However the merits of such an argument have come under close scrutiny. Unionists argue that the forbidding of any devolvement of power to sub-national states is the only way to preserve the political and constitutional binding of Britain and not embark on the political “motorway without an exit to an independent state”, in the words of Tim Dalyell. Conversely supporters of political change have pointed to developments in France and Spain, both overly-centralised unitary states which have both contained and undermined separatist movements by devolving power to the regions. The question is will this be the experience for Britain?
Scotland has been granted the most devolved power in recognition of the fact that Scotland presides as the most culturally and politically distinct nation in the Union. However there has been much debate regarding the true potency of the newly devolved powers to Scotland. Although constitutionally subordinate, the Scottish parliament wields a new locus of political power. Indeed it is the First Minister who now carries a stronger mandate to speak for Scotland than any Secretary of State, which increases the possibility of the Scottish parliament colliding with the British government; something avoided with Northern Ireland because this artificially created province did not see itself as a separate nation from the UK. With Westminster all but ceasing to legislate for Scotland, this will be accompanied by a removal of ministerial responsibility in Whitehall for Scottish affairs. Therefore, with Westminster no longer debating Scottish issues, it is only in constitutional theory alone that full legislative power remains with Westminster; thus characterising the new relationship between the two states as quasi-federal and only unitary during times of crisis. Westminster will reside as power only able to supervise another legislative body making laws on a wide range of issues. In addition, it will not be easy for Westminster to abolish the Scottish parliament without a national referendum or for it to unilaterally alter the devolution settlement to Scotland’s disadvantage, as it would logistically have to seek the consent of the Scottish Parliament. Therefore Westminster will no longer retain the fundamental characteristic of a sovereign parliament: the right to make any law it wishes.
Although culturally distinct, Wales has never been a separate integrated political unit - an incorporated part of the Union for far longer than Scotland and Northern Ireland. The lack of enthusiasm for Welsh independence can be attributed to an array of factors: the greater assimilation of Wales into British identifications and institutions; the continuing split within the Welsh Labour Party over devolution; the lack of national self-confidence; the absence of a strong Welsh elite. The success of Plaid Cymru has also been sketchy, as their mandate of safeguarding the Welsh national heritage has served as a more divisive rather than uniting issue. All of these factors illustrate why the Welsh have only been granted executive powers rather than the legislative powers won by Scotland.
There is a considerable feeling of national identity in Scotland and, to a lesser extent, Wales. Yet, since devolution, this has only been expressed weakly in votes for the secessionist parties. Superficially it seems as if Westminster, at least for now, has managed to ‘buy-off’ the demands of nationalists, and called the bluff of those who promoted themselves as fervently demanding total national autonomy. However, while probably partly true, such an assertion is over-simplistic. Unionists certainly do not desire the break-up of the UK and in reality, nor do many so-called ‘nationalists’. Devolution symbolises a mutual compromise between the rivalling factions: providing the nationalists with greater constitutional authority, overriding many of the powers of Westminster, while still retaining, at the very least in name, the Union. Therefore it would be inaccurate to categorise the nationalists as a naïve brigade failing to gain the ultimate concession, as Vernon Bogdanor has carefully pointed out. However, for these interest groups, such constitutional gains made may have been paid for in terms of electoral popularity as voters deem their mandate for governance redundant.
Celtic nationalism is largely based on political rather than economic grievances. While many nationalists complain that Scotland and Wales do not appropriate a large enough share of Westminster’s coffers; it is common knowledge that, especially in the case of Scotland, funding per capita is much greater than the English national average. The Scots and to a lesser extent, the Welsh have been campaigning for political devolution ever since the matter resurfaced in the 1960s in order to partially eliminate the democratic deficit of quango control and the prospect of Scots being governed by a party they do support in the majority. Self-government therefore in the eyes of many, can only serve to diminish the basis for expressing such grievances in terms of protest votes for nationalists
The likely impact of devolution is hard to assess.
The potential benefits of change can certainly be overstated. The possible downside of constitutional change can also be exaggerated. The apocalyptic view, which sees an irrevocable fragmentation of the UK, ignores the fact that Britain has changed its territorial arrangements at many times in its history without disintegrating.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hazell, R. The State and the Nations, 2003
Hazell, R. Constitutional Futures. A History of the Next Ten Years, 1999
Holliday, I. Developments in British Politics 5, 2000
Bogdanor, V. Devolution: Decentralisation or Disintegration? 1999
Wright, T. The British Political Process: An Introduction, 2000
Coxall, B; Robins, L; Leach, R. Contemporary British Politics 4TH Edition, 2003
