The opposite of ethical naturalism is Intuitionism. This says moral judgements are based on an infallible intuitive knowledge of good things. Moore, the proponent of intuitionism said that the things that are intrinsically good cannot be defined or analysed, and he said “If I am asked “what is good?” my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter.” Moral words are simple ideas that can’t be broken down, such as “Yellow” (and ‘good’). This word can’t be broken down, because the only definition of ‘yellow’ is ‘yellow’, unlike ‘horse’, which can be broken down and is a complex idea. Anyone who does try to do this (break down an ethical judgement into parts as a fact) is according to Moore, committing a fallacy, the ‘naturalistic fallacy’.
Prichard, another intuitionist, said that you couldn’t link moral obligations to the intrinsic goodness of any action. One should just weigh up the moral obligations they held to the different sides of an argument when making an ethical decision, and your intuition would tell you which obligation is greater. W. D Ross said in a moral dilemma, there are various duties or obligations that we hold that are apparent. We should follow a particular duty (the ‘prima facie’) unless a higher duty exists that compels us to pursue that instead. Ross also differentiated between thing that are right to do, and things that are good to do. To help an old lady across the road is the right action -the right thing to do- but if you are just doing it to gain praise from your minister who is also walking along the road, then it isn’t good, because the motivation or intention isn’t good.
Emotivism and David Hume say that sentiment is the source of right and wrong. If you decide to help someone, you do so because of feelings, not reason. Hume believed that there was a common feeling for each other’s welfare, and we all have a capacity for compassion, which has nothing to do with reason. He said you couldn’t go from a factual statement (an ‘is’) to a moral one (an ‘ought’). Logical positivists (started by a group of philosophers known as the ‘Vienna Circle’) say that moral facts were not like scientific ones. It then went on to say that they were not facts at all. A.J. Ayer said that meaningful statements had to be verified either synthetically or analytically. Synthetic ones are those that can be tested by sense perceptions- e.g. ‘It’s snowing’. Analytic ones are ones such as ‘1+1=2’ and ‘all widows are women’-they are ones that are true by definition. Moral beliefs, such as what is right or wrong arte either moral opinions or religious beliefs, and can’t be verified either synthetically or analytically, so aren’t meaningful. Moral beliefs are not true by definition (a priori) or by the senses (a posteriori). Ethical statements instead simply show our feelings or emotions towards things (e.g. “Henry is good” just shows us that we feel positively towards Henry). This is sometimes called the “boo/hurrah” theory- to say “lying is wrong” is just saying, “boos to lying”. C.L. Stevenson said that if you say “capital punishment is wrong”, you are showing an attitude opposed to it which is formed by fundamental beliefs against capital punishment- be they religious, moral or political- There are strong beliefs underlying peoples beliefs about “right” and “wrong”.
Prescriptivists seek to make moral statements objective. R. M. Hare said moral statements do more than just describe behaviour or express attitudes. He said thy have a prescriptive quality because they command behaviour, guiding actions. If someone says “Abortion is wrong, they are trying to prescribe an attitude and behaviour, and they want others to come to their way of thinking and act in this way. Hare believed that moral statements have a universal character, just as for example if I said something is red, I become committed to the view that anything of the same colour will likewise be red. The judgement that something is red is descriptive because it describes, but also it is universal because it applies to anything similar. Moral statements also hold this principle too- seen in the N. Testament (“do unto others what you would have done unto yourself”), and in Kant’s teachings (“Act only on the maxim through which you can and at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”) Hare argued that moral statements have this universalisability, and it is in our interest to prescribe the advice to others, as we would want to have such advice given to ourselves.
In conclusion I can see that meta-ethics sees ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in many different ways. Naturalists used reason to justify moral statements such as ones including “right” and “wrong”, Intuitionists used a special moral sense to discover the correct moral statements, Emotivists denied the existence of moral facts as being meaningful in any way beyond personal opinion, and Prescriptivists produced an ethical theory that sought to make moral statements objective.
