I, however, believe that Stalinism constitutes an ideology of its own and is distinct from Marxist-Leninism in two ways; firstly, Stalinism was an ideology characterised by a massive drive for modernisation and secondly, Stalin introduced the doctrine of ‘Socialism in one country’. Both of these are relevant to this question because the first relates directly to the emergence of the command economy and the second relates to the ideological concept of diplomatic isolation.
The drive for modernisation comprises Stalin’s policies of industrialisation and collectivisation, two major features of his command economy. The industrialisation programme really began in April 1929, with the submission of the first five-year plan and involved the forcible relocation of a large portion of the peasant population into newly built industrial complexes. In total 19 million peasants permanently migrated to the cities in the period 1926 to 1939. These new industrial centres, were concentrated in the field of heavy industry, such as steel (e.g. the metallurgy combine in Magnitgorsk5) and the military sector. The peasants that weren’t forcibly moved to these industrial centres faced forced collectivisation, which was introduced suddenly and without preparation in November 1929.
Collectivisation was the policy by which communal farms (most farms were run by village communes or ‘mir’) were turned into state-run collectives. All inputs (including, for a short period of time, livestock) was seized by the state and all output was then sold to the state at a set price.
Both of these policies are relevant in that it was through these policies that Stalin was able to grasp political control over the economy; Stalin was essentially deciding what was to be produced, how it was to be produced and who would be producing it.
In order to establish the reasons behind the conception and implementation of the policies of collectivisation and industrialisation, it is helpful to use the conceptual framework mentioned earlier i.e. the four motivational factors behind Stalin’s command economy (personal power, political reasons, ideological precepts and economic realities).
Economically, Stalin was creating the ‘sinews for future growth’ as well as the basis of a modern arms industry. Stalin believed that it was ‘through heavy industry, that the rest of the benefits of the economy would come.’ How exactly he arrived at this assumption is unclear, as the model of growth that he used (i.e. that of ‘extensive growth’), is, and proved to be, unsustainable in the long run. However, the motivational factor of economic growth was present nonetheless.
Stalin also stressed the security considerations of the Soviet Union. Russia had a feeble war industry and lacked steel and machinery-making capacity. The army’s shortage of weapons during the First World War emphasised this point. Although Russia had had the allied exports from France and the UK, the fact of geography had made impeded the flow off supplies. Added to this was the fact that Russia’s allies were by no means certain in the years to come, Stalin believing that the Soviet Union was within a ring of ‘imperialist encirclement’. These economic realities played a large role in shaping the nature of Stalin’s command economy.
However, there were also political factors at work. Throughout Lenin’s period of rule, the working class was small, the majority of the population being peasants (the so-called ‘peasant problem’). This had political implications, as the legitimacy of the Bolshevik party’s power rested on working class dictatorship. Lenin even admitted that “either the political conquests of the Soviet power will perish, or we will rest them on an economic foundation.” The survival of the communist regime depended on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Stalin’s policies of collectivisation and industrialisation effectively created this proletariat by forcing peasants into the industrial workforce and thereby securing the ruling mandate of the Bolshevik party.
By the mid-thirties, the structure of Stalin’s command economy was in place. By 1937, planning was centralised with resources being allocated by the state and party organs. Investment was entirely financed out of the state budget and the market played no role in its allocation. Prices were also set by the state. The political penetration of the economy was almost complete, the party exercising its control by appointments in the economic sphere and direct intervention via central committee officials, with Stalin himself being the supreme arbiter of all matters great and small. In this way, Stalin could concentrate resources on areas of priority without the issue of public opinion, private enterprise interests or considerations of profitability and as such consolidated his personal power.
This move towards centralised planning was a move, not only towards socialism, but also, paradoxically, towards totalitarianism.
The role of ideology also played a part in the shaping of the command economy. The economic fact that the Soviet Union was ‘isolated in a hostile world’ spawned the ideology of self-sufficiency.
The drive for modernisation was one of the two key tenants of Stalinism. This in itself was influenced by political, economic, personal and ideological factors. But the concept of ideology is a theme that must be addressed in itself. It is here where the second characteristic of Stalinism is relevant: the doctrine of ‘socialism in one country’.
To label this doctrine an ideological factor is slightly tenuous as the doctrine itself was the response to actual events as opposed to principled beliefs.
Marxist philosophy was based around the fact that revolution in one country would spark off other revolutions around the world. This clearly was not the case. The West was secure in its capitalist structure and a socialist revolution was unlikely to say the least. This undermined Marx’s theories. In response, Stalin created the doctrine of ‘socialism in one country’, believing that socialism could be built without the need for a world revolution. The ideological precept that was a defining factor of Stalinism was, in effect, merely a response to the diplomatic isolation faced by Russia at the time.
The doctrine of ‘socialism in one country’ then bred the ideology of self-sufficiency. Although economically unsound, the ‘harsh reality’ of the Soviet Union’s situation meant that the concept of self-reliance (made explicit in the second five-year plan) was effectively carried out (e.g. the Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor works and a powerful machine-building industry) and was later exported to the Soviet-type economies of Eastern Europe (e.g. Poland post 1945).
The command economy under Stalin was close to the economic archetype. There was almost total political penetration of the economy: resources were allocated, not by the ‘invisible hand ’ of market forces, but by the visible hand of the state. What was produced, how it was produced and for whom it was produced was controlled centrally (with the exception of small, legal peasant markets). It was this merging of the economic and political spheres that characterised the Soviet Command economy under Stalin.
With regards to the reasons for its emergence, it would be reductionist to link of the command economy purely with either diplomatic isolation or ideological precepts and, by the evidence that I have just put forward, these are only two amongst several explanations. However, the fact that these two factors were chosen for discussion is significant.
The emergence of the command economy was not as a result of either diplomatic isolation or ideological precepts, but both, because one spawned the other. The ideology of self-sufficiency arose out of the fact that the Soviet Union was diplomatically isolated.
And, crucially, the ideological precept of self-sufficiency arises out of the doctrine of ‘socialism in one country’, one of the two key ideological tenants that distinguishes Stalinism from Marxist-Leninism, and hence defines Stalinism as an ideology.
So, in conclusion, I would attribute the emergence of the command economy in the Soviet Union during the Stalin era to a combination of the two factors that define Stalinism itself as an ideology: the push for modernisation and economic growth and the ideological doctrine of ‘socialism in one country’.
The first factor, that of modernisation, was influenced by the pursuit of personal power (the political penetration of the economy meant that Stalin had overall control), economic realities (Stalin’s belief that heavy industry, not demand-driven consumer goods was the key to building a strong economy), and political factors (the creation of the proletariat).
The second factor is influenced by the fact that the economic reality of diplomatic isolation was not an alternative to, but the cause of the doctrine of ‘socialism in one country’. The purely ideological precept of self-sufficiency did play a role in the emergence of the command economy, but it was itself conceived by the fact that the Soviet Union was diplomatically isolated.
In short, diplomatic isolation spawned the ideological precept of self-sufficiency and it was this, combined with the drive for modernisation and economic growth (itself affected by economic, political, and personal factors) that caused the emergence of a command economy in the Soviet Union in the Stalin era.
Bibliography
1. Stalinism and After – Alec Nove, third edition, Unwin Hyman
2. Leninism – Alfred G. Meyer, Cambridge publications
3. A History of the Soviet Union 1917-1991 – Geoffrey Hosking
4. An Economic History of the USSR 1917-1991, Alec Nove third edition, Penguin paperbacks
5. The Politics of East Europe – George Schopflin, Blackwell publications
6. Policy and Politics in Contemporary Poland – Jean Woodall, Frances Pinter publications
7. Economics – Davis Begg, 5th Edition, McGraw Hill,
8. Marie Levigne - The Economics of Transition, second edition, Macmillan press
Although Lenin was finished as a politically active figure by 1923, Stalin’s influence in this economic context did not begin until later on (possibly 1929 with the first five-year plan), so the date of Lenin’s death, as being the beginning of Stalin’s era, is one of convenience and continuity.
Economics – Davis Begg, 5th Edition, Mc Graw Hill, p.9
‘Commanding heights’ were described as large-scale industry, large shops, most wholesale trade, banking and foreign trade by Alec Nove, Stalinism and After, third edition, Unwin Hyman p. 25
Leninism – Alfred G. Meyer, Cambridge publications p. 282-283
A History of the Soviet Union – Geoffrey Hosking, p. 151
See second paragraph on the definition of a command economy.
Stalinism and After – Alec Nove , third edition, Unwin Hyman p. 35
A History of the Soviet Union 1917 to 1991 – Geoffrey Hosking, p.153
The extensive growth model as outlined by Marie Levigne in The Economics of Transition, second edition, Macmillan press p.23 is one that relies heavily on the increase of inputs into an economy to stimulate growth. It is unsustainable in the long run.
Stalinism and After – Alec Nove , third edition, Unwin Hyman p. 62
An Economic History of the USSR 1917-1991, third edition, Penguin paperbacks p. 161
Stalinism and After – Alec Nove, third edition, Unwin Hyman p. 62
David Begg states in Economics, fifth edition Mc Graw Hill, p.556 that all countries can benefit by specialising their production output and engaging in international trade.
Here, Alec Nove is referring to the Soviet Union’s position of diplomatic isolation.
An Economic History of the USSR 1917-1991, third edition, Penguin paperbacks p. 173
Policy and Politics in Contemporary Poland, Frances Pinter publications, Jean Woodall
Reference is to Adam Smith’s concept of market allocation of resources
