How Far Can 1997 Be Described As a Critical Election?
HOW FAR CAN 1997 BE DESCRIBED AS A "CRITICAL ELECTION?"
The general election of 1997 was seen by many to be a fore-gone conclusion. The experts and the polls had been predicting a Labour victory for almost five years, ever since Black Wednesday in September 1992, and many felt election day itself, may just be a forgettable formality. What had not been expected, however, was one of the biggest Parliamentary majorities in recent times, and one of the biggest collapses of any government in history. Was it, therefore, a "critical election"?
The whole terminology surrounding a critical election began in 1955, when V.O. Key identified the type of contest "in which the depth and intensity of electoral involvement are high, in which more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community, and in which new and durable electoral groupings are formed." The key word here is "durable" because we need time to know whether a critical election has actually occurred. Subsequently, as Pippa Norris explains, "this idea was extended by Angus Campbell (1966) to classify elections into three categories, as 'maintaining', 'deviating' or 'critical' types."
A "maintaining" election is one where very little alters politically, such as the 1992 general election. The issues that dominated the campaign would follow the old agenda, i.e. economic performance, or the welfare state. Similarly, the social alignments of the voters would be consistent with previous elections, such as the Conservative's predominance amongst professional middle classes. In addition, the election "would continue the imbalanced and weakened two-party system which has characterised Britain since the early seventies, with the Conservatives as the dominant party of government facing a divided opposition." There would be no return to the era of pendulum politics, circa 1945-70, when both main parties had regular stints in office. Upon this evidence, it was very unlikely that 1997 would produce a "maintaining election" and indeed a huge Labour victory in itself clearly provided no such contest.
A "deviating election" seemed more likely, if the polls were to be believed. As Pippa Norris explains, "in these contests the basic pattern of social and issue alignments is not seriously disturbed, but particular personalities or events produce a temporary reversal in the normal share of the vote for the majority party." This may have produced a weak Labour government, possibly relying on third-party support, due more to voters' negative reaction to the Conservatives, rather than a positive move towards Labour. In addition, it would be expected that the Labour support mobilised amongst traditional voters, but failed to break into the Conservatives' "middle-ground." The "old" policy agenda, would have dominated the campaign and "there were no great issues dividing the parties in the eyes of the electorate." Once again, 1997 does not fall into this category, due mainly to such a strong Labour government. It is possible to argue that much of the electorate voted "negatively", such as the huge evidence of tactical voting against the Conservatives, but there was clearly a much stronger existence of a "positive" switch towards New Labour. The Conservatives would support Norris' suggestion of there being little difference between the parties, but this was not the case with newer policy areas, such as constitutional reform. Thus it would appear that the 1997 general election falls more neatly into the category of a "critical election."
Is 1997, therefore, one of those extremely rare elections that will rank alongside, or even above, the Century's other historic elections? Although psephologists differ over which should be included in this category, the Liberal victory of 1906, and the Labour landslide of 1945 will almost certainly be present. Other possibilities include 1918, 1974 or Thatcher's small, but immensely significant conquest in 1979. From the off-set it was always possible in 1997, but still very doubtful - the result was almost certain and many wondered whether the voters were really interested enough to make this into something special. For ...
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Is 1997, therefore, one of those extremely rare elections that will rank alongside, or even above, the Century's other historic elections? Although psephologists differ over which should be included in this category, the Liberal victory of 1906, and the Labour landslide of 1945 will almost certainly be present. Other possibilities include 1918, 1974 or Thatcher's small, but immensely significant conquest in 1979. From the off-set it was always possible in 1997, but still very doubtful - the result was almost certain and many wondered whether the voters were really interested enough to make this into something special. For a critical election to be achieved, there must be significant changes in both the social alignments of the voters, and the issues that dominate the election. In addition, it will have "major consequences for the long-term balance of party competition and the dominant policy agenda of successive governments."
Traditionally, critical elections occur from one of two bases - what Norris calls "top-down" or "bottom-up" factors. The former is the result of a major political party directly affecting the way the electorate votes. Most commonly this is a very damaging split, such as the Tories in 1846, the Liberals in 1885 or Labour in 1983. 1997 has seen a relatively new issue that could be described as such a factor. The whole question of Europe publicly split the Conservative party, and the damage was evident right up to election day itself. It was the first time this topic has really affected an election outcome, because even in the early 1970s, a time of much confusion, other issues still dominated the agenda. Many cite this as one of the principle reasons behind their massive defeat, and unless a more profound stance emerges from the Conservatives, it may well have long-term consequences on the dominance of the party system.
The second consideration, a "bottom-up" scenario, is initiated by the voters, e.g. contextual factors such as an increased franchise (1918), new issues which divide the electorate, or long-term shifts in the balance of partisan identification. This is much harder to decipher, because although 1997 saw a swing to Labour of phenomenal proportions, as of yet there is no evidence that this is long-term. It could, however, be a decisive turning-point and in subsequent elections, it will be the Conservatives who have to pitch for the middle class vote. Ivor Crewe identified class and party dealignment in the 1970s and 1980s, and the evidence from this election may be that voters have moved even further away from the political view that was once expected of them. Therefore, only time can really tell the reasons behind 1997, and we must be cautious in our statements, but what we can be sure of is that the election was critical.
Pippa Norris suggests four indicators that would make 1997 a critical election. First, is a "substantial" Labour victory, which in fact does not do the result justice - it was almost bigger than a landslide. A 179 Parliamentary majority is huge by any comparison and the Conservative's defeat is their worst since the 1830s. Secondly, Norris talks of "new patterns of party competition, such as significant changes in party identification, images, leaders, representatives and membership." There was certainly a new identification of "New Labour," with their modern and revitalised image under the young and energetic Tony Blair. The symbolic images that voters held of the parties during the period of 1992 and 1997 had altered ever since Black Wednesday, when the Tories were no longer the party of economic competence, whilst at the same time, Labour became a party conceived as being strong, united and capable of governing. The party also enjoyed huge membership, becoming the fastest growing political party in Europe and in addition, there was also a significant increase in the number of women MPs, combined with Labour's apparently successful attempt to make politics more modern and appealing to the voters.
Penultimately, is the question of new social alignments - paramount for an election to be called "critical." Not surprisingly, therefore, 1997 achieved this criteria with huge Labour advances into traditionally Conservative areas of support. As John Curtice explains, "as in Scotland and Wales, so also across Great Britain as a whole, the Conservatives' principal problem is that their vote has become too geographically evenly spread." The South of England swung enigmatically towards Tony Blair, with almost 50% of the London vote, and even a 12% swing in the South East. the gender gap was breached, with 47% of women (traditionally more conservative) voting for Labour, the same statistic as men. The middle class professionals, Margaret Thatcher's key support-base, voted this time with Labour - 49% of C1s and 56% of C2s, although it can also be noted that the move towards Labour was almost the same in each social grade. Nonetheless, the changes were there for all to see, including incredibly rare moves such as some Tories refusing to vote (perhaps as much as 29% of supporters) and over 1 million of them switching direct to Labour, instead of the Liberal Democrats, usually a more common approach. We do not know how permanent this factor will prove to be, but new social alignments have been created and the Tories must now seek the return of their lost voters.
Finally, Norris states the requirement of new issue alignments, which once again, 1997 provides. The question of Europe, and especially the single currency, was fiercely debated and resulted in the afore mentioned Tory splits, which Major disastrously embroiled himself in. Devolution was another new issue, with the prospect of Parliaments for Scotland and Wales offered by the opposition parties and attacked by the Conservatives. In the post-election euphoria, this topic has dug itself even deeper into politics, with no Tory MPs in Scotland or Wales and a lively devolution campaign resulting in the Labour government's referendum victories in September 1997. Education became the real main policy during the election campaign, memorable thanks to Blair's "education, education, education" promise, while "old" issues such as the economy (despite its very impressive level) and the welfare state gained less noticeable attention. It was very much a different campaign to its predecessors, and not only for the policies, but also for such problem areas as sleaze.
Therefore, I believe 1997 can not only be described as a "critical election", but the "critical election" of the 20th Century. It fully achieves all of Norris' criteria and in many respects, goes even further. There has been a huge disturbance in the political system of Great Britain, resulting in almost certainly a long-term change, probably irreversible for many years to come. Unless the new government makes a terrible mistake, the next few elections should fall under the category of "maintaining" ones. There has been a "sea-change" in British politics, and the balance of party competition has been significantly altered. However, one thing we are not going to see is a return to the "pendulum politics" of the early post-war era. Norris suggested that the election should demolish the "imbalanced and weakened two-party system, with the Conservatives as the dominant party of government facing a divided opposition." This has been achieved, however it does not mean the old-style both-party dominance is rekindled once again. Instead, it means that the balance has swung further than had been expected, so that one-party dominance is still in existence. Only this time, it is a strong Labour government facing a divided opposition, which makes the result all that more "critical."
Nonetheless, while all the evidence points in favour of 1997 being a "critical election", we can not ignore a few anomalies in this definition. Firstly is the factor mentioned in the above paragraph - there is still no return to the post-war pattern of balanced two-party competition, something Norris identified as crucial. Granted it may have gone further to the other side, but whether the dominant party is Labour or Conservative, it still provides imbalance and weakness within the political system. Secondly, is the incredibly disproportionate nature of the British system, because Labour actually only managed 44% of the national vote, less than what they achieved in every election from 1945 to 1966. It is also only 2% higher than the Tories in 1992, yet they only managed a 21 seat majority, compared to Labour's 179 in this election. Even more startling is the comparison with Howard Wilson's 1964 Labour victory, also with 44%, but amazingly with only a majority of 4 seats. Only the Labour governments that won in 1974 gained office on a lower share of the electorate than Tony Blair did this time around. Therefore, the political landscape was more critical in the result, rather than in the voting, and the electoral system appears to have been very favourably disposed towards Labour, when in the past, "many have considered to be the Conservatives' best friend."
Smaller arguments can also be made, such as the very low turn-out on election day, resulting in fewer converts to Labour than seems at first apparent - because of this, as John Curtice explains, "indeed, just three in ten of those registered to vote cast a ballot for a Labour candidate." In addition, as Anthony King explains, "tactical voting turned a loss into a rout," a key factor of this election, while the Labour vote can also be put under scrutiny - 13,600,000 compared to Major's 14,100,000 in 1992 for example. Interestingly, votes cast for Labour were highest in constituencies where they were second place, whilst in seats where the Liberal Democrats were in second place, the swing to Labour was 3% less than the national average - "if every constituency had swung the same way, Labour's majority would have been 131 rather than 179." "Labour's 1997 victory appears to have done little to disturb the relationship between class and vote" states Curtice in yet another relatively futile argument, mentioning how the swing to Labour averaged at about 15% in all class groups. In addition, support for Labour amongst the elderly actually dipped slightly (-2% - NOP/BBC exit poll) but was easily counter-balanced by the first-time voters whose endorsement for Labour was up by 19% on the last election. Difficult as it may sound, this was not even the Conservatives worst ever defeat, nor was it their lowest percentage or lowest number of seats, and they still mustered more support than Labour in the South East, South West and East Anglia. Curtice notes that "they still managed to win 3% more of the vote than Labour did in 1983, when Michael Foot received a drubbing at the hands of Margaret Thatcher." However, this evidence all fades into near obscurity when faced with the size of the Labour victory, which is no doubt the result of a very "critical election."
The political system of Britain has finally shattered. After 18 years of pushing against the walls, they finally gave way in 1997. It was a "critical election" to rank alongside, or even above, any in British history, setting the scene for a new era of politics. The statistics themselves almost tell the story - a 179 seat majority for Labour, only 165 seats for the previous government and a national average swing of almost 13%. The issues at stake had been new and different - a single currency? a Scottish Parliament? a minimum wage? The voting behaviour of Britain significantly altered - traditional Conservative supporters all turned their allegiance to Labour, such as southern voters, women and middle-class professionals. The party system was affected so much that it not only destroyed the Conservative dominance, but by-passed any suggestion of two-party dominance and started an era of Labour dominance. In years to come, I believe 1997 will be looked upon as the definition of how to produce a "critical election."
ALAN RODEN
THE 1997 GENERAL ELECTION