At the same time, conditions of living for common workers not belonging to Stakhanovities or shock brigades were unsatisfactory: due to increasing numbers of industrial workers of the cities and factory building being a priority of government instead of living houses, there was a lack of living space and most workers ended up in communal apartments, with usually only one room per family. Moreover, industrial goods were the priority of the government instead of consumption goods, which resulted in deficit of many commodities essential to workers. In short, we can say that conditions of workers were not important to the government; the priority was always the economic benefits to the state.
However, the results of industrialisation and 5-year plans to the economy of USSR cannot be denied. In the time period between 1928 and 1937, amounts of production in the heavy industry grew greatly: production of oil by 150%, steel more than 300%, and coal production tripled. Yet, the plans were not fulfilled completely.
Another measure taken by Stalin to build the USSR economically was collectivisation, which caused even greater calamities to the Soviet people. Collectivisation begun in 1928, the official reason being that, as it was estimated, there was a 2 million tons big shortage of grain meant to feed the workers in the cities which would surely lead to famine. The long term solution to this problem was collectivisation- ending peasant ownership of land and agricultural yields and making them work for wages in collective farms, kolkhozes, and sell the production for government-set, permanently low prices. It meant that the peasants would lose their property and financial independence that had been gained under NEP and become completely dependent on the government. Also, this enabled Stalin to deal with one of the classes he considered most hostile to the communist regime- the rich peasants, kulaks, who made up about 5% of all Soviet peasants. He declared in an official speech in 1929 that his intention was to “crash kulaks so that they would never rise again”. Of course, this required drastic methods, which Stalin was truly fond of using. Kulaks were separated in three groups. Ones who were considered to be the most hostile to the regime were sent in exile to Siberia and other remote corners of the USSR to be placed in the labour camps or even executed; the wealthiest kulaks were transported to other regions, and the third group, said to be the least harmful to the regime, were assigned to remain where they lived, but on the worst land. The property of kulaks was confiscated. However, Stalin did not care about the vast expenses of removing so many people, even though the country was claimed to be in a lack of money.
However, kulaks were not the only ones who suffered from collectivisation, nor the ones who suffered most. The peasants, especially in some regions of the country, were strongly opposed to collectivisation. Some left the countryside and moved to the cities to work in the factories, where they had to face lack of space and bad working conditions, and be fast with learning jobs that they had no skills for. Other peasants went further. As a sign of protest, they started a massive destruction of the agricultural yields that were going to be taken away from them: grain, cattle and even the farm buildings. This resulted in drop of food production in the period between 1928 and 1932: the numbers of pigs, goats and sheep fell most drastically, by more than 50% Grain production fell least, only by 7% - because the government did not let the peasants keep enough for their own survival.
Thus, the first consequence of collectivisation was food shortage, which caused much greater famine than Stalin was supposedly concerned about when he triggered it off. The famine killed an estimated number of 5 to 6 million people, mostly touching regions in the Caucasus and Byelorussia.
Therefore, it is easy to see that the massive emigration to the cities and famine resulted in decreasing number of peasants. Collectivisation contributed to industrialisation.
Of course, the famine in countryside was not a concern for Stalin because the people who died were “just” peasants, not the city workers who were more important for him. The workers were a priority: they were more devoted supporters of the CP, besides, their work was vitally important in making USSR in an industrialised country. Therefore, the areas touched by famine were not only left without help; moreover, they were isolated and the starving peasants left to their fate. This is one of the proofs that the Soviet government only cared about preserving human life if it was necessary to the communist regime.
In the cases of industrialisation and collectivisation, however, the casualties were “just a by-product” of the Stalin’s policies. It was different when it came to purges and labour camps. In these cases, the government policies were deliberate mass assassination of the individuals that were found unfavourable to the regime.
The purges did not and were not intended to build Soviet State; they were a form of terror performed to strengthen Stalin’s power and authority and cause fear.
The purges began after murder of one of Stalin’s most devoted accomplices, Sergei Kirov, in 1934, and the circumstances of the assassination are still unclear. Claiming that the assassination was a start of a major conspiracy against him, Stalin used the murder to start what was afterwards called The Great Purge. The purge was especially harsh against the ex-members of Left opposition, including the ex-rivals of Stalin: Zinoviev and Kamenev were executed in 1936 after the “Trial of Sixteen”; Bukharin was shot later, in 1938. These and other important party members were arrested and given “show-trials” where they were usually accused of most absurd crimes and made confess by torture, threatening or vain promises. Gradually, the purge grew wider and begun to afflict USSR’s military forces. By 1939, two thirds of the military officers were exterminated, including 13 generals, Marshal Tuchachevsky being the most influential and therefore the first to be shot. Soon, the purges started to afflict ordinary citizens. Neighbours began denouncing each other, mostly to settle personal matters, and by 1938, the whole nation was living in constant fear. What had started as a purge in the Party had become The Great Terror.
In contradiction to collectivisation and industrialisation, this cruelty did not bring any good to the state. The country was on the verge of the Second World War, and so many deaths in the military sector could not stay without influence on the USSR’s performance in the upcoming war. It is easy to infer that the purges had only one purpose- to secure Stalin absolute power through setting the nation in fear.
It was different with the labour camps. They not only isolated and gradually destroyed people Stalin found dangerous (also the political opponents that were not executed after being arrested in ordinary prisons), but also contributed to the industrial success implied by the 5-year plans. By 1930, labour camps had been established in every part of USSR, and there was a special department in the secret police devoted to administration of the camps- Gulag. The camps consisted mostly of political prisoners taken during the purges, but a part was also kulaks, workers punished for not achieving the norms, and ordinary criminals. They were held in terrible conditions- food was rationed, working hours were long and without a break, the labour was done without help of machinery and the living conditions were horrible. What was practiced in the Soviet labour camps can be surely called slave labour. It is estimated that 12 million or 20% of all zeks, how the prisoners called themselves, died in the camps.
The contribution of this slave labour to the Soviet economy was notable at the expense of prisoners. Slaves from the labour camps built many canals and railway lines, and the workers at the Kolyma camps, where the conditions were the most horrible and the mortality rate the largest, produced great amounts of gold each year. It is also notable that the slave labour at the camps was more efficient to the government- prisoners did not have to be paid, motivated or given social guarantees, and it was not found necessary to secure them with proper food, machinery or living quarters.
On the whole it can easily be inferred that Stalin really did build the Soviet state and economy at the expense of the Soviet people. There might be different interpretations of whether these policies were justifiable or not. Some might state that, as Stalin said it himself, USSR was lagging behind the more developed Western economies and it was necessary to catch up fast or the USSR really might be “crushed”. But this is a matter mostly depending on the judger’s ethical norms. However, to me deaths of millions of people, which were the results of USSR’s economical policy, are not acceptable at any money cost. Famine, slave labour, terrible conditions of the people could be avoided by taking more moderate measures and more time to develop the economy. Besides, as it could be seen in the case with Great Terror, Stalin was not that much concerned about growth and development of USSR as he was about obtaining and preserving his own unlimited power. Fulfilment of one man’s personal interests was what caused death casualties of millions, and one must have strange moral norms to find this policy morally acceptable.
