As well as being without any means of attack from the ground, Belfast also suffered from lack of fighter planes. One dog-fighter squadron of Hurricanes and five flights of No 968 Barrage Balloon Squadron were the only planes available to the city.
The German strategy of attacking the city by night was an effective one. There were no night fighter planes to defend Belfast and its people, which meant that bombs were dropped without hassle with the aid of darkness. Searchlights were not a threat either: Belfast did not have any, and were therefore unable to spot the attacking planes.
One means of defence that could have been successful was camouflage and decoy. However, it was impossible to disguise Belfast, due to the presence of Belfast Lough. Water could not be hidden from their attackers, and so the city could easily be identified.
After the April raids, in an attempt to prevent such disastrous results again, action was taken to help disguise the Stormont estate, in the form of covering the Parliament Buildings with layers of pitch. However, due to lack of funds and equipment, successful camouflage could not be achieved, leaving Belfast easier for Germans to aim at.
One of the most destructive weapons used during the raids of Belfast were the incendiary bombs. Large fires, four of which were considered serious, soon spread through the streets of the city due to these bombs, which caused more overall damage than even the high explosives. In order to tackle these fires, fire crews and equipment were needed, as well as water. Unfortunately, water mains were ruptured by falling bombs and the fire services found they were unable to be used. The local supply lasted a mere hour before other sources needed to be found. Central systems were not powerful enough to tackle the colossal fires, and obtaining water from rivers such as the Farset proved useless when the tide went out.
In addition to the low water availability, the firemen themselves and water pumps were in short supply. Finding they could not cope alone, reinforcements were sent for from Eire and Britain, which proved a success as fires were soon under control.
The structure of the city itself was also a reason for such a high death rate. Houses in the 1940’s were small, so as to fit as many into one street as possible. As a result, large amounts of people in one area were killed by single bombs. Homes were also near the workplace, factories such as the Harland and Wolff shipyard, to allow easy access. However, large factories and places of production were the specific targets of the German’s, which meant that many houses were situated in, or close to, the targeted areas.
The precision of the Luftwaffe pilots also contributed to the effects of the Blitz, and its effects. It was difficult for the German’s to aim directly at their target, and there was no guarantee that the bomb would land where expected, which was usually on factories. The darkness would decrease the visual advantages the pilots had, so bombs were often dropped on housing areas. As well as this, the strength of the wind was a major factor in where the parachute bombs fell. They were easily guided off course and landed on neutral areas.
The men could also have felt nervous or afraid, which would have effected their judgement and performance. The experience of being shot at from the ground whilst mid air would have caused fright, resulting in bombs being released prematurely or belatedly.
Another reason for accidental deaths would be the inaccuracy of the instructions and plans given to the pilots. Errors could have occurred during plotting the areas to attack or equipment may have malfunctioned, meaning that areas bombed could have been entirely residential.
To cope with such a disaster as the Belfast Blitz, numerous amounts of people were needed from many different professions. In particular, many trained in First Aid, such as nurses and ambulance staff, were needed to deal with the injured. However, there was a scarce number of such people, and the small number available were overwhelmed, leaving the wounded unattended. Repair gangs to mend the damage done to the city were in high demand, yet almost 300 more were needed to handle the work at hand. Many other such professionals could have helped decrease the death total, but many were still in training. There were, however, a large amount of typists, clerks and messengers available; 889 were willing yet unneeded. These people could not assist with the matters which needed urgent attention, such as casualties or fires, and were therefore mostly ineffective. More medical and repair personnel would have made the task of restoring the city and saving the lives of its people much easier and successful.
Lastly, the most widely acknowledged reason why Belfast suffered so greatly during its bombardments, is the inaction of the Government. The decisions regarding air raid precautions for Northern Ireland were based on a report by J.E Warnock, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs. This record stated that to spend money at the expense of local businesses to protect the country from invasions, such as the ones Belfast suffered from, would be unwise. It assured the Government that Northern Ireland would more than likely not be targeted, due to the long journey the loaded German planes would have to take to reach it. The flight would also pass over Great Britain; a country containing much more appealing targets than Northern Ireland, and which also had an impressive military defence system. Warnock was of the belief that the Luftwaffe would not risk such a journey. However, as the report was written in June 1939, the fact that the German’s had entered France by 1941 was not taken into account. This resulted in the Government’s relaxed attitude, which reflected onto the public. Dance halls, theatres and cinemas remained open on the outbreak of war in contrast to mainland Britain. It is believed that if aware had been heightened among the people of Belfast, the prospect of attack, and the attacks themselves, would have been taken more seriously, which could have saved lives.
Another area in which the Government were criticized for was the lack of evacuations. The vulnerable members of the city, such as children and those living near suspected targets such as the Harland and Wolff shipyard were not removed from potentially dangerous areas. If action had been taken to ensure the safety of such people, the death count would have been considerably smaller.
Both the Government and local people encountered many problems, some of them which could have been avoided, during the attacks. Hoses needed to put out fires were not long enough. It was almost impossible to clear roads after explosions due to lack of equipment. Minor, escapable problems such as these could have been avoided through simple planning and discussion by the Government.
The public was also ill-prepared when it came to protecting themselves and their family during the bombings. Precautions were not taken to ensure that people knew how to deal with the events which were to happen to them. There was also a lack of air-raid drills, which could have proven to be useful, if not vital, when it came to the actual bombarding.
To conclude, it is apparent that there were many reasons, some small and seemingly trivial, others crucial, as to why the city of Belfast suffered so highly during its attacks by the Luftwaffe than any other targeted city in the United Kingdom. As I have explained throughout this essay, simple precautions such as adequate amount of air raid shelters and hoses could have made a large and positive impact on the final death total after the bombardments. The general attitude of the Northern Ireland Government, as well as the general public, added to the unexpected results and inability to deal with such attacks. However, it can be seen that the foremost reason for Belfast’s suffering lies with its Government. Its reliability on an inaccurate and misleading report resulted in one of the United Kingdom’s worst tragedies.
Nicola Crooks
