There were many reasons why the policy of evacuation was planned to begin with. The government feared the Germans, having seen how strong their attacks by air were, and how lethal the Luftwaffe could be. This was proved by the events at Guernica, by the huge effects of the German bombs, and merely confirmed their fears. The British also feared invasion by the Germans, and realised that some of the major cities would be under threat by Hitler’s ‘Operation Sealion’. The major cities were not only under threat by this, but also because they had the largest populations, so the bombs would kill the most people. This would cause a lack of morale. In the cities, were the main industrial centres, where all the supplies for the war were made, especially munitions. Hitler also used the Baedeker to target British heritage cities, which again would cause a loss of morale if bombed.
Sir John Anderson, who took charge of ARP, found the 1935 plans for evacuation, and renewed interest in them. He increased the amount spent on the plan, so he could arrange a mass evacuation of the cities. The fear of the German bombers however, was not completely justified. The original fears of 100,000 tons of bombs being dropped in just two weeks were not lived up to; in fact, this amount wasn’t dropped in the entire war. The casualty count was also over-predicted, and few died in comparison to the amount that was predicted before the war.
This over-cautiousness may be due to the political situation at the time. Appeasement had failed, and so war seemed inevitable. This was partially thanks to Hitler seizing Czechoslovakia with speed; at this point, chamberlain ordered mass preparations for the war that was soon expected. In this first proposal for evacuation, fearful parents eagerly signed up for it, with 83% applying. However, after the Munich Conference, war was not feared, and the evacuation proposals dropped. They were not restarted until a month later, by John Anderson.
The invasion of Poland, however, proved to be the catalyst for the final plans for evacuation. Fear of Hitler's power was once again widespread, so the government reintroduced the plans for evacuation. There were two waves of evacuation, but the first one seemed pointless. The first wave was during what is known as the ‘Phoney War’, and when the Germans failed to respond, many children returned home after a few months. The second wave, and the true policy, can really be said to start in September 1940, with the start of the Blitz. Now there was a real threat, the government acted in earnest to get as many children as possible evacuated. What was previously just a far-off fear of attack by air, was now a reality.
There were many factors that led to the mass evacuation of children from Britain, but the crucial factor had to be fear. The other factors were all important in themselves, and the invasion of Poland did act as a good catalyst, but if there was not widespread fear, then evacuation would not have proved so necessary. The government overestimated the impact of the German bombers; evacuation may have saved lives, but it was very expensive for something that might not have been entirely necessary. The parents were afraid, and had they not been fearful, then they would not have consented for their children to go. Fear was the main cause; accelerated by the other reasons.
