One of the main reasons for collectivisation was to provide investment capital through sales of grain. Economically, most historians agree that collectivised Russian agriculture did not present a great improvement. Ward states that “By the early 1940’s, 50 million Soviet Citizens were still reliant on ration cards for their daily bread and meat production did not reach pre-collectivised levels until after 1953”. Even Soviet production figures are in support of this (despite probable exaggeration) showing a slow path to the achievement of pre-collectivised levels. It has even been observed by economic analysts that a policy of state taxation would have provided more investment capital than the brutal methods used in collectivisation. The low procurement prices offered by the government inevitably hindered grain production, and the class war that Stalin waged against the Kulaks cost rural Russia some of its best workers. Perhaps the only defence of this policy is that its harshness drove workers to the towns where they could assist in the five year plans, but the real cost to the peasantry is simply immeasurable. Thus it would be fair to say that collectivisation actually caused economic regression, and was flawed in the progressive, revolutionary sense as well as economically.
Collectivisation was not just used for economic gain, but for political gain. Harsh policy was designed to break the peasantry and the system of liquidisation of the Kulaks served to rid the countryside of a potentially “capitalist” element. The peasantry were never again able to hold the state to ransom as they had done in 1921, as through a system of control and brutalisation they came to realise the awful power of Stalin and the Russian state, or as Viola states “The process of collectivisation served to brutalise and perhaps atomise the rural population”. From the accounts of Vasily Grossman and Leo Kopelev it is possible to ascertain the extent to which the Russian people were indoctrinated into believing Stalin’s processes were justified, and that the liquidisation of the Kulaks was necessary, or as Kopelev puts it “Our great goal was the universal triumph of Communism”. However this victory is relative as it is extremely counterproductive. The peasantry would squander the food they had instead of giving it up to the state, and gorge themselves on it, if Sholokhov is to be believed, and many peasants welcomed the Nazi’s when they invaded in 1941. Furthermore the Kulaks that Stalin seemed so keen on annihilating who were, in many cases “simple peasants being torn away from their native oil”, perhaps slightly wealthier or more wilful, in that they would not join the collectives. Their wealth would inevitably come from the fact that they had some skill, thus deporting them or executing them served only to compound dire economic conditions. Thus Stalin could be said to have been successful in his political aims, although they potentially hindered collectivisation economically.
It is estimated that the death toll of collectivisation lies somewhere between six and twenty million. Even at its lowest this represents a sickening disregard for human life, and when it is considered that the mortality figures are worse than the effects of “the Great Purge or any of the famines during the Tsarist Period” (Gordon), it is clear that no real revolution took place. Surely no progress is being made when the famines of the Collectivist era are considered to be worse than those of the Tsarist, especially when it is considered that many of the famines were effectively engineered by Stalin, due to importation of already scarce grain. It is argued that life during the Collectivist era was not as uncomfortable as is often suggested, with crèches set up for women workers children and literacy classes started for women. However attendance to these classes was compulsory and harsh punishments were imposed for absence.
Therefore it is conclusion that by no means did Stalin achieve a revolution from above, except perhaps in political terms, which only served to undermine his economic policy, rather I would argue that collectivisation represented an unmitigated disaster for the Russian peasantry.
