How successfully did the Conservatives manage the process of de-colonisation?

 The Conservatives always knew they would not be able to please everyone in Kenya. Power would either have to be given to white farmers or Black Kenyans. The Mau Mau movement was instrumental in persuading the British Government that continued colonial rule would be prohibitively expensive, in terms of military costs, and would caste Britain in a poor light on the international stage. With this in mind, preparation for independence was inevitable, with the intermediate stage of setting up an internal self-government. The resulting free election inevitably gave power to Jomo Kenyatta and, with MacMillan already admitting that “nothing could be gained by delay, everything might be won by a sign of confidence”, full independence came just three years later.  The speed of this political transformation certainly ensured that relations between Kenya and Britain would remain constructive for many years to come, but it must have contributed to Kenya’s poor economic state, with wide-scale poverty, political arrests and human rights abuses. Some have argued that if some power had been retained by Britain a gentle transition to full independence may have caused less problems.  For example, some assistance in the form of establishing a competent civil service, or the arrangement of favourable loans, might have given the newly independent Kenya some hope of avoiding the political and economic upheaval that occurred in the aftermath of independence. However, it should be emphasised that the Conservatives’ concern lay not with the Kenyans or white farmers but instead with its world reputation.  It did not wish to appear racist or unfair and therefore speeded up its attempts to withdraw as quickly as possible, especially when reports of Mau Mau atrocities leaked into the world press.

Unfortunately, finding a fast-track to independence was not so easy in other parts of the world, especially Malaya and the subsequent Malaysian Federation. This time, Britain found itself dealing with a region which was far more important, both militarily and economically, yet displayed greater political instability both internally and externally. For example, in 1948 a rebellion inspired by Chinese communist occurred in Malaya and Singapore which eventually had to be put down by General Templer. Clearly the presence of such a huge power to the north of the region would be important in subsequent attempts to grant independence incorporating western-style democratic government.  Nevertheless, in 1957 Malaya was declared independent by the British Government. By 1963, Malaya’s neighbours, Sarawak, North Borneo, Singapore and Brunei, had all voted for the establishment of a Malaysian Federation. This immediately caused Indonesia to claim sovereignty over these states and hostilities erupted between the Federation and Indonesia. Britain sent troops to Malaya to protect its borders and, within three years, Indonesia had given up its territorial claims, although Singapore had by then left the Federation.  As with Kenya, the Conservatives realised that Britain could no longer afford to protect its overseas colonies. As a secondary world power it could not stem the tide of communism – only the USA might have the military power to do so. In living up to its pledge to ensure the security of Malaya it acted with integrity and earned the respect of these post-independence colonial states. However, Britain realised that its trading future lay in Europe, even if it continued to maintain links in the Far East through the Commonwealth. An orderly withdrawal must surely have been better than a rout?

In conclusion, the process of de-colonisation in Kenya and Malaya did not unduly damage Britain’s international reputation. Although it often put its own interests first, whether military, strategic, or economic, before making any decision, it had to adjust to a changing world where Russia and the USA would be the new super powers and Britain would simply play a walk-on role.