Can the condition of the Italian political system still be characterised by the phrases 'stable crisis' and 'eppur si muove' (but does it move) If so, why has the task of reforming it proved so difficult?

The 1980s and 1990s have seen a proliferation of corruption scandals across Western Europe. One can argue that the most spectacular case of corruption occurred in Italy where an entire political class has been put on trial and the political system transformed largely as a result of public outrage.  In what is known as the ‘Tangentopoli scandals’, there was the legal prosecution of corrupt bureaucrats, businessmen, party officers and members of parliament. The investigations of the so called Mani Pulite (‘clean hands’) enquiries revealed a massive and complex web of corruption spanning all traditional political parties including the Italian communist party which had been excluded from national but not local government for most of the post-war period. The corruption in Italy can be said to be extreme due to the unusual domination of government by one party-the Christian Democrats and its allies between the late 40s and early 80s. The underhand way of how Italian politics operates became a constant theme in the 1980s. The DC was very badly affected by the Tangentopoli scandals (or ‘kickback city’) as one of its main merits was to be seen as the preventative force against communism but the were also revealed as fraudulent. When the DC were exposed in the Tangentopoli scandals, Italians recognised the need for change. One could perhaps conclude that although the DC provided a constant political nation, the foundations of this established political party was indeed corrupt.

In 1983 Bettino Craxi became the first non-DC Prime Minister in the First republic and became in the longest running government in post war Italy. His tenure in office could be said to coincide with some economic good fortune and he could be said to have created around him an aura of decisionismo (decisiveness), contrasting sharply with the lack of direction of previous regimes. Craxi was able to provide a sense of purpose and stability to the Italian government that had been lacking so long from the Christian democrats. However, although the Italians may have been justified in thinking that a fundamental change had taken place in their economic and political systems (with Italy now officially the 5th biggest global economy), cracks began to appear within the governing coalition. The Christian Democrats felt they had supported Craxi long enough and they wanted the role of premier to cede to a Christian Democrat. However, it soon became clear that Craxi had no intention of playing the supporting role. The Christian Democrats withdrew their support precipitating early elections in June 1987. Amintore Fanfari returned as caretaker Prime Minister seeming to indicate a reversion to the previous style of government. This shows that although one can characterise Italian politics as ‘moving’, it does not necessarily mean it will be moving forward.

Italy is politically unique, not only because it had one of the only ‘pure’ Proportional representation systems in Europe but also because it has two organisations that need to be considered: The Mafia and the Catholic Church.

The organised crime networks in Italy bear different labels. Camorra in Campania, N’drangheta in Calabria and most famously, Mafia in Sicily. Historians, anthropologists and criminologists debate its specific historical origins but most agree it is based on traditional patterns of patron-clientelism and that it burgeoned in response to the weaknesses of the administrative and judicial structures of the state. The chronic weakness of the state resulted in the emergence of self-help institutions and the exclusive power position of informal groups subsequently made it impossible for the state to win the loyalty of the public, while its resultant weakness again strengthened the family, the clientage and the Mafiosi positions.
        If the absence of credible enforcement of laws and contracts was one precondition for the emergence of the Mafia, a second was the so-called ‘ ancient culture of mistrust’. Diego Gambetta emphasises this prerequisite for Mafioso power: “Distrust percolates through this ladder, and the unpredictability of the sanctions generates uncertainty in agreements, stagnation in commerce and industry and a general reluctance towards impersonal and extensive forms of co-operation.” Given the pervasive lack of trust in Italian politics, the Mafia was able to thrive in certain areas, especially in the south. The Mafia was able to enforce and enable economic agents to negotiate agreements with a modicum of confidence that these agreements would be kept.  With this in mind, despite the costs of this system-social, economic, political, psychic and moral-from the point of the individual trapped, powerless, in the desolate anarchy of the Mezzogiorno, to choose to obtain the Mafia’s protection can hardly be seen as irrational. Hilary Partridge (1993) argues that in the south of Italy “ Toleration and even collusion with the Mafia have marked every political regime at least until the collapse of the traditional parties in 1993.”   The Mafia can be said to play a key role in the movement of Italian politics and can be seen as another reason why reform of Italian politics has been so difficult. With criminal activity playing such a pivotal role in the political system throughout the first republic, one can see that the exclusion of this factor adds to the difficult process of change of reform.

The formal basis of church-state relations in Italy can be seen as the three Lateran Treaties of 1929, one of which-a concordat - was amended in 1984. These agreements were seen as a diplomatic triumph for Benito Mussolini and Pope Puis XI as they brought an end to the ideological and legal war that raged for sixty years between the Holy See and the Italian State.  Mussolini saw an advantage in gaining church support and the treaties ensured sovereignty of the Pope in the Vatican, Roman Catholicism being recognised as the sole religion of Italy and a financial settlement to compensate the papacy on its loss of property. These agreements permitted the church to retain its very wide role in Italian society especially in education and through its charitable activities in social welfare.

However, throughout Europe as the post-war period advanced there was a steady attenuation of the ties between the church and the state as secular attitudes spread throughout society. In Italy the drastic population shifts from the land to the cities and from the South to the North destroyed a centuries old social order. Italian Catholicism was rooted in a peasant society and culture. The country was transformed from being largely rural, illiterate and impoverished to being urbanised, technologically advanced and prosperous, revolutionised social attitudes and well as the European community bringing Italy into the mainstream political sphere of Western Europe. The secularisation process was stronger and more remarkable in Italy than elsewhere in Europe. Italy was the geographic centre of the Catholic world and the Catholic Church was much more intimately involved in the political system, enjoying privileges unique to other democratic countries. Catholicism formed a deep and natural part of the social fabric and for the average Italian citizen, church ceremonies were at least as much as a social as religious events. The Catholic Church’s weakening position in society allowed radical political decisions to be made, even if they conflicted with Catholic faith. In 1970 a parliamentary majority formed of the lay parties and the left enacted Italy’s first divorce law. According to Frederic Spotts et al (1986) “for the first time in the history of the Italian republics were being taken in defiance of the church.” This trend carried on over other issues such as contraception and abortion. The decline of the Catholic church can be said to have affected Italy because for a tradition that had been carried on for such a long time, it’s demise in power was rapid and destroyed the centuries old primacy of the Italians in the world wide church. With such radical changes happening so fast, one may say that such ‘move’ is bound to rock the stability of the traditional Italian state and add to the difficulty of reform by taking away one of the most important factors in the first republic.

One can see that the first Italian republic had features that allowed lucid and not stagnant political activity. However the endogenous factor of the proportion representation voting system can be seen as a mechanism for allowing movement but at the same time allowing the instability that the first republic was characterised by. One can assess that this political instability left a problematical legacy to overcome when the process of reform came about. One must also take into account the exogenous factors exclusive to Italy, which made reform even trickier. The dominance of the Catholic Church, the corruption and ‘Tangentopoli scandals’ and the Mafia’s extensive criminal activity all added to the complicated business of reforming Italy.

 

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