Conservative Victory of 1941, Peel and the Weakness of the Whigs.

unpopular with the public, the party itself was now under scrutiny over whether it could be trusted. More problems in weakness engulfed the Whigs, more specifically, in reference to the way in which they provoked working class hostility in the late 1830’s. This saw a repetition of the violence that occurred in the beginning of the decade and Chartism was growing steadily. At this time, the situation was worsened further by Britain being in a state of economic depression which was leading to unemployment and an increase in the prices of food. The working class population of Britain was further angered by the clear unfairness of the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act – this to put it simply, treated poverty as a crime and forced many people to work in the dreaded warehouses, which could also be known as ‘Poor Law Bastilles’ due to their harsh working conditions. As a result, there was a lot of hostility towards the government as there was no legislation for the working class population. On top of this, adequate public health arrangements were inaccessible for the working class along with the absence of proper sewage systems. The 1833 Factory Act was another reason for working class hostility as the law only applied to textile factories. The ‘Ten-Hour Movement’ was very disappointed as they had hoped to reduce a normal workday to ten hours and eliminate child labour.  The Whigs further caused their own downfall by eliminating the pressure groups which had originally co-operated with the reforming legislation, especially the Evangelicals, Radicals and the Benthamites. Overall, the Whigs were clearly very weak, and never had a strong support to which they could build on, yet under Lord Melbourne, on top of this unpopularity amongst the public, unrest within the party itself grew and as a result weakened the party further. However, even though the Whig government may have been weak, the victory the Conservatives had in 1841 was clearly not just down to their opponent’s frailty. Peel played a very significant role in the reorganisation of the Conservative party. The Reform Bill of 1832 is what enabled the Conservative party to be formed and once it was, Peel immediately ‘stamped’ down to his party exactly what he wanted it to stand for; ‘a strong government, firm leadership, sound administration, the maintenance of law and order without fear or favour and the recognition frights and duties’. Peel wanted a party that would be strong and that would have maintaining law as one its top priorities. Yet Peel’s leadership was something that would play a huge part in the way the Conservatives went about themselves. He had the political experience, clearly was an intellect and of course, Peel had quite the influence over the nation that would surely enable him to get the Tory party in a strong position for the 1941 elections. The crushing 1832 defeat left Peel’s Tories in a highly unenviable position. With just 185 seats in Parliament, and having suffered major defeats over Catholic Emancipation and the Reformations Bill, the party appeared destined for a period in the political wilderness. However, Peel was an innovator with his policies, and it was because of this fact that as a result, the party became stronger. In December 1834, the Tamworth Manifesto was declared. The document aimed to portray a ‘new’ Conservative party, one which was unafraid of reform. This of course helped to move Peel away from the discredited Ultra Tory position. Whilst carefully maintaining the traditional Tory stance of stability and protectionism, the Tamworth Manifesto asserted that Peel was in favour of reformations that induced ‘the correction of proven abuses, and the redress of real grievances.’ This attitude allowed Peel to win over many of the new, industrialist elite, and to establish a consistent policy within his own party. The re-branding of the Tories as the ‘Conservatives’ also helped Peel to move the party away from the mistakes of its past. Moreover, Peel understood that the middle classes, newly provided with voting rights, were a more important social grouping than ever. He thus looked to modernise the party by making it less narrow and less dogmatic, enabling him to take advantage of the Reform Bill’s hidden benefits. The new boundary and constituency changes that it implicated meant that parties had to be organised on a national scale. Peel therefore encouraged party membership, in which constituents were able to certify their Conservative standing by joining its electoral role. At the same time, Peel introduced ‘party agents’. Masterminded by F. R. Bonham, these agents were responsible for public relations and, during this period, for spreading Peel’s new interpretations of Toryism. Although not a new concept, under Peel’s guidance this model thrived, enabling the message of the Tamworth Manifesto to travel beyond his constituency and hence to make an impression on the entire country. In this period of change, though, it was imperative that Peel reaffirmed the foundation of traditional Tory values. He therefore emphasised the protection of the Anglican Church; the maintenance of law and order; the upholding of the role of the monarch; and the defence of the constitutional rights of the House of Lords. In doing so, Peel was able to ensure that his new schemes did not detract from the traditional policies that had served the Tories so well in the past. One can therefore see that, whilst Peel welcomed reform where necessary, he was careful enough to certify that a safe balance between protectionism and modernisation was maintained. More than any other feature of the 1841 election, it could be argued that it was this reorganisation that most assured Conservative success. However, it is true to say that Peel’s victory followed a series of remarkable circumstances that served to enhance public confidence in his leadership. During the early part of 1835, for example, Peel was presented with an unexpected chance to test the success of his policies, and the extent of his man-management. Having confirmed his ability in the Commons and the Lords, Peel was William IV’s first choice to replace the dismissed Prime Minister Lord Melbourne. Peel’s ministry lasted only one hundred days; being a minority government, it was easily defeated by the Lichfield House Compact of 1835. However, Peel had demonstrated admirable vision in his policies regarding the Church and the problems in Ireland. He also learnt to extend the breadth of Tory policy to incorporate the needs of the wider British electorate. From then until 1841, Peel looked to strengthen his control on party policy, and to affirm the foundations of the party’s nationwide support. Between 1832 and 1841, there were an extraordinary four elections, enabling Peel to gradually build up support within the two Houses. The Conservative seats increased from 185 in December 1832 to 279 in January 1835, and from 314 to 367 between August 1837 and July 1841. This undoubtedly aided the progress of Peel’s policies. However, it must be acknowledged that Peel was extremely fortunate in being able to increase his influence in such a way; with fewer elections, the Whig majority may never have decreased so rapidly. Furthermore, Peel was able to judge how well his policies were received in the minds of the electorate by analysing the locations of his party’s gains. However, it is the ‘Bedchamber Crisis’ of 1839 that, in retrospect, appears the most fortunate event for Peel. Lord Melbourne had resigned and, with the Whigs appearing devoid of inspiring policies, Queen Victoria took the bold step of appointing Peel, Prime Minister. The Conservatives were delighted. Peel, however, had the foresight to realise that entering Parliament as a minority for the second time would make his leadership appear weak and ineffective. To confirm the Queen’s confidence, he therefore asked that the wives of Whig noblemen be removed from the household posts at Court, where they had been placed by Melbourne. As a show of loyalty to the outgoing Prime Minister, Victoria refused. Peel had made the correct decision: Melbourne continued in office for a further two years, before a vote of ‘no confidence’ dismissed him, and the Conservatives were able to enter government at the height of their political strength. Whilst being less important than Peel’s reorganisation of his party, these fortunate events were crucial in asserting his high standing both within Commons and the country. However, without the Conservatives re-emergence as a political force, such fortunate circumstances would have occurred without being capitalised upon. A pre-requisite for Conservative success, though, was Whig failure. The party, who had experienced such unprecedented- and as yet unparalleled- success in the 1832 election, had to fail spectacularly in order to allow the Tories to regain power. They did. First, however, one must consider that the Conservatives’ 1832 position was not as disastrous as it first appeared. The Whig landslide was due largely to the momentum of their inevitably popular Reformations Bill, and does not accurately reflect popular opinion at the time. Furthermore, the party was, at its heart, divided. It was Parliamentary Reform alone that had united Grey’s cabinet, and the other issues on the Whigs’ political agenda were far more divisive. The first public display of this division occurred through Russell’s rather radical proposals concerning the Church of Ireland. Viewing the institution as unimportant in the hugely Catholic country, Russell suggested diverting some of its wealth into the building of schools and hospitals. The Whigs’ hard-line Anglicans were outraged, and characters such as Lord Stanley and Sir James Graham left the party as a matter of principle. Ultimately, the pair would join Peel on the Tory front bench. Such divisions led to Lord Grey’s 1834 resignation, and despite the regrouping which put an end to Peel’s five-month tenure in 1835, the Whigs suffered long-term damage. Peel had been given a platform, and duly used it to publicise his Tamworth Manifesto, generally regarded as the first sustained statement of ‘Conservative’ principles. Furthermore, the Whigs’ common majority depended relied upon an agreement with the Radicals and Irish Catholics within parliament. This allowed Peel to imply that the Whigs would be influenced by these ‘extreme’ groups, and thus to depict the Conservatives as a source of salvation. Peel continually reiterated this point in the late 1830s, and, struggling to cope with economic depression, the Whigs found themselves in a vulnerable position. The Conservatives highlighted the Whigs’ repeatedly unbalanced budgets, Peel accusing them of “inexcusable incompetence.” This, combined with the rise of Chartism, Peel was able to induce fear within the British public: with the Whigs in charge, he asserted, the economy would suffer, Chartism would rise and radicals would gain influence within Parliament. Thus, one can see that Peel was able capitalise on these Whig errors, and in doing so emphasise his own party’s success. However, without Peel’s exploitation, the Whig mistakes may have gone unnoticed. It was only through the Tories’ re-emergence, and their leaders’ astute judgement, that they were to feel the full wrath of their failures. In conclusion, I think that the victory in the elections of 1841 were down to many factors, however, to define one more significant than the other is also important to my analysis. I think that the reorganisation of the Conservative party was very important as it led to the creation of new policies and principles, a clear example being the Tamworth Manifesto. This is probably a more important reason than the legacy of Peel’s Hundred Days. The main two factors though were of course, the weakness of the Whigs, and the role Peel himself played from 1835 to 1841. The question is though, was the Whigs weakness a more important factor than Peel’s brilliance at capitalising on this inadequacy. I personally believe that although Peel accentuated every mistake made by the Whigs, had the Whigs not made each and every mistake that they did, then the revitalisation of the Tories may not have been as successful as it was. To put it simply, the Whigs should never have been in the position of weakness that they were in and thus, for this reason I think that the statement posed in the question is fairly accurate in the sense that it was probably the most important reason but it must be noted, it wasn’t the only reason – there were many factors that contributed to the Conservative victory in 1841.