Olivares admired the Dutch model of commerce, and, as Elliott puts it, he wished to “turn Spaniards into merchants” (pp. 70). He planned to do this by boosting the shipping power and encourage trade, instead of the current anti-capitalist atmosphere (embodied in the Inquisition), including road tolls and heavy taxation on goods – “a complete mercantilist policy” (NCMH, pp. 281). At the time, Spanish ships that went to the Americas highlighted exactly how unprepared Spain was for commerce – 90% of all goods on board were not Spanish in origin! (NCMH, pp. 438). A revision of commercial policy may well have stopped Spanish decline, but unfortunately, the Crown and Castilian governments refused to listen to Olivares’ advice, preferring as they did to conquer the unconquerable United Provinces. Finally, Spain faced revolts within its borders – Catalonia and Portugal revolted in the early 1640’s, shortly after suffering a catastrophic naval defeat by the Dutch in 1639. The result of these defeats and revolts was “the end of an age in which Spain had dominated the affairs of Europe” (NCMH, pp. 472). In 1648 the Treaty of Münster was signed, assuring independence for the United Provinces. Thus was the resulting ‘decline of Spain’.
The Netherlands in the same period saw virtually an opposite situation to the Spanish. The Dutch geographical situation gave it access to three crucial points: The Baltic trade, the North Sea fisheries and the Atlantic Ocean. In “The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800” (1965), CR Boxer noted that “domestic agriculture did not provide the sinews of [Dutch] wealth” (pp. 4), while Simon Schama is explicit in saying that the Netherlands’s “Mother Trade” was importing of Baltic Grain (The Embarrassment of Riches, (1988) pp.223). He goes on to say that while other European cities were suffering from high prices and risks of low grain stocks, the Dutch had regular supplies (ibid). The result of this was a freeing of rural population from agriculture and an influx of people to urban centres. The North Sea fisheries provided 37% of the Netherlands population employment. Amsterdam, Leyden, Gröningen and Delft were major urban centres. Amsterdam was clearly the greatest city in the area – following Parma’s capture of Antwerp in 1585, he allowed a two-year ‘grace period’ of exodus for Calvinists and dissidents of Spain, which saw all the financial sectors relocate to Amsterdam, thus boosting its status further (Boxer, pp. 18). People who didn’t want to be subverted to the Spanish prompted this exodus, thus Amsterdam’s rise is due to Spanish policy in Antwerp – yet another symptom of the ‘rise of the Netherlands’. Defoe called the Dutch “the brokers of Europe” (Dr. Richard Mackenney, Lecture 17: “A changing culture? The Dutch in the 17th Century”) – this was due to their trading policy, trading with all countries, even Spain, except a lumber embargo in 1621 at the end of the 12-year truce, to prevent the building of ships. This is a cause of Spanish decline, as one of Spain’s greatest needs was naval power.
Where the Netherlands really crippled the Spanish was in the trades of the Atlantic and Indian oceans. During the twelve-year truce between 1609 and 1621, the Dutch secured two-thirds of the carrying-trade between Brazil and Europe (Boxer, pp. 19), plus “capturing the trade of the East and West Indies”, building up in 12 years what took 120 years for the Spanish and Portuguese. (NCMH, pp. 280) All these maritime actions was a cause which decreased the influence of Spain abroad, severed Portuguese ties to the Spanish crown (as the Portuguese lost out as the Dutch became more prominent) and precipitated further financial problems for Spain. It is clear that the secret to the Netherlands rise and the direct decline of Spain can be attributed to the Dutch maritime economy – a cause of Spanish decline due to rising power of the Netherlands.
Thus, in the early modern period, we see several reasons why Spain declined while the Netherlands rose, and many of them are related by symptom or cause. The inability of Spain to raise themselves from their financial problems was the linchpin of their decline. The rigid conservatism met by Olivares from King and Castilian parliament that prevented any economic or political reform, which provided the Netherlands with overseas trade which reform would have gifted to the Spanish. Inept handling of the Spanish Empire failed to unite it, resulting in the burden of fighting numerous wars and revolts almost constantly between 1580 and 1650. This meant the Netherlands had the opportunity to rise in stature – another symptom of their rise. The war with the Netherlands was, of course, a cause for Spanish decline, due to the overwhelming cost of money and lives. Dutch propaganda reinforced opposition to Spain, a cause for lack of European support. Kamen identified that “Spain relied overwhelmingly on foreign money, foreign troops and foreign ships” (pp. 62), which is why Spain ended in 1650 in as weak a position as it did.
We can also identify many reasons for the ‘rise of the Netherlands’, from technological revolutions to a switch to commercial rather than agricultural activities, but the main factor was its maritime prowess. Once the Netherlands secured the Baltic, Atlantic, West and East Indian carrying trades, the Spanish decline was inevitable, as the Dutch gained massive financial boosts at Spanish expense.
In conclusion, it is difficult to identify the ‘rise of the Netherlands’ as solely a symptom or a cause of the ‘decline of Spain’. It is fairer to say that ‘the rise of the Netherlands was both due to [a symptom of], and effected [a cause of], the decline of Spain’.
Footnotes
JR Cooper (ed.), New Cambridge Modern History Volume 4 (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 269
JR Cooper (ed.), New Cambridge Modern History Volume 4 (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 280
JH Elliott, Richelieu And Olivares (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 72
JR Cooper (ed.), New Cambridge Modern History Volume 4 (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 440
Henry Kamen, Golden Age Spain (London, 1988), pp. 7
Henry Kamen, Golden Age Spain (London, 1988), pp. 9
Henry Kamen, Golden Age Spain (London, 1988), pp. 11
JR Cooper (ed.), New Cambridge Modern History Volume 4 (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 265
JH Elliott, Richelieu And Olivares (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 101
JH Elliott, Richelieu And Olivares (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 70
JR Cooper (ed.), New Cambridge Modern History Volume 4 (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 281
JR Cooper (ed.), New Cambridge Modern History Volume 4 (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 438
JR Cooper (ed.), New Cambridge Modern History Volume 4 (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 472
CR Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800 (London, 1965), pp. 4
Simon Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches, (London, 1988) pp.223
CR Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800 (London, 1965), pp. 18
Dr. Richard Mackenney, Lecture 17: “A changing culture? The Dutch in the 17th Century”
CR Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800 (London, 1965), pp. 19
JR Cooper (ed.), New Cambridge Modern History Volume 4 (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 280
Henry Kamen, Golden Age Spain (London, 1988), pp. 62
Bibliography
Boxer, CR, The Dutch seaborne empire 1600-1800, London, 1965
Cooper, JR (editor), New Cambridge Modern History Volume 4, Cambridge, 1970
Elliott, JH, Richelieu And Olivares, Cambridge, 1989
Kamen, H, Golden Age Spain, London, 1988
Schama, S, The Embarrassment of Riches, London, 1988