when Trotsky attacked the New Economic Policy initially set up by Lenin. He became alienated and as a result went into obscurity for many years until finally being deported in 1929 once Stalin had supreme power.

Therefore two other reasons for Stalin becoming Soviet leader by 1929 were Trotsky, the only major threat to Stalin gaining power, and Stalin’s own opportunism according to the prospects that arose. Ultimately, Stalin’s opportunism is a more important factor than Trotsky himself for it also enabled him to exploit divisions within the party bureaucracy over the NEP and ‘Socialism in One Country’ and not just push Trotsky out the picture by taking advantage of his mismanagement.

In conclusion by 1929 Stalin had effectively defeated both the Leftists and Rightists of the Politbuerau via his personality, his opportunism and the opportunities that arose, Trotsky’s political gaffes that saw him fade away into obscurity after initially being Stalin’s main contender for supreme leadership and finally the party bureaucracy. Ultimately the most important reason was his opportunism. This allowed him to gain political ground shrewdly and swiftly whilst still holding onto loyal supports gained from his administration as Party General Secretary. Such a job allowed him to build up a large patronage network, which would prove useful when exploiting the divisions within the party over such issues as the New Economic Policy and ‘Socialism in One Country’. This was done by means of votes, in which the many loyal to Stalin voted his way. His opportunism overall, however, enabled him to take advantage of such loyalty to its utmost and to push his strong, ambitious nature into the public spotlight so by 1929 he was the undisputed supreme Soviet leader.

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