The situation in the UK is very different. Our unitary system means that the vast majority of power lies with central government; local councils are only of use to groups concerned with local construction projects and planning permission. This situation has changed slightly in recent years, as power has been devolved to Scotland and Wales and London has acquired a local assembly and mayor. The EU has also developed into a vital supranational target for certain pressure groups whose issues are dealt with at EU level such as fishermen. However, the centre is still by far the most useful target for pressure groups.
In America, the separation of powers also means that the legislature is independent of the executive and cannot be controlled by the President. Consequently, Congress is open to external influence. This is compounded by the weakness of political parties. Partly thanks to restrictive legislation such as the Federal Election Campaign Act, and partly due to the broad spectrum of opinion each party contains, US political parties are not strong or cohesive. They have few available resources for ‘controlling’ their members of Congress; party discipline is a case of ‘carrots and twigs’. As a result, individual Congressmen and Senators are useful targets for pressure group activity.
In the UK, Parliament is a much less appealing target. Out fusion of powers means that the executive is drawn from the majority party in the House of Commons, and by using this majority and the ‘carrots and sticks’ of party discipline, the executive is generally able to control the Commons. This is less true if the governing party is divided or if the majority is marginal, in which case pressure groups may find the Commons a more useful tool. The rest of the time, though, MPs lack sufficient independence to be mush use, and the Lords lack power.
The difference is deepened by campaign finance rules – in the US, the party is limited and so candidates rely on the financial and organisational support of interest groups, and when elected will owe a debt of loyalty to their ‘sponsor’. In the UK, campaigns are less candidate centred and party labels are more important than any individual candidate. As a result, some wealthy individuals and interest groups donate money to the party, but it is neither easy or worthwhile to target any one candidate.
The executive is a useful target in both countries. In the US pressure groups may seek to make contact with members of the White House staff, or with individuals and sections within the bureaucracy. This strategy is of limited use, though, as almost all executive actions require the approval of Congress. In the UK, by contrast, targeting the executive is absolutely vital as it controls the legislature and thus determines what policy will be enacted. PM and Cabinet may be inaccessible to interest groups, though, so it becomes necessary to try to acquire ‘insider’ status through cooperation with the bureaucracy. Only ‘insider’ groups are likely to be consulted on policy decisions.
In the USA, the judiciary is a valid target because of the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review. Consequently, interest groups may bring cases themselves, or file ‘amicus curiae’ briefs in relevant case, eg. around 80 such briefs were filed in Webster v RHS on the abortion issue in 1987. British courts have no equivalent power, but the European Convention on Human Rights has encouraged pressure groups to bring test cases, eg. by supporting Diane Blood over the right to die.
In conclusion, the structure of government means that groups in the USA can obtain the desired results in many different ways – by financing elections, lobbying at national, state or local level, bringing court cases and so on. This supports a pluralist model, in which numerous groups are able to have an influence on decision making. In the UK, the system narrows down the choice of targets to the executive. This leads to a corporatist style system where only a few key ‘insider’ groups are able to have a real influence by consultation with government.
