The tension during the early 1910’s was still building. Austria-Hungary wanted to strike on Serbia, and wanted Germany backing them for this attack. However, a European war did not break out, as many western-European countries believed that the Balkan Wars (or conflicts) in 1912 and 1913 would be a small eastern-European war which wouldn’t last too long all. The previous Balkan crises before 1914 dramatically increased the tension in Europe, thus having a very strong impact on the July 1914 crisis. One main impact on Europe was the increase in Serbian power. It had doubled in size as a result of the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913, and was a large threat to Austria-Hungary – they could possibly win a war in the future with this power which they had accumulated. Serbia was increasingly become a major power in the Balkan regions therefore was a huge rival to Austria-Hungary in this area. With the current situation that Austria-Hungary was in, they certainly did not want this added rivalry to add to the list. The Triple Entente were already slowly become a strong rivalry against the Triple Alliance because of the power of encirclement which Russia and France had over Germany (an ally of Austria-Hungary), and with the added trouble which Serbia would of created, it could be possible Serbia would dominate in victory. Austria-Hungary felt threatened by Serbians and Bosnians, as many of the Serbians in the Austria-Hungarian Empire wanted to break free from the reign and join Serbia, who was their ‘Slav-State’. This meant that the more powerful that Serbia became, the more agitation there would have been for Serbs to leave Austria-Hungary.
Even though these long standing rivalries existed in Europe at the time, many people ask why war had not broken out before. It has to be mentioned that at the beginning of 1914, Germany was indeed on good terms with Britain. Trading was still occurring on a normal scale between the two countries, however they had also ‘collided’ with one another in the Moroccan Crises. The Balkan Crises previous to 1914, had provided opportunities for war to break out, however this was not the case. In July 1914, Germany believed that it was the perfect time to strike at Serbia. This was due to the fact that they could claim the strike was simply in retaliation to the assassination of the Austria-Hungary’s Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28th June that year. However, during the Second Balkan War in 1913, Germany thought that it was unnecessary to involve them in the war, as they believed the Balkan powers would diminish themselves during the war – of course the total opposite to this theory occurred. Serbia achieved a victory – they had expanded their land ownership during 1912-1913 by two, and therefore their confidence increased dramatically in European affairs.
War was made much more likely by the badly mismanaged crisis in July 1914, and tension at this point was seriously increasing. Germany had promised unconditional support for Austria-Hungary, and in a sense signed a ‘blank cheque’ for alliance co-operation. During this time, the Kaiser went on a three-week cruise – whilst he was away, Austria-Hungary talked to Germany and allowed the military to delay the attack on Serbia. This went completely against what the Kaiser had previously planned. Other military events also made this a seriously badly mismanaged crisis – the Tsar of Russia ordered a partial military mobilisation in order to avoid the Schlieffen. However, the Russian military ignored this, and Germany thus implemented the Schlieffen plan to break out of the current encirclement.
One component in the imperial world view was Social Darwinism. This derived from the works of Charles Darwin, whose theory of evolution aroused considerable interest, and sparked bitter controversy. His ideas were often tentative, and put forward with hesitation – but many of his followers were far more self-confident and they believed that his theories applied to human societies as well as animals. In particular Herbert Spencer produced a specified version of ‘Darwinism’, identifying its main principle as the ‘survival of the fittest’. Spencer said that countries were like animals, and that all had to struggle and fight in order to survive – those who won would grow stronger whilst those who lost would decline and fall. This could be linked to some of the long-standing rivalries in Europe between the late 19th and the early 20th century, and mainly between France and Germany - this long standing rivalry was mainly created in 1870, when during the Franco-Prussian war, the then Germany, took Alsace Loraine from the French, which sparked a bitter rivalry between the two regions. Throughout this time, France repeatedly demanded this land returned, but the newly founded Germany would not give in.
The Fischer Debate provides some key points on why the war could have broken out, and why perhaps this didn’t occur until after the July Crisis of 1914. The main arguments were simple. It was believed that Germany has vast expansionist aims – this became clearer after the war had begun as they started to claim land in Central and Eastern Europe. Also a main argument is that there was a clear and constant link between Bethmann Hollweg to Hitler, with Hollweg being the leading figure in the July crisis rather than the military. Also it is argued that domestic factors shaped the German foreign policy, as a victorious war would consolidate the monarch and hold back reform from taking place – thus showing Germany to be a strong nation. However, there were many weaknesses to this argument. For example, there is no evidence of a unified German plan for war or European domination from both the military and the government. It is also clear that he believes that Germany encouraged Austria-Hungary to start a war with Serbia, and continued to do so even when it seemed clear that war couldn’t be localised. Strong evidence for a weakness to this claim is that Britain and Germany were still trading in early 1914 – there were no published hostile feeling between them. Even though this may be the case, Britain had made plans with France for what they would initiate in the case of a European war including Germany. In my view, some of the claims can clearly be backed up (for example the Germans having extreme expansionist views). However as there is no proof of major military plans for a European war or domination, this argument in my opinion cannot really be strongly supported.
The impact of the long standing rivalries was certainly a key factor of the development of the July Crisis in 1914. The huge rivalry in Europe consisting of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente caused huge tension in Europe in the early 20th century, and in my opinion this can not be forgotten. The main conflict between France and Prussia in 1870 and the ongoing feud between France and Germany (after its formation post-1870 Franco-Prussian war) should certainly be highlighted in this case. The majority of the events that occurred around this time revolved around these two countries constantly, and this can certainly be proved by the evidence provided. With Germany devising the Schlieffen Plan in order to break out of the encirclement, and also to finally crush their main rivalry to their alliance system, the Triple Entente, shows that the German powers were not going to take oppositions to their alliance decisions very lightly. The Germans wanted to get rid of the rise in Socialism (which eventually formed communism) in Russia. By achieving a victorious war, this would boost the popularity of Germany, and show Europe that even though a new country, they should not be taken as a weak one. This not only shows how the crisis in July 1914 was so badly mismanaged, in my opinion it is clearly proven by the implementing of the Schlieffen Plan, when Russia fully mobilised its army when only given permission to half mobilise. By directly attacking the encirclement, Germany had signed the piece of paper which would ultimately lead to war – this happened in 1914 because of the consequences of an incredibly badly mismanaged crisis between the Balkans and Western Europe.
