From Burma, Chiang was to receive further booty by the transfer of areas in Upper Burma to China. The remainder of the country (and the whole of it if negotiations with Chiang should fail) was to be given independence with the same type of military and economic alliance.
The approach to Malaya was to coincide with the German invasion of Britain, or failing that, with the peak of the German attack. The minimum objectives were the demilitarisation of Singapore and a treaty advantageous to Japanese interests; the eventual goal was the expulsion of the British.
Thailand would receive the territory formerly belonging to it ( UFMS), the Straits Settlements would be placed under direct Japanese rule and the rest of the country was to become a protectorate
Once Singapore was neutralised, Indonesia could be brought into the fold of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, preferably by diplomatic means but if they were unsuccessful, by military action. The area would declare its independence. The government and constitution were to be established by a committee composed of Japanese, island-born Dutch, natives and Chinese in such a ration that the combined number of Japanese and native representatives would comprise more than half of the total. The Dutch Governor-General and high officials would be forced to resign but others would be allowed to keep their positions. There would be a treaty, the terms of which would place Japanese military and economic advisers in strategic positions. Nationalist movements could be evoked and manipulated to suit Imperial interests.
Burma was to be the front line area
Singapore and the Straits Settlements were considered so important strategically that direct incorporation into Japanese territory was planned. In the rest of Malaya, the existing administrative structure was to be maintained as far as possible with Japanese advisers and controllers assigned to the native rulers. A new federation of states would be formed and Japan would assume a protectorate over it as well as over the other states. Control would be centred in a governor-general resident in Singapore. A rise in the “political standard” of the Malayans was deemed a desirable goal but independence was not regarded as within the near future because of the low living standards and the lack of political development.
The Philippines were to be granted independence at an early date, though a central political body was to be established first under a Japanese governor-general.
In Indonesia all other considerations were subordinate to the economic exploitation of the area, which the Japanese regarded as their richest prize in terms of natural resources. They were determined to keep a firm grip on the islands and hoped to assume control with as little disturbance as possible of the existing administration, especially at the lower levels. Increased participation in the government by Indonesians was to be encourage
Japanese Occupation - Its Economic Impact
Pluvier - pp 269-281
Camb.Hist - pp 335-336
1. Japanese rule did not differ from colonial domination in the economic field any more than it did in the political sphere. As a producer of primary commodities and a market for industrial products, Southeast Asia continued to be dependent on outside economic forces and during the war this had shrunk to the Japanese controlled territories of Greater East Asia.
2. In exploiting Southeast Asia’s resources, Japan employed the same methods as the Western powers and throughout the period of her hegemony the interests of the various countries and their inhabitants were subordinated to those of Japan as they had been to those of the West in the colonial era.
Economic Objectives
The main objective of the military occupation of Southeast Asia was economic
The Japanese planned to dominate the economies of the occupied areas through a system of controlled monopolies. Business firms followed close behind the entry of the Japanese flag but all had to obtain prior permission from the army.
Commerce and industry were placed under military control by granting licences to Japanese companies which were to operate Western enterprises under the supervision of the army
It was governmental policy to allow only a few firms, sometimes only one, in each of the main trade lines in each country and to apportion the Co-Prosperity Sphere among several companies.
Although it was at first, somewhat averse to allowing one firm to have a complete monopoly in any field, army policy eventually fostered such a development, largely because it was easier to deal with one central authority rather than with several
The armed forces themselves took over control of communications , railways and river transport.
Japanese banks were allotted various portions of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and Japanese firms were compelled to transact their business with the bank assigned to its area. The banks in turn had to report to Tokyo and in this way an instrument of control over the firms was provided
They took over control of strategic materials such as minerals, oil, rubber and timber as well as the industrial installations and technical equipment connected with their production. They also monopolised the production of commodities like salt, tobacco, cotton, soap and matches as well as requisitioning food. As soon as it was clear that a shortage of rice was developing the Japanese introduced a system of forced deliveries at fixed prices in order to secure sufficient supplies for the armed forces and for distribution in the urban districts. Cattle were requisitioned for transport purposes and for beef and leather while sesame was requisitioned to provide as a lubricant for engines. Such rakishness encouraged opportunities for corruption and extortionist practices either by the Japanese themselves or by the civil servants in charge of administering the scheme and the police who assisted in collecting the quotas that had to be delivered
Enemy property was confiscated for the benefit of the Japanese not the local inhabitants and there was a rapid growth of “joint stock companies”, a common device in China where local concerns were forced to accept Japanese partners. Local businessmen who had hoped that the expulsion of Westerners would secure economic control in their own hands were quickly disappointed .
Army control over business increased which by the end of the war had developed to the point where Japanese companies were little more than army agents and company officials appeared in army uniforms.
Japanese interests were the only considerations and they were not concerned for the public welfare.
Economic Impact of Japanese occupation
Wartime disruption of communications and the devastation of shipping.
The invasion and the scorched-earth tactics of the retreating Allies had destroyed or badly damaged much of the infrastructure of colonial states and brought considerable havoc in the estates and mines of the colonial economy.
The basis of the former colonial economies of Southeast Asia was further undermined by the different demands which the new colonial power made of the region. For example, according to the Commodity Materialisation Plan the value of Malaya, lay in its coal and iron rather than its rubber and tin, while the intention was to extract oil, nickel and bauxite from Indonesia.
The effectiveness of Japan’s command economy, however, rested on command of the sea and air; yet this was short lived, because of American victory at Midway in June 1942.
Trade collapsed owing to a surfeit of traditional exports and a great shortage of vital imports. There were gluts of rice in Burma and Thailand but acute food shortages elsewhere, especially in areas which had become dependent on food imports during the prewar period.
Insufficient goods led to rationing, hoarding, a rampant black market and galloping inflation.
This economic upheaval meant that except for a small minority who won contracts, Southeast Asians in general suffered unemployment, poverty and the loss of basic necessities.
As a result of the exorbitant demands of the Japanese, the system intensified the deficiency of the basic needs of the people. The diversion of sesame oil to lubrication purposes caused a shortage
The Japanese tried to solve the food shortages by forcing people into agricultural schemes, while former plantations were used to cultivate food crops.
The increasingly successful Allied blockade produced sever economic dislocations and the disappearance of Western goods to which the urban populations had become accustomed
The Japanese paid for all their transactions but they did so by issuing currency not backed by gold which in effect made it worthless. The circulation of Japanese currency caused a devaluation of the various Southeast Asian currencies which gradually developed into an inflation when the Japanese increased the circulation of their currency.
Social Impact
Loss of lives as a result of the atrocities committed by occupying forces upon Southeast Asians, verged on genocide in the case of Singapore’s Chinese.
The food shortages reached starvation proportions in some areas and diseases were on an epidemic scale throughout the region by the time Allied forces arrived
Communities were uprooted as families fled the towns to the rural areas to escape direct contact with the regime and squatted on the fringes of the jungle to survive on subsistence cultivation.
Labour was recruited forcibly from the Burmese, the overseas Indian community and Indonesians to build projects such as the Burma railway or military defences.
Men were conscripted for military and paramilitary service or for the Indian National Army
Japanese ‘divide and rule’ policy as in Malaya and Singapore or in Burma aggravated the hostility between ethnic communities that had been latent before the occupation period, such as ill feelings between Chinese and Malays or Burmans and Karens.
Occupation also provoked competition for power within individual communities. However, conflict was less the result of deliberate policy on the part of the Japanese. Conflict was in fact the outcome of economic hardships, changes in political patronage, the erosion of local government and the sheer mutual mistrust of those who were not accustomed to be poor
Japanese Occupation and its impact on SEA economy
1. Basically Japanese rule did not differ from West colonial domination in the region’s economy. As a producer of primary commodities and a market for Western manufactured goods, Southeast Asia continued to be dependent on outside economic forces, although for the region only Japan remained the link with the outside world which owing to the war situation, had shrunk to the Japanese-controlled territories of Greater East Asia.
2. In exploiting Southeast Asia’s resources, Japan applied the same methods as the Western colonial regimes and throughout the Occupation period, the interests of Southeast Asia and their inhabitants were as subordinated to those of Japan as thy had been to those of the West in the colonial era
3. Indo-China and Thailand were the only Southeast Asian countries where a local government was in charge and with them Japan settled economic relations through negotiations. Hence, French business continued to play a role in Indo-China and Thailand remained responsible for her own economic process.
4. In the colonies under Japanese military occupation, the Japanese felt free to carry out whatever policy they wished by following a process of unrestrained economic penetration. The properties of nationals of the Allied Powers were seized and Western owned mines, plantations, factories and commercial firms were taken over by the military administration and either operated by the armed forces or turned over to Japanese companies. The war opened up many opportunities for Japanese business especially for companies like Mitsui and Mitsubishi or banking firms as the Bank of Taiwan or the Yokohama Specie. These were able to secure a dominant position in Southeast Asia’s overseas trade, mining, manufacturing industry and finance.
Tutorial
The breakdown of Southeast Asia’s economy
1. As Japan was the centre of the Co-Prosperity sphere, theoretically she had to supply
Southeast Asia with consumer goods and provide a market for its products. In practice, however, she was incapable of doing so. Japan’s economic basis was too small for such a huge undertaking and especially so now that she was waging a total war. With her industry converted to war production, Japan had very little to spare in the range of textiles, chemicals, machinery or other manufactured articles or capital goods as Southeast Asia needed. Japanese imports into the region did not in any way help the adverse effects of the termination trade with the Western nations. As a result, there was a critical shortage of these commodities in Southeast Asia which badly affected public finance, because of the disappearance of customs revenue, the living conditions of those accustomed to imported goods, especially in the urban areas. Finally, Southeast Asia’s productive capacity suffered from the lack of new equipment and spare parts
2. Japan was unsuccessful in absorbing Southeast Asia’s staple exports. She was greatly interested in rice and in those primary materials and agrarian products which she badly needed for keeping her industry going and conducting the war, such products like oil, rubber, bauxite, raw cotton iron ore and timber. However, these exports were severely hampered by the Allied bombings against Japanese shipping. At the beginning of the war, Japan had the world’s third largest merchant marine, but by the end of 1943, her losses in terms of tonnage were heavy. Hence, there was a virtual collapse of transportation which further diminished the imports of manufactured goods and caused Southeast Asia to lose its external markets.
3. The decline of the region’s mining industry and plantation agriculture was partly owing to the breakdown of overseas transportation. In many cases the industries suffered heavy losses from the destruction during the Japanese invasion and and the departure of European personnel. Furthermore, the mismanagement of mines and factories, technical ignorance and the fact that new machinery and spare parts were unavailable or as in agriculture owing to an inadequate knowledge of plant diseases and proper cultivation methods contributed to reducing Southeast Asia’s capacity
4. Japan was unwilling to promote the region’s production of goods. Industries which produced more than Japan could absorb, like Malayan rubber, Indonesian tin or Vietnamese coal, or which competed with Japanese products, such as Philippine or Java sugar, were only supported or maintained in so far as they satisfied local needs. For the rest, the factories were converted for other purposes, or demolished, and the machinery removed, especially the iron and copper parts which were used as scrap. This was not just straight plunder but was also to achieve the objective of the Co-Prosperity Sphere’s requirements, by encouraging the production of only commodities in which Japan was interested. Hence,the long term result of occupation was the fragmentation of the region’s resources and its production was thoroughly ruined.
Out of the 837 tin mines operating in Malaya in 1940, either with dredges or ravel pumps less than 100 were worked during the occupation period and production fell nearly 90%. Tin mining in Billiton came to an almost complete halt. The acreage under tea in Indonesia was reduced by 52%, that under coffee by 28% and production dropped drastically. In 1942, the coal mines of Tongking were halved compared with the 1937 figure. Philippines sugar, which suffered an immediate setback due to Japan’s lack of interest, was destined to be replaced by cotton. The cultivation of sugar in the Philippines was only sufficient to meet local needs or to produce liquid fuel and alcohol for Japanese military purposes. More than half of Java’s sugar factories were converted for the production of cement and in 1945, the yield of sugar was one-fifteenth that of 1942.
5. The Japanese concentrated on products which they were interested. Thus, the mining of bauxite (for aluminium) in Indonesia was carried on throughout the entire war, with the total output exported to Japan. In agriculture the Japanese also introduced new crops or used existing products for other purposes than they were customarily were. For eg: they converted sesame oil and castor-oil into lubricants.The Japanese had also hoped to set up a large commercial cotton industry in the Philippines.but this was not very successful there was lack of capital, manpower and machinery and cultivation was badly affected by the lack of proper seed preparation and pest control
6. Each territory was forced to stand on its own feet and each had to rely on its own resources which was contrary to the principles the Co-prosperity Sphere plan which provided for the establishment of a viable interlocking economic sphere.
7. From the start there was lack of coordination brought about by the war circumstances and the difficulties of transport and to a greater degree by the autonomous position of the military forces which were in charge locally and whose activities often effectively counteracted whatever programmes of economic development Japan’s experts and the government in Tokyo might have planned
