In 472 BC the league declared war against Carystus, a state that had been unwilling to join the Delian League since it was established. Yet the allies feared dangerous consequences that Carystus might collaborate with Persia due to its close to position to Athens. Therefore Athens would have been much more concerned towards the situation, though the allies would have supported her.
The war was declared on political reasons, as Carystus’ collaboration with Persia would put all the members of the Delian League in danger. Thucydides tells us that ‘in the end Carystus surrended on terms [of the league]’. This case shows a much more appreciative side of Athens as she was looking out for the best interests and safety of the league by preventing a potential danger. But as Carystus was positioned close to Athens, it is possible that the Athenians had been more concerned with protecting themselves rather then the allies as well. Athens may have considering herself threatened. Yet her power to force smaller states into alliance proved to be successful through the results of the war with Carystus. This could be argued as a positive turn out for Athens, yet the league promoted freedom and independence. In theory, Carystus would have been able to choose whether or not she wanted to join the alliance yet it was only through war that she surrendered to Athenian terms. The city of Naxos suffered similar treatment in 469 BC.
Naxos was one of the larger islands in the Aegean and a crucial contributor of ships to the Delian League. However, in 469 BC, she requested to withdraw as an ally of the league and revolted. According to Thucydides, Athens declared war and ‘after a siege, Naxos was forced back to allegiance’. This was the first case in which an ally broke the oath made in 478 BC and as a result, the city lost its independence. By forcing Naxos back into the league, Athens took away its sense of self-government and tributes to the treasury had to continue on a compulsory basis. The revolt of Naxos in 469 BC proved to be a test case for Athens, showing the extent of her power and the extreme aggression that she was willing to show in order to uphold her authority. Though she was legally in the right by warning both Naxos and other allies of the consequences of their actions, Athens had used harsh treatment to for fill the needs of the league – ‘This was the first case when the original constitution of the League was broken and an allied city lost it’s independence’.
Thucydides suggests that the revolts such as those undertaken by Carystus and Naxos were due to the harsh system of finances used to support the league – ‘The chief reasons for these revolts were failures to produce [contributions]…and sometimes a refusal to produce any ships at all’. Failure to produce these payments caused uproar among the Athenians. Strongly determined to uphold the aims of the Delian League, they treated such actions almost to the extent of treachery. This seems ironic, as on a number of occasions Athens went against the beliefs of freedom and independence herself, such as the cases of Carystus and Naxos. The harsh treatment of her allies made Athens unpopular among the members of the league – ‘For the Athenians insisted on obligations being exactly met, and made themselves unpopular by bringing the severest pressure to bear on allies who…did not want to make [contributions]’. Thucydides also believed that it was the flaws of the allies themselves that gave the Athenians their unpopular appeal. Most were reluctant to provide military service and instead paid money to the league. According to Thucydides, ‘the Athenian navy grew strong at their expense, and when they revolted, they always found themselves inadequately armed and inexperienced in war’. By this time in the progress of the Delian League, Athens’ treatment of her allies had begun to change, though it was to become much more ruthless and intentional in the future. It could be interpreted that the reason for this way of treating the allies was a way of upholding her position as leader, as shown by the oath of loyalty.
A turning point in the progression of the league occurred in 468 BC at the Battle of Eurymedon. The coast of Caria was still under Persian control and Cimon was determined to clear the area entirely. The battle was fought on both land and sea and both times the Athenians claimed victory. They managed to defeat the Persian navy and clear them from Caria. This double victory meant that Cimon had justified the existence of the Delian League and carried out its objective of freeing Greek cities and towns that had fallen victim to Persia. However, the riches collected from the war were used to rebuild the city walls of Athens. Despite her victories, Athens took advantage of the league’s purposes by taking the riches and using them for her own benefit. Yet she could have easily argued the same case as Scyrus – that this was a form of compensating what had been lost at the hands of the Spartans. More importantly, the league had for filled its key aim and eliminated the threat of Persia from the Aegean. Most allies believed that the Delian League no longer had a purpose. Yet the decision lay with Athens. Her decision was made clear after the case of Thasos.
The revolt of Thasos in 465 BC revealed Athens’ decision to take the league much further beyond its original aims. Thasos was a rich and powerful city in the northern Aegean, which had a strong fleet of ships and extensive mining and trading interests with Thrace. Thasos came into conflict with Athens during a personal dispute regarding the gold, which Athens claimed was her own. Thasos revolted and withdrew from the league. A two-year war followed this argument but the result was harsh. Athens confiscated the Thasians’ navy and stripped them of their independence, lowering them to a tribute-paying state. The siege could have been successful for the Thasians, as during these two years they appealed to Sparta for assistance. Sparta agreed to help but were disrupted by the occurrence of an earthquake and the threat of a revolt among the helots. Thucydides describes these events, which occurred at the same time as the revolt of Thasos – ‘ Spartans, without informing the Athenians of their intentions, promised to [assist the Thasians] and would have done so if they had not been prevented by the earthquake…and by the simultaneous revolt…of the helots’. Having no defence from Sparta, Thasos had to except Athenian terms – ‘Their walls were demolished and their navy surrendered; they were ordered to pay an indemnity immediately and to pay tribute in future’.
The revolt of Thasos was a significant turning point in the progress of Athens’ rise to imperialism. It proved that Athens showed no intentions of allowing the states to leave the alliance, or more specifically, to escape her leadership. This was also the first time in which Athens had used the power of League against a member state in private conflict. A fair conclusion at this point would be that the Athens treatment of her allies has reached a new level or inequality, going against the league’s original intentions. But it could be equally suggested that Athens had methods of gaining total power over the allies that were under her control.
According to Thucydides, the events of Eion, Scyrus, Carystus and Naxos were all gradual steps of progressions for Athens’ rise to become an empire. With this intention in mind, her treatment of her allies changed dramatically in order to achieve this aim. However, her main cause for such harsh conduct was to assure that she would not be left the fight the Persian army alone, as Thucydides suggests – ‘Fear of Persia was our chief motive’.
Cities that did not co-operate, such as Naxos, would suffer dramatic consequences for their actions and were demoted to tribute paying states. The league had previously comprised of two different types of members, who would pay either ships or money. However, tribute payers emerged soon after the revolts of rebellious allies, possibly as a way of Athens warning her allies of the penalties of rebellion. Tribute paying states were those who had lost their independence and freedom. Although the battle of Thasos marked a potential end to the cause of the Delian League, the introduction of tribute-paying states hinted at a dramatic change in the nature of the organisation and Athens’ new methods of total control.
During the years 465-460 a major turning point in Athens’ relationship with her allies occurred with the growth of radical democracy. These new policies caused conflict with Sparta, but this made Athens realise that it would be safer to keep her allies close in the case of a Spartan or Persian attack. Therefore she felt forced to pressurise the members of the league further. During the years 459-454 BC, the allies were required to support Athens in the pursuit of her own personal interests. As Athens had the authority to compel her allies, there is no doubt that she had transformed the aims of the Delian League into something that looked out for her own personal security rather then that of the allies as well. An example of this occurred during the war of Athens against Aegina.
Athens’ victory at the end of this war meant that Aegina was forced to pay thirty tributes, the largest amount any other state had been forced to pay previously. A second case occurred at the battle of Tanagra in 457BC, in which allies specialising in sea-warfare were expected to contribute and assist Athens, naval allies having been governed by Athens. Both cases show that Athens felt a need to pressurise her allies further, possible out of fear of an attack from Sparta or Persia. Both cases did not support the original purpose of the Delian League and it is clear that Athens has become much more harsh in her treatment of the allies in pursuit of her own cause. However, Athens could have easily argued that the reason for this treatment was to assure preparation for an attack.
A turning point of Athens’ rise to imperialism occurred in 454 BC, in which the treasury of the Delian League was relocated from Delos to Athens. Although this marked a significant step in the evolution of the league into an empire, there would have been reasons both for and against this act. It is possible that Athens’ purpose for relocating the treasury was for reasons of safety, having recently lost a battle against the Persian army in Egypt. However, upon its removal from Delos, meetings of the Congress of Allies ended and without consulting the allies, Athens took it upon herself to decide what should be done with the tributes and funds. As it had done previously, the Athenian Council was placed in charge of supervising the collection of funds from each paying state. As a further consequence, the funds were used to support Athenian interests within the city itself. Tributes were used to pay for building funds and some even went directly to the treasury of Athene. A similar case had occurred after the battle of Eurymedon in 468 BC, when Athens had used the riches won after the battle to rebuild her city. It is possible that she may have been compensating herself for her losses during the earlier conflict with Sparta. But it is most likely that these acts were evidence of Athens taking advantage of the treasury having moved it to Athens.
By cancelling further meetings of the Congress of Allies, Athens had total control over the treasury and the actions of the league. She could act without even consulting her allies at all. This is evident of dramatic unjust decisions by Athens resulting in a lack of independence and freedom for her allies, all of whom suffered due to these resolutions. They no longer had a say in the progression of the Delian League, which had undergone a transformation into a completely opposite organisation then it had been intended to be back in the early 478 BC.
As well as the words of Thucydides, evidence of Athens’ treatment of her allies exists in the form of a number of inscriptions. These documents dated from 453-449 shortly after the removal of the treasury from Delos. They show evidence of Athens’ continuing progression towards imperialism having recently made a truce with Sparta and renewed the aims of the Delian League to continue the war against Persia. Yet she also continued to keep the allies under her authority. Athenian garrisons were placed in rebellious states to serve a military purpose in the favour of Athenian interests. They were also set up to protect Athenian governors who installed democratic governments within these states. As well as enforcing political and military authority upon the allies, the inscriptions show that Athens also made them swear oaths of loyalty to her – ‘I will not revolt from the people of Athens nor will I permit another to do so’.
Evidence from the inscriptions showed that Athens took a strong hold on judgemental affairs and concerns with law and order. The Erythrae Decree marked the beginning of Athens involvement in legal affairs of treason. As time went on, Athens assured that all legal trials were to take place in Athenian law courts. This affected the freedom of the allies and caused problems for those who lived in states that were a great distance from the city itself. It is also possible that Athens’ authority manipulated certain cases for her own advantage, symbolic that the allies were becoming less influential in the progress of the league.
In 449BC, peace was established between the Greeks and the Persians under the leadership of Athens, represented by Callias. This act of peace brought the war to an end and it was agreed upon that neither side would launch military attacks upon the other. However, Athens had abandoned her allies who were still at war in Cyprus and Egypt. Despite this newly established peace, hostility continued to pressurise the allies and the contribution of tributes had to persist. It was possible that the allies refused to pay these contributions now that peace was established. Surely if the aims of Athens’ reformed league have been for filled, it would have seemed only fair to cancel the contributions. Athens may have intended on continuing the contributions so as to be safe and assured for her future security, or even for her own personal intentions (the rebuilding of her temples and walls). Such an unjust action is evident of her intentions for imperialism.
A law known as the Cleinias Decree was passed in 447BC which marked Athens’ decision to continue the collection of contributions from the allies – ‘The Council…and the Inspectors (episkopoi) should look after the collection of tribute every year and bring it to Athens’. These inspectors were appointed Athenians, who would collect the contributions from the allies. Laws were also set down to assure that those who refused to continue making contributions would have to plead in Athenian law courts with harsh punishment settled if a verdict is claimed guilty.
There is evidence of this from the inscriptions: – ‘When a guilty verdict is declared, the prytaneis are to make a decision as to what the offender should pay or suffer’. Despite the fair nature of these trials, it is possible that Athens’ influence upon law, as well as the fact that these conferences would take place Athens itself, implies that the outcome of trials could be manipulated in favour of the Athenians. A coinage decree was passed between 450 and 446, which enforced the usage of Athenian coinage, weights and measures in the states that she had control over. All currencies were to be melted down and replaced with the new Athenian silver coins, in addition to the usage of Athenian weights and measures. Those who refused to abide by these new Athenian systems were punished harshly – ‘If anyone else apart from the magistrates…fails to act in accordance with the decree…he is to lose his civic rights, and his property is to be confiscated and a tenth given to [Athene]’. Although this change of currency made trade easier, it is symbolic of the allies continuing loss of freedom. Being stripped of their currencies would have been seen as a great offence. But Athens’ intentions are coming to light, as well as her increasingly harsh enforcement of authority upon the allies. There is no doubt that forcing her currency upon the allies is preparation for the day when Athens would finally lead an empire.
The Chalcis Decree, passed in 446BC was landmark evidence of Athens’ rise to power, showing that the allies had become subjects of her imperial influence. The island of Euboea had revolted against Athens and as a result, the Athenian Pericles enforced discipline on the Euboens. The decree passed concerned the city of Chalcis and required them to swear an oath of loyalty to Athens, marking their loss of freedom and independence. The decree assured that they would not revolt against Athens again, and that they would continue to pay tributes and provide military aid in the case of war.
Samos was an ally of Athens that suffered a great loss of freedom in a similar case to that of Naxos back in 469BC. In 440BC, Samos and Milteus raged war against one another over a personal dispute regarding the capture of an island that both states claimed as their own. Samos almost won the battle had it not been for Athens intervention. She ordered a halt to the conflict but Samos refusing to meet Athenian demands and threatened to withdraw from the alliance. Athens took immediate actions and sent forty ships under the leadership of Pericles to Samos. Thucydides accounts that after a nine-month siege, the city ‘pulled down their walls, gave hostages, handed over their fleet and agreed to pay reparations in instalments at regular intervals’. It had been reduced to a tribute-paying subject. As well as this harsh punishment, Pericles established a new democratic government on the island and made the Samians swear an oath of loyalty to Athens. This case was similar to that of Naxos, as Samos had revolted in order to withdraw from the alliance. Athens used her power to force Samos back under her control. Yet the contrast between the two cases was that Naxos occurred during a time when the Delian League aimed to protect the allies from Persia. In the case of Samos, the league had undergone a transformation to become more of a defence for Athens, rather then for the entire alliance. Naxos’ revolt was understandable to the extent that Athens would have needed as many allies to fight against Persia as possible, yet now, her treatment of Samos is evident of her methods to keep her allies in order as she rose to become leader of an empire.
Following the case of Samos, the relationship between Athens and her allies become strained and hostile. The five-year peace treaty between Athens and Sparta was threatened with corruption as the allies began to complain of the bad treatment that they were being dealt with by the Athenians. Yet the reason for this treatment was because Athens felt that she needed to keep her allies close and under strict control, knowing that war was approaching quickly. She was forced to suffer terrible difficulties as a result. An example of this came in 432BC with the case of Corcyra and Corinth.
War broke out in 432BC between Corcyra and Corinth over a case of personal jealousy - Corinth envying Corcyra’s strong naval advantage. Both hoped that they would receive help from Athens by putting their arguments forward. Thucydides accounts that this put Athens in a difficult position – ‘The Athenians realized that if Corcyra required them to join in an attack on Corinth, they would constitute a breach of their treaty with the Peloponnesian’. Corinth was an ally of Sparta and attacking her would damage the five-year peace treaty. After considering the situation, Athens formed an alliance with Corcyra and sent ten ships to assist them under the leadership of Cimon’s son, Lacedaemonius. But they were given strict instructions not to break the treaty and attack Corinth with no purpose. Thucydides accounts ‘the alliance was to be of a defensive character and would only operate if Athens or Corcyra…were attacked from outside’. But also in his account of the events, Thucydides mentions that by attacking a Spartan ally, Corinth had an excuse to make war against Athens – ‘This gave Corinth her first cause for war against Athens, the reason being that Athens had fought against her with Corcyra although the peace treaty was still in force’. The incident created strain on Athens’ relationship with Sparta, yet the case could be viewed on two sides. Athens showed loyalty to an ally through assisting Corcyra, yet at the same time she was going against the treaty. This is similar to the way that she went against the aims of the Delian League in order to pursue her own personal aims.
A second incident, which created further strain on Athens’ relationship with Sparta, occurred in the same year with the passing of the enforcement of the Megarian Decree in 432BC. The decree assured that no citizen of Megara could access the Athenian Agora or any Athenian port. Though more harshly, any Megarian found in Attica would be put to death immediately. Thucydides describes the reasons for this dispute – ‘[Athens] accused Megara of cultivating consecrated ground, of cultivating land that did not belong to them, and of giving shelter to slaves who had escaped from Athens’. Soon after the decree was passed, the Megarians complained to Sparta about the injustice of the act – ‘What of the oaths of peace and friendship we swore, Greek with Greek?’. Upon hearing this, Sparta attempted to stand up to Athens and demanded that she treated her allies with respect, not restricting them of their independence. Yet according to Thucydides Athens showed no intentions of withdrawing the decree. It was the decision of Pericles not to withdraw the decree that gave cause for the Peloponnesian War to commence.
From examining the period of 478-431 BC in depth, it is clear that Athens’ treatment of her allies changed dramatically as she progressed to become leader of an empire. I believe that at first she took her role of leader seriously and intended to uphold the aims of the Delian League whilst protecting her allies. Yet as the time went by, the extreme power that she possessed began to influence her actions.
After the removal of the Delian League from Delos to Athens in 454BC, I believe that her harsh treatment of the members was justified by her aims to keep a close alliance in the case of a Perisan or Spartan attack. However, her increasingly pressurising aggressiveness made her unpopular among the allies. According to Thucydides, even Pericles, a powerful and influential Athenian who had lead the siege against Samos, realised this but also appreciated the dangers of changing this tactic all together – ‘Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go’. To this extent, it is reasonable that Athens should use such extreme measures, as it seemed to be the only way in which she could uphold her power and keep her allies close. Yet by doing so she had transformed the original aims of the Delian League entirely, which had a purpose to promote freedom and independence. In the later cases of Corinth and Megara, it was Athens unwillingness to agree on independence that triggered the Peloponnesian War. In effect, I believe that Athens had helped to end a war, onto to start another whilst in pursuit of her personal desire for imperialism.
