Describe the main strengths and weaknesses of the cosmological argument for the existence of God.

3) There can’t have been an infinite series of things causing other things to exist.

4) There was a first cause, itself uncaused (God).

Here the second premise is plausible. It is surely true that nothing can cause itself to exist, since the cause must always come before the effect, so the thing would have to exist before it existed, which is absurd. Although a troublesome third premise is here, which we will discuss later.

The third way: the contingency argument 

1) Some things are contingent (they might not have existed).

2) Anything which might not have existed at one time did not exist (no contingent thing is eternal). 

3) If everything were contingent, there would have been a time when there was nothing. 

4) If there ever was a time when there was nothing, there would be nothing now. 

5) There is not nothing now (something now exists). 

     6) Not everything is contingent (something is necessary).

7) Every necessary thing gets its necessity either from itself or from something else.

8) There can’t be an infinite chain of necessary things giving necessity to other necessary things. 

9) There must be a necessary thing which gets its necessity from itself (God).

This argument has a premise like the infinity premises of the first two ways, premise eight. It also contains a serious logical error, which makes premise three false. Aquinas is arguing from "For everything there is a time when it does not exist" (which is what would be true if everything were contingent) to "There is a time for everything when it doesn’t exist." This is not good reasoning. In general, you cannot argue from a sentence that begins "For all F’s there is a G..." to another sentence beginning "There is a G for all F’s...." To see why this is bad reasoning, see the difference between "Everybody loves somebody" and "There is somebody that everybody loves." The first could be true if the whole human population was divided into loving couples, but the second could only be true if there was one person receiving everybody’s adoration. It has been said that even if something is corruptible, it does not follow that it will actually be corrupted. My cat is kickable, but does that mean that I have to kick it? It has been urged that even if we agree that everything corrupts at some time, there is no reason to think that there is some one time when everything has corrupted. In the same way, it might be that everything has a time when it doesn’t exist, but it is a different time for each thing. The objects in the world might have overlapping "lives" so that there never is a time when nothing exists, even though none of the objects are eternal. So premise three is false.

Both of these arguments appeal to a premise in which some kind of infinite series is claimed to be impossible. Why should we accept that? It cannot be that the idea of infinity is itself incoherent, so that infinite sets of any kind are possible.

Mathematicians assure us that the notion of infinity is consistently definable. Some have thought that completed infinities, or infinite collections of actual things ("completed" in the sense that all the members of the collection are present at once) are impossible. The story of Hilbert’s Hotel shows that there is no logical problem with an infinite collection of actual objects. The only possible remaining worry is that there may be some problem with the notion of an infinite past. It seems that if there were no first moment, then an infinite amount of time would have to have passed before now. But it seems that an infinite amount of time can never have gone past, so there must have been a first moment. This would be good reason to think the past could not be infinite, except that it is false to think that an infinite amount of time could not have passed. It only seems impossible if you think of an infinite amount of time passing from the beginning until now. But if the past is infinite, there is no beginning to start from. All in all, we are left without reason to think that the infinity premises of these arguments are true. We also have no reason to think they are false, so for all we know the second way is a good argument after all.

        The cosmological argument seems to be saying that there cannot be an infinite series of causes; that the buck, so to speak, stops somewhere. Aquinas, for example, says that there cannot be an infinite series of causes. They have also asked how can the cosmological argument avoid contradicting itself. If, for example, nothing causes itself how can there be a first cause which does not itself require a cause other than itself?

        William of Ockham raised at least three problems with the Cosmological Argument.

1. Ockham challenges Aquinas’ view that an infinite series was impossible. He maintained that causes could be originating causes and not conserving causes. One could bring something else into existence but then not have to conserve its existence. A mother is responsible for bringing a baby into the world but not for retaining the baby in existence once its grown. Aquinas wishes to establish that the world depends on God now, God did not just create the universe and then leave.

If you are not convinced by Aquinas’ view that the existence of the universe is caused by God then any argument consequent on that on the nature of the conservancy of the world, by God, is irrelevant to you.

2. Ockham queried whether there was any necessary link between cause and effect – the cosmological argument depends on there being a necessary link between cause and effect. Some scientists today believe there are uncaused causes - certain fundamental particles come into existence without any apparent explanation.

3. Ockham did not think it possible to prove that there was only one God nor that the most perfect being possibly existed. Either God is:-

The most perfect being that actually exists, in this case there is clearly such a being but this does not mean it is the Christian God 

or

the most perfect possible being that could exist. However, there is no way of showing that this possible being is also an actual being.

Ockham’s claim is that the most that the cosmological argument can establish is the most perfect being that actually exists and there is no way of moving from this to showing that God is the most perfect possible being.

        Another form of the cosmological argument is the Kalam Cosmological argument which was first put forward by Islamic theologians and philosophers. Kalam means ‘discourse’ or ‘argument’. Instead of arguing that the universe depends on God now, this argument sets out to show that God is the originating course. It can be summarized as follows:

        1.) Everything that has a beginning of existence must have a course

        2) The universe began to existence

        3.) The universe has a course

        4.) The course is God

1 is regarded as being intuitively obvious, although it was a position rejected by David Hume who maintained that there is no necessary course and a suppose effect, the two may just occur together. A ship going through the water may not cause the wake; the wake may occur at the same time as the movement of the ship but without the two being connected. Also, developments in our understanding of particle physics indicate that some particles come into existence without a cause, thus implying that there may be random or uncaused events. However, the claim that some events can occur without any cause cannot be established, as it is possible that present unknown causes may be found in the future.

2 is held to be supported by the big bang theory. This provides a scientific explanation and description of the beginning of the universe. Both supporters of the cosmological argument, and those who deny it use the big bang theory as a proof for or against the existence of God. Scientific observation has confirmed that there was a beginning to the universe, and has provided further evidence that the universe developed a structure very early in its history. The debate rests on whether or not the cause of the Big Bang was natural or divine. Was the Big Bang caused by a spontaneous random event, or by a deliberate action by God?

3 is held to follow from 1 and 2 whilst 4 is held to be the most plausible cause given 3 – particularly if God can be held to be in some sense personal and to be pure mind rather than matter. Mind may be held to be the best ultimate explanation for matter – although if God is wholly simple and timeless there are obvious problems with the idea of God being ‘personal’ or being described as ‘pure mind’ and one would have to resort to analogical language.

Hume, David (1711-1776) was an empiricist. He argues it is impossible to conceive of an effect without conceiving of the cause of that effect, and he concludes that given any supposed effect E which is normally said to be caused by C, we can yet affirm E without implying that C ever existed at all. ‘When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other.’

For example, you through a switch the current flows. The throwing of the switch is the cause, the flowing of the current, the effect.

Nevertheless, if this view of causation is offered in defense of the view that there is no cause of the existence of things, it is open to a rejoinder. For we normally do agree that we have to ask what brings it about that particular things exist. And this point is important in considering the cosmological argument.

Is Hume’s argument such to make it reasonable to disbelieve in the intuitive correctness of the view that if X exists then X is caused to exist by something else?

Hume writes:

“…as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, ‘twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; and consequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction or absurdity; and is therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning from mere idea; without which ‘tis impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a course.”

        But this argument only asserts that because we can imagine something coming into existence without a cause it is possible that something really can come into existence without a cause. Though why say that the cause of existing things does not require a cause of its existence? If it is reasonable to assert that there is a cause of the existence of thing, is it not reasonable to ask ‘What causes the existence of the cause of the existing things?’ For must not the cause of existing things exist? We find ourselves faced with the possibility of an infinite regress. If it is true of A that it is caused to exist by B, why may not B be caused to exist by C,D,E…and so on ad infinitum? If there actually is a cause of all existing things, but if that cause requires a cause and that cause another and so on ad infinitum, then nothing will exist at all. If it is true that the mere existence of things requires a cause, but if there is no first cause of which this cannot be said, then all the things which exist will only be caused by what shares with them the need to be accounted for with reference to a cause.

        The cosmological argument seems to be saying that there cannot be an infinite series of causes; that the buck, so to speak, stops somewhere. Aquinas, for example, says that there cannot be an infinite series of causes. They have also asked how can the cosmological argument avoid contradicting itself. If, for example, nothing causes itself how can there be a first cause which does not itself require a cause other than itself?

        Though this could be debated. If we are talking about God, and if we regard God as the source of existing things, then we could say that God is not a being. Another way of making this point is to deny that the cause of existing things is in a genus or is a genus. It could therefore be said that the cosmological argument can work on the assumption that the cause of existing things is not a thing, in which case the above contradiction would disappear. 

The Kalam argument depends on assumptions that can be rejected, for instance:

that every event has a cause;

that the universe needs an explanation outside the universe;

that the question ‘what caused God’ is illegitimate; and

the kalam argument may be held to point to an originating rather than a conserving cause, and thus to a deist view of God.

         Nevertheless, it does point to the fact that we do not know what caused the Big Bang. Such a question may be beyond reach of science and shows the point at which philosophy must take over. Effectively it labels the explanation for the existence of the Big Bang as ‘God’.

        

Conclusion:

        Like the teleological argument, the cosmological argument suffers from our uncertainty of whether or not the past, like the future, is infinite. If the past stretches back infinitely, then there never was a Prime Cause. If there have been an infinite number of causes in the past then logically there cannot have been a first cause.

        The argument, by itself, only seems to show the existence of a necessary being which is the cause of the universe. While this does include some key elements of the theistic conception of God, it obviously leaves out quite a few important ones. The conclusion is compatible with many views of God. So, even if it is successful, the cosmological argument hardly constitutes more than an entering wedge into the knowledge of God. If someone accepts the conclusion, the proper attitude for him to adopt is surely a desire to learn more about God. 

Brian Davies takes the position that the cosmological argument cannot stand alone as proof for the existence of God, and would have to be supported by other evidence. 

b.) To what extent do the weaknesses of this argument limit its effectiveness? (6)

Immanuel Kant rejected the cosmological argument based on his theory that reason is too limited to know anything beyond human experience. However, he did argue that religion could be established as presupposed by the workings of morality in the human mind (“practical reason”). God’s existence is a necessary presupposition of there being any moral judgements that are objective, that go beyond mere relativistic moral preferences; such judgements require standards external to any human mind-that is, they presume God’s mind.

Although, a person may know that God is omnipresent but that does not mean they fully understand his being. It could be that God is beyond our understanding but that does not necessarily mean that he is.

        The cosmological argument seems to be saying that there cannot be an infinite series of causes; that the buck, so to speak, stops somewhere. Aquinas, for example, says that there cannot be an infinite series of causes. They have also asked how can the cosmological argument avoid contradicting itself. If, for example, nothing causes itself how can there be a first cause which does not itself require a cause other than itself?

        Though this could be debated. If we are talking about God, and if we regard God as the source of existing things, then we could say that God is not a being. Another way of making this point is to deny that the cause of existing things is in a genus or is a genus. It could therefore be said that the cosmological argument can work on the assumption that the cause of existing things is not a thing, in which case the above contradiction would disappear. 

Leibniz is credited with having formulated one of the most fundamental of all metaphysical questions, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Leibniz went on to formulate a version of the cosmological argument similar to, but also different from, that of Aquinas. In place of Aquinas’s observation that every event has a cause, Leibniz observed that every event must have a sufficient reason for its happening. Why there is something rather than nothing also requires a sufficient reason to explain why it should be so. Everything in the world requires a reason for its existence, since nothing happens without a reason. But everything in the world can be explained with reference to something else within the world. Therefore the ultimate reason why there is something at all rather than nothing must come from outside the world. For a sufficient reason to account for the world of reality, there must be a Being which is able to create existence. Such a Being must necessarily exist; that is, exist of itself (Latin, a se). Because there is something rather than nothing, therefore, a necessary Being exists, which we call God. 

Bertrand Russell cast ridicule on Leibniz’s argument, suggesting that you could just as well argue that because everyone in the world had a mother, the human race must also have a mother!

It may be that Russell misses the point here, as Gaunilo did with the ‘lost island’ when discussing the ontological argument. Neither Aquinas nor Leibniz is arguing that because each event in the world requires a casual explanation, the whole series of events that make up the world also require a casual explanation. This would be ridiculous.

The philosopher, Albinos, says simply that something in the form of a sufficient reason, or cause, must bridge the gap between nothing and something. Aquinas is saying you cant have an infinite series of things, each of which needs to be explained by something prior to it, without demanding how the whole thing started in the first place.

        Richard Swinburne agrees with Leibniz, the Principle of sufficient reason demanded that there be an absolute cause or explanation (beyond which it is impossible to go) for the existence of the universe.  This absolute cause must be something from which existence springs. God is a metaphysically necessary, independent being who could not ‘not-exist’; from this necessary being came the contingent universe.

As Kenny says “Aquinas believed that the sun was very much more than a necessary condition of human generation. The human father, he explains…in generation is a tool of the sun…The series of causes from which the second way starts is a series whose existence is vouched for only by medieval astrology…The second starts from an archaic fiction.” 

However, this claim is not very plausible. A supporter of Aquinas may know he held odd views about astrology. He may therefore concede that many particular events are demonstrably mistaken. But he can also add that this point is utterly irrelevant to the arguments of the second way. As the text of Way seems to suggest, the second way is concerned with generous casual questions rather than particular ones. In a sense, it is arguing about causality itself.

Bertrand Russell was simply unimpressed with the argument. He declined even to show interest in an explanation or cause for the world, saying that the world was ‘a brute fact’, that it was ‘just there’. He said it was not necessary to describe things as either continent or necessary. It was not necessary to postulate any previous cause. The cosmological argument, he thought, did not need to be demolished because it was a pseudo problem, not a real one. He argues it is possible to conceive of an effect without conceiving of the course of that effect.

In reply, Frederic Copleston argued if you refuse to sit down at the chessboard, you cannot be checkmated. So he is saying you cannot prove an argument wrong, simply describing it as non-existent, as Russell tried to do. Hume had claimed that it was not justifiable to make the move from saying that every event in the universe has a cause, therefore the whole universe must have a cause. 

        Coppleston believed that the universe must have an explanation whereas Russell saw no need. If supporters of the cosmological argument insisted there must be a cause for the universe, then surely there opponents can insist on a cause for God. If God made the universe, who made God?

        

Conclusion:-

Some philosophers argue that even if there was a first cause of the universe, there is no proof that it is the God of Classical Theism. The first cause could be anything. Hume argued that the first cause, if there was one, could be the material, physical world rather than God. The material world as its own cause is just as satisfactory an explanation as God.

The success of the different versions of the Cosmological Argument depend on a willingness to ask the question, ‘Why is there a universe?’ If you are content simply to accept that the universe is just there and does not need an explanation, or that it can be explained by an infinite regress, then the Cosmological Argument fails. In addition, God must also be shown to be a simpler or better ultimate explanation than the brute fact of the existence of the universe, and the idea of an uncaused cause which transcends the distinction between something and nothing must be shown to be credible.

        As for the Kalam argument. A circle provides an infinite journey. The surface of a sphere provides for infinite movement in all directions. Therefore, it is possible to think of a universe that is limited both in terms of space and time, and yet appears infinite to those within it. Were I to travel far enough, I would return home: familiar to us now, but unthinkable to those who assumed the Earth to be flat and speculated as to what existed beyond its edge. Is the Kalam argument an attempt to speculate what lies beyond the universe's edge.

If the whole force of the argument is to ask for an explanation, then logically one can ask ‘What is the explanation of God? Who caused him?’ And to reply, ‘He is outside the series of explanations’ sounds like an escape to the core of the argument. 

Bibliography

Books:        

Philosophy of Religion for A Level by Anne Jordon, Neil Lockyer, Edwin Tate. First published in 1999 by Stanley Thornes (on coherence Publishers) Ltd.

The Puzzle of God by Peter Vardy. First published in Great Britain in 1990 by Flame, expanded and revised edition published in 1995 and 1999 by Fount.

Philosophy of Religion - The Exam Board. Edexcel – published 2001

Atheism-The case against God by George Smith, published in 1997

Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford University Press, 1979)

Philosophy of Religion, 2nd Ed., Norman Geisler & Winfried Corduan. Baker Book House, 1993.

Class Notes taken from The puzzle of God by Peter Vardy-Fount An imprint of HarperCollinsPublisher, 1999

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion by Brian Davies. Oxford University Press, Walton Street, 1982

Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy by Bertrand Russell, 1990, page 179

G. E. M. Anscombe, “ ‘Whatever Has a beginning of Existence Must Have a Cause”: Hume’s Argument Exposed’, Analysis (1974)

The Miracle of Theism, J.L.Mackie, Claredon Press, Oxford, 1982

The Determinability of God’s Existence, Richard Host. Sydney, Australia, May 1994

Julius R. Weinberg, Ockham, Descartes, and Hume, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1977

Philosophy of Religion by Mel Thompson. Published in the US 1997 by NTC Publishing Group

G. J. Hughes, The Nature of God (Routledge publishers, 1995)

G. W. Leibniz, A Resume of Metaphysics in G. H. R. Parkinson (ed.), Leibniz: philosophical Writings (London and Toronto, 1973)

Questions about God. A guide for A/AS Level students by Patrick J. Clarke. Stanley Thornes (Publishers) Ltd 1999

Dialogues concerning natural religion by David Hume. Published posthumously 1779

A Brief History of Time by Stephen Hawking. Bantam publishers, 1988

The Great Philosophers: An introduction to Western Philosophers, Bryan Magee, Oxford University Press, N.T., 1987.

Brian Davies OP, Thinking about God. Chapman Publishers, 1985

Websites:

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Cosmological argument

Others:

The Cosmological argument. Talk given at the Centre for Philosophical Studies. King’s College, London on March 4th, 1998 by Mr. J.R. Lucas

Class notes on the cosmological argument

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