The Impact of Electoral Design on the Legislature.

Alternative Vote 

Another majoritarian system is the Alternative Vote which is used in elections to the Australian House of Representatives and in Ireland for Presidential elections. Australia is divided into 148 single-member constituencies. Instead of a simple 'X', voters rank their preferences among candidate (1,2,3...). To win, candidates need an absolute majority of votes. Where no-one gets over 50 per cent after first preferences are counted, then the candidate at the bottom of the pile with the lowest share of the vote is eliminated, and their votes are redistributed amongst the other candidates. The process continues until an absolute majority is secured. In the 1996 Australian elections, for example, there was a close call on the first preferences, with both the Australian Labour Party and the Liberal party getting 38.7 percent of the vote. In the final preferences however the ALP won 46.4 percent compared with 53.6 percent for non-ALP candidates. Again this process translates a close lead into a more decisive majority of seats for the leading party. This systematically discriminates against those at the bottom of the poll in order to promote effective government for the winner.

Semi-Proportional Systems 

Semi-proportional systems provide another option, including the cumulative vote where citizens are given as many votes as representatives, and where votes can be cumulated on a single candidate (used in duel-member seats in 19th Century Britain and in the State of Illinois until 1980). The limited vote is similar, but voters are given fewer votes than the number of members to be elected (used in elections to the Spanish Senate). In Japan, until 1994, voters used the Single Non-Transferrable Vote where electors cast a single vote in a multi-member district.

Single Transferable Vote 

The system in this category which continues to be used is the 'Single Transferable Vote' (STV) currently employed in legislative elections in Ireland, Malta, and the Australian Senate. Each country is divided into multi-member constituencies which each have about four or five representatives. Parties put forward as many candidates as they think could win in each constituency. Voters rank their preferences among candidates (1,2,3,4...). The total number of votes is counted, then this total is divided by the number of seats in the constituency to produce a quota. To be elected, candidates must reach the minimum quota. When the first preferences are counted, if no candidates reach the quota, then the person with the least votes is eliminated, and their votes redistributed according to second preferences. This process continues until all seats are filled. Proportional Representation

Party Lists Systems 

Where majoritarian systems emphasise governability, proportional systems focus on the inclusion of minority voices. Proportional electoral systems based on Party Lists in multimember constituencies are widespread throughout Europe, and worldwide 57 out of 150 countries use PR (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1993). The principle of proportional representation is that the seats in a constituency are divided according to the number of votes cast for party lists, but there are considerable variations in how this is implemented in different systems. Party lists may be open as in Norway, Finland, the Netherlands and Italy, in which case voters can express preferences for particular candidates within the list. Or they may be closed as in Israel, Portugal, Spain and Germany, in which case voters can only select the party, and the ranking of candidates is determined by the political party. The rank order on the party list determines which candidates are elected, for example the top ten to fifteen names. Party Lists may also be national as in Israel, where all the country is one constituency divided into 120 seats. But most Party Lists are regional, as in Belgium where there are seven regions each sub-divided into between 2-34 seats.

The electoral formula varies among systems. Votes can be allocated to seats based on the highest averages method. This requires the number of votes for each party to be divided successively by a series of divisors, and seats are allocated to parties that secure the highest resulting quotient, up to the total number of seats available. The most widely used is the d'Hondt formula, using divisors (such as 1,2,3 etc). The 'pure' Saint-Laguë method divides the votes with odd numbers (1,3,5,7 etc). The 'modified' Saint-Laguë replace the first divisor by 1.4 but is otherwise identical to the pure version.

An alternative is the largest remainder methods, which uses a minimum quota which can be calculated in a number of ways. In the simplest with the Hare quota, used in Denmark and Costa Rica, the total number of valid votes in each constituency is divided by the total number of seats to be allocated. The Droop quota, used in South Africa and Greece, raises the divisor by the number of seats plus one, producing a slightly less proportional result. Mixed Systems 

Additional Member System 

Lastly many newer systems, such as those recently adopted in Italy, New Zealand and Russia, use mixed systems, although with a variety of alternative designs. The Additional Member System used in Germany combines single member and party list constituencies. Electors have two votes. Half the Members of the Bundestag (328) are elected in single-member constituencies based on a simple plurality of votes. The remaining MPs are elected from closed party lists in each region (Land). Parties which receive less than a specified minimum threshold of list votes (5 per cent) are not be entitled to any seats. The total number of seats which a party receives in Germany is based on the Niemeyer method, which ensures that seats are proportional to second votes cast for party lists. Smaller parties which received, say, 10 per cent of the list vote, but which did not win any single member seats outright, are topped up until they have 10 per cent of all the seats in Parliament. It is possible for a party to be allocated 'surplus' seats when it wins more district seats in the single-member district vote than it is entitled to under the result of the list vote.

The Normative Criteria of Evaluation 

The debate about electoral reform has largely revolved around the practical consequences of incremental changes to the status quo. But underlying these arguments are contested visions about the fundamental principles of representative democracy (see Dunleavy and Margetts 1995). The heart of the debate concerns the central criteria which an electoral system should meet, and whether strong and accountable government is more or less important than the inclusion of minority voices.

Government Effectiveness 

For proponents of majoritarian system the most important criteria is government effectiveness. For admirers, the system of first-past-the-post in parliamentary systems produces the classic 'Westminster model' with the twin virtues of strong but responsive party government. 'Strong' in this sense means single-party, not coalition, government. Cohesive parties with a majority of parliamentary seats are able to implement their manifesto policies without the need to engage in post-election negotiations with coalition partners. The election result is decisive for the outcome. Cabinet government can pass whatever legislation they feel is necessary during their term of office, so long as they can carry their own back-benchers with them. Strong government depends on an exaggerative bias in the electoral system which rewards the winner with a bonus of seats. A 'manufactured majority' is created by translating a relatively small lead in votes into a larger lead of seats in parliament. In the postwar period, for example, British governments have received, on the average, 45 percent of the popular vote but 54 percent of seats. Even in a close election, where the major parties were level-pegging, one party has usually been able to form a government independent of any coalition partners (see Norris 1996).

Responsive and Accountable Government 

Yet governments are also seen as 'responsive'. At the end of their tenure in office governments remain accountable to the electorate, who can throw them out if they so wish. In a competitive two-party system a small swing in the popular vote is sufficient to bring the opposition into office. This system can be envisaged as a pulley-and-weights mechanism: a modest pull on the electoral rope produces a disproportionate displacement of weight. For proponents the twin virtues mean power is shackled with accountability. Governments are given enough freedom to carry out unpopular policies, if necessary, during their full term in office and at the end the electorate can form a clear judgment of their policy record. In addition, at the local level the link between citizens and their constituency MP is thought to provide citizens with a voice in the nation's affairs, as well as making elected members accountable to constituency concerns. Conventional wisdom suggests that there is greater incentive for constituency service in single-member districts than in large multi-member constituencies.

Responsive government, and responsive members, depend upon the rate of potential seat turnover, and a delicate two-party equilibrium. If substantial numbers of government back-benchers have majorities of, say, under 10 per cent over their nearest rival, a relatively modest swing of the vote could easily bring the opposition into power. Although governments have a parliamentary majority to take tough and effective decisions, they knew that their power could easily be withdrawn at the next election. In contrast, proponents argue, in systems with coalition governments even if the public becomes dissatisfied with particular parties they have less power to determine their fate. The process of coalition-building after the result, not the election per se, determines the allocation of seats in Cabinet.

Fairness to minor parties 

For advocates of majoritarian elections, responsible party government takes precedence over the inclusion of all parties in strict proportion to their share of the vote. In this view the primary purpose of general elections is for parliament to function as an indirect electoral college which produces an effective, stable government. The way that the system penalises minor parties can be seen by proponents as a virtue. It prevents fringe groups on the extreme right or left from acquiring representative legitimacy, thereby avoiding a fragmented parliament full of 'fads and faddists'. Yet at the same time if the electorate becomes divided between three or four parties competing nation-wide, the disproportionality of the electoral system becomes far harder to justify. Smaller parties which consistently come second or third are harshly penalised.

Rather than majoritarian governments, advocates of proportional systems argue that other considerations are more important, including the fairness of the outcome for minor parties, the need for Madisonian checks to party government, and the representation of minority social groups. For critics of plurality systems, the moral case for reform is based traditionally on the 'unfairness' to minor parties who achieve a significant share of the vote, like the Canadian Progressive Conservatives in 1993, or the Alliance party in New Zealand in 1993, or the British Liberal Democrats in 1983, but who win few seats because their support is thinly spread geographically. In addition, proponents argue, because fewer votes are 'wasted' in a PR system there is a greater incentive for people to turn out to vote.

Social Representation 

Demands for change have also been generated in recent decades by increasing concern about the social composition of parliament. Political systems systematically under-represent certain social groups in terms of class, race and gender. In 1995 women were only 9.4 percent of national legislators worldwide, and this proportion has declined in recent years (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1995). But within democracies there are substantial variations in this pattern, and women have usually lagged furthest behind in countries using majoritarian systems (Norris 1996). Parties concerned about this issue have considered various strategies including legally binding gender-quotas (used in Argentina for the Senate), dual-member constituencies designated by gender, and most commonly affirmative action in party organisations. Some of these mechanisms can be adopted in single-member districts, (for example in the mid-nineties the British Labour party experimented with all-women shortlists for nomination in half its target marginals). But affirmative action is easiest when applied to balancing the social composition of party lists (for example, designating every other position on the list for male or female candidates, or balancing the list by region, occupation, or religion) (Lovenduski and Norris 1993). These mechanisms can also serve other political minorities based on regional, linguistic, ethnic or religious cleavages, although the effects depend upon the spatial concentration of such groups. Therefore debates about electoral reform have often produced conflict about means (what would be the effects on party fortunes of alternative systems?) but even more fundamentally about ends (what is the primary objective of the electoral system?). In order to examine these claims we need to go on to consider what consequences flow from the adoption of alternative systems.

The Consequences of Electoral Systems 

A large literature has attempted to examine the impact of alternative electoral systems. The most important consequences which will be examined here include the election of parties to parliament, the proportionality of votes to seats,the production of coalition or single-party governments, the representation of social groups, levels of electoral turnout, and the provision of constituency services. To analyse these factors we will compare the election result for legislative office in the most recent election (mid-nineties) in fifty-three democracies, with data drawn from LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (1996). These democracies included 17 majoritarian systems, 12 mixed or semi-proportional systems, and 24 countries with proportional representation.

The Impact on the Party System 

One of Duverger's most famous claims is that, in a law-like relationship, the plurality rule favours a two-party system while proportional systems lead to multipartyism (Duverger 1955). This raises the question of what is to 'count' as a party, in particular how to count very small parties. In recent years Lijphart (1994) reexamined the evidence for this thesis. The study compared 27 advanced industrialised democracies in 1945-90 based on the Laakso and Taagepera measure of the 'effective number of parliamentary parties' (ENPP) which takes account not only of the number of parties but also the relative size of each. Lijphart found that the ENPP was 2.0 in plurality systems, 2.8 in majority and 3.6 in proportional systems. Within proportional systems he found that the minimum threshold of votes also has an effect on the inclusion of minor parties. [DIAGRAM 2 ABOUT HERE]

We can use the same measure to extend the analysis to a wider range of democracies including developing and developed societies, in the most recent election in the mid-1990s. The results of this comparison show that the effective number of parliamentary parties was 3.1 in majoritarian systems, 3.9 in mixed or semi-proportional systems, and 4.0 in proportional systems (see Diagram 2). Duverger's law that PR is associated with multipartyism finds further confirmation from this analysis although, as discussed earlier, smaller parties can do well under first-past-the-post if their support is spatially concentrated.

The Proportionality of Votes to Seats 

The proportionality of election results measures the degree to which the parties' share of seats corresponds to their share of votes. Previous studies have found this to be significantly greater under PR than under majoritarian systems (Mackie and Rose 1991; Lijphart 1994; Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995). There are a number of ways of measuring proportionality, which reflect divergent notions of the basic concept. One of the most elegant and simplest solutions is to measure the largest deviation in the election result, which will generally be the percentage over-representation of the largest party (Lijphart 1994). As discussed earlier majoritarian systems provide a winner's bonus for the party in first place, while penalising others, so this provides one indication of disproportionality. The results of this measure suggest that the average winner's bonus under majoritarian systems is 12.5 percentage points, compared with 7.4 under mixed systems, and 5.7 percent under proportional representation. Hence under majoritarian electoral systems a party which won 37.5 percent of the vote or more could usually be assured of a parliamentary majority in seats, whereas under PR systems a party would normally require 46.3 percent of the vote or more to achieve an equivalent result.

The Production of Single-Party or Coalition Governments 

The classic argument for majoritarian systems is that they tend to produce stable and responsible single-party governments, so that the electoral outcome is decisive. In contrast, unless one party wins a majority of votes, PR is closely associated with coalition cabinets. A survey of twenty countries found that single-party governments were formed after 60 percent of majoritarian elections, but only 10 percent of PR elections (Blais and Carty 1987). If we compare the parliamentary democracies in this analysis 56.3 percent of elections under majoritarian systems produced single-party governments, compared with 36.4 percent of elections under mixed systems, and 34.8 percent of PR elections. In countries with PR and fragmented party systems, like Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland, all governments tend to be coalitions. But majoritarian electoral systems can also result in coalition governments, such as in Britain between the wars. Moreover PR systems may also have single-party governments, such as long periods of dominance by the Austrian Socialists, the Norwegian Labour party, and the Swedish Social Democrats. The pattern of government formation is therefore far more complex than any simple linear relationship might lead us to expect (Laver and Shepsle 1995), although as expected there is a significant relationship between the production of single party governments and majoritarian electoral systems.

 The Provision of Constituency Service 

A further claim of single-member majoritarian systems is that these promote casework, since MPs are elected from a specific district. Members should also have incentives for such service where they compete with others within their party in multi-member systems like STV and the Single Non-Transferable Vote. In contrast closed party list systems should provide limited incentives for members to engage in such activities, and limited opportunities for citizens to contact 'their' representatives. Unfortunately there are few systematic cross-national studies of casework to confirm these propositions, and previous studies which do exist have proved skeptical about any simple and direct relationship between the type of electoral system and the degree of casework (Bogdanor 1985; Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995).

The 1994 European Representation Study provides some limited evidence, since candidates for the European Parliament (N.1308) were asked to rate the importance of various tasks they might face as an MEP, using a scale from 'not very important' (1) to 'very important' (7). These tasks included case-work, defined broadly as 'helping individuals with particular problems'. The results indicate that case-work emerged as most important for parliamentary candidates from Britain (ranked 5.5 in importance), which is the only country using a majoritarian system for European elections. Nevertheless there was considerable variation within proportional systems, since this work was also highly rated by candidates from Germany (5.3), Ireland (4.8) and Denmark (4.4), while it was regarded as less important by candidates from Luxembourg (3.6), France (3.5), and Italy (2.9). We need further research about orientations to casework across a range of countries with different electoral systems to explore these issues more systematically.

The Impact on Electoral Turnout 

The standard assumption from previous studies is to expect turnout to be slightly higher in proportional systems (Powell 1986; Jackman 1986; Blais and Carty 1991; Black 1991). The reasons are that as a fairer system, since there are no 'wasted votes', people may be more willing to participate. PR also increases the number of parties and therefore the choices available to the electorate. Moreover PR makes elections more competitive, so parties may have greater incentive to try to maximise their support in all constituencies. The evidence in this comparison confirms this relationship: turnout averaged 65.4 percent in majoritarian systems, 71.2 percent in mixed or semi-proportional systems, and 75.7 percent in proportional systems (See Diagram 3). This participation gap was not so great among established democracies but it proved particularly significant among developing countries.

The Representation of Social Groups 

One central virtue of proportional systems is the claim that they are more likely to produce a parliament which reflects the composition of the electorate (Norris 1995). District magnitude is seen as particularly important in this regard. The main reason is that parties may have an incentive to produce a 'balanced' ticket to maximise their support where they have to present a party list, whereas in contrast there is no such incentive where candidates are selected for single-member districts. Moreover measures of affirmative action within party recruitment processes can be implemented more easily in systems with party lists.

[DIAGRAM 4 ABOUT HERE]

In this regard it is difficult to compare the representation of ethnic or religious minorities, which depend in part upon the spatial distribution of these groups, but we can contrast the representation of women across systems. Based on the proportion of women in the lower house in the mid-nineties the results confirm that women are better represented in proportional systems. Women were 7.3 percent of MPs in majoritarian systems, 13.2 percent in mixed or semi-proportional systems, and 17.2 percent of members in PR systems. Of course again the pattern was not linear, (see Diagram 4) and more women were elected in some majoritarian systems like Canada than in other countries like Israel using highly proportional systems. The cultural context, and especially the process of recruitment within parties strongly influences the opportunities for women in elected office (Lovenduski and Norris 1993). Nevertheless the electoral system functions as a facilitating mechanism which allows for easier implementation of measures within parties, like affirmative action for female candidates.

Conclusion: Choosing an Electoral System 

Often the choice of electoral system seems mechanistic - constitutional engineering designed to bring about certain objectives. But the issue of how the electoral system functions has consequences which reflect essentially contested concepts of representative democracy. For advocates of responsible party government the most important considerations are that elections (not the subsequent process of coalition building) should be decisive for the outcome. The leading party should be empowered to try to implement their programme during their full term of office, without depending upon the support of minority parties. The government, and individual MPs, remain accountable for their actions to the public. And at periodic intervals the electorate should be allowed to judge their record, and vote for alternative parties accordingly. Minor parties in third or fourth place are discriminated against for the sake of governability. In this perspective proportional elections can produce indecisive outcomes, unstable regimes, disproportionate power for minor parties in 'kingmaker' roles, and a lack of clear-cut accountability and transparency in decision-making.

In contrast proponents of proportional systems argue that the electoral system should promote a process of conciliation and coalition-building within government. Parties above a minimum threshold should be included in the legislature in rough proportion to their level of electoral support. The parties in government should therefore craft policies based on a consensus among the coalition partners. Moreover the composition of parliament should reflect the main divisions in the social composition of the electorate, so that all citizens have voices articulating their interests in the legislature. In this view majoritarian systems over-reward the winner, producing 'an elected dictatorship' where the government can implement its programmes without the need for consultation and compromise with other parties in parliament. Moreover the unfairness and disproportionate results of the electoral system outside of two-party contests means that some voices in the electorate are systematically excluded from representative bodies.

Therefore there is no single 'best' system: these arguments represent irresolvable value conflicts. For societies which are riven by deep-rooted ethnic, religious or ethnic divisions, like Mali, Russia or Israel, the proportional system may prove more inclusive (Lijphart 1977), but it may also reinforce rather than ameliorate these cleavages (Tsebelis 1990). For states which are already highly-centralised, like Britain or New Zealand, majoritarian systems can insulate the government from the need for broader consultation and democratic checks and balances. In constitutional design it appears that despite the appeal of 'electoral engineering' there are no easy choices.

First-Past-The-Post

How the System Works:

The current system for electing MPs to the House of Commons is called First-Past-The-Post. There are 659 separate constituencies across the UK each electing one single Member of Parliament. In order to vote you simply put an 'X' next to the name of the candidate you support. The candidate who gets the most votes wins, regardless of whether he or she has more than 50% support. Once members have been individually elected, the party with the most seats in Parliament, regardless of whether or not it has a majority across the country, normally becomes the next government.

The system is used:

for elections to the House of Commons and local elections in the UK and in USA, Canada and India.

Arguments used in favour:

• It is simple to understand.
• The voter can express a view on which party should form the next government.
• It tends to lead to a two-party system. The system tends to produce single party governments, which are strong enough to create legislation and tackle the country's problems, without relying on the support of any other party.
• It provides a close link between the MP and their constituency.
• The system represents the views of the people, as the candidate with the greatest support wins through a fair process.
• The UK's democracy is one of the strongest in the world, it works and since no system is perfect, why should we go through the massive overhaul of changing?

Weaknesses:

• Only one MP is elected in each constituency, so all the voters who did not vote for him or her are not represented. Their votes do not help elect anybody and so are wasted, they could have stayed at home and the result would not have been altered.
• In 1997, in Great Britain, 14.7 million voters cast ineffective votes - that is 48.2% of those who voted. A high proportion of these voters are the same people every time, e.g. Conservative voters in County Durham or Labour voters in much of Surrey.
• >There is a lack of choice given to the voters. The candidates are selected by a small number of party members, and voters can only choose between parties. If the candidate selected for your party has views with which you disagree, you are left with no alternative choice within that party.
• Voters are represented unequally. In 1997, the average number of votes per MP elected was: 32,376 for Labour, but 113,826 for Liberal Democrats
• Concentrated support for a party produces results. In 1997, Conservative support was spread thinly over most of Scotland. They got 18% of the vote in Scotland, but no seats. The Liberal Democrats got 13% of the Scottish vote and a similar share of the seats because they had strong support in a few constituencies and minimal support in most of the others.
• The system leads to many people casting negative votes i.e. voting against the candidate they dislike most rather than for the candidate they like best.
• The way the boundaries of constituencies are drawn can affect the results. Governments are often accused of gerrymandering, adjusting the boundaries of constituencies to influence the results.
• In 1997, Labour won 43.3% of the total vote, but got 65.2% of the seats in Parliament, giving them power to form a government. Although 11 out of 20 British electors voted against the Government, it has complete power.

The Supplementary Vote (SV)

How the System works:

With the supplementary vote, there are two columns on the ballot paper - one for the first choice and one for the second choice.  Voters are not required to make a second choice if they do not wish to.  Voters mark an 'X' in the first column for their first choice and a second 'X' in the second column for their other choice.

Voters' first preferences are counted and if one candidate gets 50% of the vote, then he or she is elected.  If no candidate reaches 50% of the vote, the two highest scoring candidates are retained and the rest of the candidates are eliminated.

The second preferences on the ballot papers of the eliminated candidates are examined and any that have been cast for the two remaining candidates are given to them.  Whoever has the most votes at the end of the process wins.

The system is used:

to elect the Mayor of London.

Weaknesses:

• SV suffers from all the disadvantages of AV.
• Unlike AV, SV does not ensure that the winning candidate has the support of at least 50% of the electorate.
• SV does not eliminate the likelihood of tactical voting.

Single Transferable Vote (STV)

How the System Works:

Each constituency would elect between 3 and 5 MPs depending on its size. Voters rank the candidates, putting a '1' for their favourite, a '2' for the next, and so on. If the voter's first choice candidate does not need their vote, either because he or she is elected without it, or because he or she has too few votes to be elected, then the vote is transferred to the voter's second choice candidate, and so on.

In this way, most of the votes help to elect a candidate and far fewer votes are wasted. An important feature of STV is that voters can choose between candidates both of their own and of other parties, and can even select candidates for reasons other than party affiliation. Thus, a voter, wishing for more women MPs could vote for a woman from their own party and then all other women candidates, whatever party they stand for.

The system is used:

in the Australian Senate, the Republic of Ireland, Tasmania, Malta and Northern Ireland for local elections and elections to the European Parliament.

Arguments used in favour: 

STV does more than other systems to guarantee that everyone gets their views represented in parliament and that they have a say in what is done by their elected representatives. STV is the best option for:

• Putting the power in the hands of the voters.
• Keeping MPs linked to the people who voted for them. Most voters can identify a representative that they personally helped to elect and can feel affinity with. Such a personal link also increases accountability.
• Making parliament reflect the views of the voters.
• Only a party or coalition of parties, who could attract more than 50% of the electorate could form a government. Any changes would have to be backed by a majority since public opinion is reflected fairly in elections under STV. This is far more important than that a government should be formed by only one political party.
• It enables the voters to express opinions effectively. Voters can choose between candidates within parties, demonstrating support for different wings of the party. Voters can also express preferences between the abilities or other attributes, of individual candidates.
• It is simple for voters to use.
• There is no need for tactical voting . Voters can cast a positive vote and know that their vote will not be wasted whatever their choice is.
• It produces governments that are strong and stable because they are founded on the majority support of the electorate.

Weaknesses:

• The system does not produce such accuracy in proportional representation of parties as the party list or additional member systems.
• It breaks the link between an individual MP and his or her constituency.
• Constituencies would be 3-5 times larger than they are now but with 3-5 MPs.
• MPs may have to spend an excessive amount of time dealing with constituency problems and neglect the broader issues.
• There are critics who say that this system could lead to permanent coalition governments, but this would only happen if the voters as a whole want it.
• It is disliked by politicians, since it would remove power from them and give it to the electors, and many MPs with safe seats would lose the security they feel now.

Answering the Common Arguments Against STV

It could destroy the link between MPs and the constituents

Under STV, the constituency link is retained, albeit between several MPs and an enlarged constituency. The accountability of MPs to their constituencies is actually increased in that, unlike the current single-member constituencies, no individual MP has a safe seat. Due to the reduction in security of tenure brought about by STV, all MPs will need to win their seats on merit. Voters also tend to feel a natural link with the whole of Leeds, for example, rather than an allegiance to Leeds North or Leeds Central. They may prefer to have real influence with the MPs representing the whole of the city, rather than hold one MP responsible for their sector. The idea of working together, as a team with other representatives in the area is the norm for local government, where working together for a local ward, is often seen as advantageous.

STV could cause internal party rifts

In most cases, party solidarity and loyalty will inhibit individualistic campaigning, and even if this were to happen, a party could exclude a future ticket to a recalcitrant candidate. There is intra-party competition in every election system. With First-Past-The-Post, it is internalised within the selection and re-selection process; with Party Lists, it becomes a permanent internal competition for a high place on the list. In order to maximise its total support in a multi-member constituency; a party is likely to put up a balanced team of candidates. Under STV all existing MPs can stand for election, and may have an advantage in being better known than their new colleagues.

MPs could become bogged down in casework.

There is no evidence in Britain that local casework-based candidates poll better than national names, often voters like to be represented by national names who may have little day to day contact with the constituency.

The ballot papers would be too complicated for the public too understand.

Electors are perfectly able to cope with STV ballot papers. The first Northern Ireland Assembly election under STV in 1973, which produced a 70% turnout, is a good example. The voters elected representatives from both sides of the community in every constituency.

Party List Systems

How the System Works:

There are many variations of party list voting, but the most basic form is the closed party list system. The system is quite simple; rather than voting in a single-member constituency for a specific candidate, electors vote for a party in a multi-member constituency, or sometimes a whole country.

Each party's list of candidates, ranked according to the party's preference, is published on the ballot paper. All the votes are counted and each party receives seats in the constituency in the same proportion as the votes it won in that constituency.

A quota is calculated for the constituency - the number of votes required to win one seat. Those who become the party's MPs, will be those placed highest in the party's list of candidates. Voters simply vote for the party, they have no say as to which candidates are elected.

An open party list system is one that allows the voter to vote either for the list as published or to vote for an individual candidate, wherever that candidate appears on the party's list. The possible effect of this is to alter the order in which candidates have been placed on the list, and therefore the list of successful candidates, while still registering support for the voter's preferred party. Seats are allocated according to the number of quotas won.

The system is used:

in most countries in continental Europe, South Africa, Israel and Russia, and was used in Britain for the 1999 European Election (Northern Ireland will retain STV).

Arguments used in favour:

• The strength of such systems are that they guarantee a high degree of party proportionality.  If a party receives 32% of the vote, then it will get 32% of the seats in parliament. Every vote has the same value.
• The system is also very simple for voters, who have only to make one choice for a party out of a small selection.

Weaknesses:

• With closed party lists, voters have little or no effective choice over candidates, they only get control over which party is in government, but with no control over the members of that government.
• Party lists do nothing to ensure fair representation for traditionally under-represented groups in society, and in fact could do the opposite, since party leaders are most likely to choose people from a similar background to represent the party.
• Parties can stifle independent and minority opinion within their ranks. Because of the very large constituencies, there is little chance for accountability to voters and no local connection between members and voters. The system keeps power out of the hands of voters and firmly in the hands of party leadership.

Additional Member System (AMS)

How the System Works:

Several variants of Additional Member Systems have been proposed, but basically they are a combination of the First-Past-The-Post system and party list voting. The purpose is to retain the best features of First-Past-The-Post while introducing proportionality between parties through party list voting.

Each voter has two votes, one vote for a single MP via First-Past-The-Post, and one for a regional or national party list. Half the seats or more are allocated to the single-member constituencies and the rest to the party list. The percentage of votes obtained by the parties in the party list vote determines their overall number of representatives; the party lists are used to top up the First-Past-The-Post seats gained by the party to the required number. So if a party has won two seats in the constituencies but in proportion to its votes should have five, the first three candidates on its list are elected in addition.

The system is used: 

in Germany and it was also chosen by New Zealand in a referendum in 1993, (although in New Zealand it is called Mixed Member Proportional Representation or MMP). The new Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly were both elected by AMS in May 1999 as will be the London Assembly in May 2000.

Arguments used in favour:

• It results in broadly proportional representation along party lines while ensuring that there is a directly accountable MP for each constituency.
• It retains a number of single-member constituencies.
• It has produced strong and stable governments in Germany (but not single party governments)
• Each elector has at least one effective vote. Even of they see no chance of winning in the single member constituency, people can use their second vote for a party they support and still have a limited say through an additional member.
• The separation of the vote, allows the voter to make an expression of popular approval or disapproval which is not possible under First-Past-The-Post.  Because the first vote does not affect a party's total representation, a voter can use it to express personal support for a candidate without necessarily helping that candidate's party.
• AMS would give people the government they wanted, keeping the link between MPs and voters as well as giving some value to all votes, via the additional members.

Weaknesses:

• It combines many of the faults of First-Past-The-Post with many of the defects of the list systems of PR.
• Half of all MPs are not directly accountable to any voters, just to their party leadership, and have no constituency.
• It creates two types of MP, one with a constituency role and duties and one without such a base.
• To retain some constituency MPs, constituencies would have to increase in size.
• The parties would retain power over selecting candidates for constituency seats and would have complete control over choosing their Additional Members.
• Those who are under-represented today may not fare any better under AMS.
• In Germany a party can win more constituency seats than its total entitlement, and is allowed to retain its extra seat(s) and the total membership of the Bundestaag is increased by that number over the standard 656.

Single Transferable Vote

 

Political scientists have long been advocated the Single Transferable Vote (STV) as one of the most attractive electoral systems. However, its use for national parliamentary elections has been limited to a few cases - Ireland since 1921 (see ), Malta since 1947 (see ), and once in Estonia in 1990. It is also used in Australia for elections to the Tasmanian House of Assembly, the Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, and the federal Senate (see ); and in Northern Ireland local elections.

In the nineteenth century, Thomas Hare in Britain and Carl Andru in Denmark independently invented the core principles of the system. STV uses multi-member districts, with voters ranking candidates in order of preference on the ballot paper in the same manner as the Alternative Vote (see ). In most cases this preference marking is optional, and voters are not required to rank-order all candidates; if they wish they can mark only one. After the total number of first-preference votes are counted, the count then begins by establishing the "quota" of votes required for the election of a single candidate. The quota is calculated by the simple formula:

votes
Quota = _________ + 1
seats + 1

The first stage of the count is to ascertain the total number of first-preference votes for each candidate. Any candidate who has more first preferences than the quota is immediately elected. If no-one has achieved the quota, the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated, with his or her second preferences being redistributed to the candidates left in the race. At the same time, the surplus votes of elected candidates (i.e., those votes above the quota) are redistributed according to the second preferences on the ballot papers. For fairness, all the candidate's ballot papers are redistributed, but each at a fractional percentage of one vote, so that the total redistributed vote equals the candidate's surplus (except in the Republic of Ireland, which uses a weighted sample). If a candidate had 100 votes, for example, and their surplus was ten votes, then each ballot paper would be redistributed at the value of 1/10th of a vote. This process continues until all seats for the constituency are filled.

Single Transferable Vote - Advantages

 

As a mechanism for choosing representatives, the Single Transferable Vote (STV) is perhaps the most sophisticated of all electoral systems, allowing for choice between parties and between candidates within parties. The final results also retain a fair degree of proportionality, and the fact that in most actual examples of STV the multi-member districts are relatively small means that an important geographical link between voter and representative is retained.

Furthermore, voters can influence the composition of post-election coalitions, as has been the case in Ireland, and the system provides incentives for inter-party accommodation through the reciprocal exchange of preferences. STV also provides a better chance for the election of popular independent candidates than List PR, because voters are choosing between candidates, rather than between parties (although a party-list option can be added to an STV election; this is done for the Australian Senate - see ).

Single Transferable Vote - Disdvantages

 

The Single Transferable Vote (STV) is often criticized on the grounds that preference voting is unfamiliar in many societies, and demands, at the very least, a degree of literacy and numeracy. The intricacies of an STV count are themselves quite complex, which is also seen as being a drawback.

STV also carries the disadvantages of all parliaments elected by PR methods, such as under certain circumstances increasing the power of small minority parties. Moreover, at times the system, unlike straight List PR, can provide pressures for political parties to fragment internally, because at election-time members of the same party are effectively competing against each other, as well as against the opposition, for votes.

Many of these criticisms have, however, proved to be little trouble in practice. STV elections in Ireland (see ), Malta (see ) and Tasmania (see ) have all tended to produce relatively stable, legitimate governments comprised of one or two main parties.

First Past the Post (FPTP)

 

To date, pure First Past the Post (FPTP) systems are found in the United Kingdom and those countries historically influenced by Britain. Along with the United Kingdom, the most analyzed cases are Canada, India, New Zealand, and the United States of America. However, New Zealand switched to a MMP system of Proportional Representation in 1993 (see ).

FPTP is also used by a dozen Caribbean nations; by Belize and formerly Guyana in Latin America; by ten Asian states (including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Malaysia); and by many of the small island nations of the South Pacific. Eighteen African nations, mostly former British colonies, use FPTP systems. In total, out of the 212 countries and related territories (see ) sixty-eight - just under one third - use FPTP systems.

In FPTP systems, the winning candidate is simply the person who wins most votes. In theory, a candidate could be elected with two votes, if every other candidate only secured a single vote. Alterations to this rule transform the system into the Block Vote, the Two-Round System, or the Single Non-Transferable Vote, and these systems are dealt with in more detail in ,  and . However, one adaptation that can also be categorized as FPTP was used in Nepal in the early 1990s. There, due to the low level of literacy in much of the electorate, candidates ran under a party symbol, rather than as individuals. Voters chose between parties, rather than between candidates. Candidates for office were allowed to run in more than one district, if they wished. Any candidate elected in two or more seats would then have to choose which district they would represent. Partial elections were held to fill the vacated seats.

UK: Electoral System Experimentation in Cradle of FPTP

 

The classical First Past the Post (FPTP), single-member district, electoral system that is so strongly associated with Great Britain did not in fact come into widespread use for Westminster elections until 1884-1885 - a full 50 years after the First Reform Act of 1832, which marked the beginnings of representative democracy in the UK, see . Up until 1867 most members of the British House of Commons were elected from two-member districts by the Block Vote who served to compound the seat bonuses given to the larger parties, see . The Second Reform Act of 1867 introduced the Limited Vote (in which electors had one fewer vote than the number of seats to be filled) for the election of 43 members of the Commons, chosen from 13 three-member districts and one four-member seat, see .

The Third Reform Act of 1884-1885 abolished these Limited Vote seats and FPTP became established as the dominant system. Even today, and despite Westminster's reputation as the birthplace of FPTP, the system is not used throughout the United Kingdom. The Single Transferable Vote form of PR was re-introduced in Northern Ireland, after a 50 year absence, for local government elections in 1973 in an attempt to craft incentives for accommodatory behaviour between the political representatives of the Nationalist and Unionist communities, advantage the moderate and non-sectarian middle, and ensure adequate representation of the minority Catholic community, see . In the same year STV was used to elect the ill-fated Stormont Assembly - which had been created to give the people of Ulster a degree of self-governing power. Nearly a quarter of a century later, in May 1996, a new body charged with finding solutions to the province's troubles, the Northern Irish Peace Forum, was elected by PR in order to give rise to the most representative body possible, see . Ninety Forum members were elected from 18 list PR districts of five members in size, while the top 10 parties in terms of votes won across Ulster were awarded two additional seats in the assembly. Since 1979 Northern Ireland's three members of the European parliament have been elected by STV while, at the same time, Britain's 84 English, Scottish, and Welsh MEPs have been elected by FPTP.

The proliferation of different electoral systems in use in the UK has meant that electoral reform, for all tiers of British government, has become an increasingly debated issue. In July 1997 the new Labour government, led by Prime Minister Tony Blair, announced that they would present legislation to change the electoral system for British members of the European parliament to a form of regional list PR in England, Scotland, and Wales, while leaving unaltered the PR STV system in Northern Ireland. Similarly, the proposed Scottish and Welsh assemblies, which will have a degree of autonomous law-making power devolved from the Westminster parliament, are to be elected by PR methods if they are approved by the Scottish and Welsh peoples in September 1997 referenda. Both assemblies are to have Mixed Member Proportional systems which retain FPTP seats based on the current Westminster single-member districts, but include district-based PR lists which will compensate, to some extent, for any overall disproportionality, see . The proposed Welsh Assembly will have 40 FPTP single-member seats and 20 list PR seats, while the proposed Scottish Assembly will have 73 FPTP seats and 56 list PR seats. No set threshold for representation has been agreed upon but the Welsh Assembly will have an effective threshold of just under five per cent for a party to win a list seat while in Scotland parties will need far fewer votes to gain representation - probably closer to 1.5 per cent of the total vote. Lastly, STV has been proposed by the Fabians (an influential Labour-affiliated policy institute) for local government elections. But it is unlikely that electoral system reform will be seriously considered for local government in this parliament's lifetime - not least because the government's agenda for constitutional reform is already so over-loaded.

However, the overwhelming focus of electoral reform remains the House of Commons and at the time of writing Britain appears closer to changing her FPTP system than at any time since 1917. In that year a proposal to introduce the Alternative Vote (AV) for two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, and the Single Transferable Vote (STV) for the remaining one-third of seats, was narrowly defeated after a stalemate between the House of Lords and House of Commons. A second attempt to move to AV was rejected by parliament in 1931, and it was not until the 1970s that electoral reform muscled its way back on to the British political agenda. In 1976 the Hansard Commission on Electoral Reform, chaired by the former Conservative cabinet minister Lord Blake, recommended that a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system be used for parliamentary elections, with three-quarters of the members being elected by FPTP and one-quarter from regional PR lists. The calculation for list seat allocations would take place at the national level and these seats would compensate for any disproportionality in the overall results of the single member district seats.

After four consecutive defeats for the Labour party (1979, 1983, 1987, and 1992) the previously solid Labour support for FPTP began to fracture and in 1990 the leadership set up a commission, chaired by Professor Raymond Plant, to investigate electoral system reform options. The Plant Report (1993) recommended a switch to a sibling of the Alternative Vote which they called the Supplementary Vote - the same system used to elect the Sri Lankan president, see . While this proposal was never officially adopted by the Labour party in opposition they did nonetheless adopt a policy that, when returned to office, they would hold a national referendum on electoral system change. This policy was given teeth in a joint agreement on constitutional reform between Labour and the Liberal Democrats (who had consistently advocated a switch to a PR) announced on the eve of the 1997 British general election.

The debate over reforming the way members of the House of Commons are elected reflects the First Past the Post versus Proportional Representation debate which has underlain much of the discussion of British constitutional practice throughout this century. The criticisms of the current FPTP electoral system have been restated many times. First, FPTP in the UK has led to some highly disproportional results where minority parties received far fewer seats than their percentage vote might have indicated and has led to situations where the "losing" party, in terms of votes won, became the winning party in term of seats won and thus formed the government.

The Liberal Party, then Liberal-Social Democratic Alliance, then Liberal Democrats, have been the most victimized on the first count - although over the last four elections the disparity between the third party's vote and seat share has been decreasing. In 1983 the Liberal-SDP Alliance won 25.4 percent of the vote but only 3.5 percent of the seats. In 1987 the Alliance won 22.6 percent and 3.4 percent of the seats. In 1992 the newly formed Liberal Democrats won 17.8 percent of the votes and 3.1 percent of the seats, but in 1997, utilising more sophisticated targeting techniques and benefiting from the tide of anti-Conservative feeling, the Lib Dems were able to win 6.5 percent of the seats with 16.7 percent of the popular vote. The uphill struggle that new parties face under FPTP was dramatically illustrated in the 1989 UK European elections when the UK Green Party won 15 percent of the vote but not a single seat. The second anomaly, of one party winning most votes but forming the opposition, has happened twice in the post-war period. In 1951 the Labour Party won more votes but the Conservatives won most seats and formed the government, while in February 1974 the indignity was reversed with Labour forming the government after the Conservatives had polled most votes.

A second powerful criticism leveled at the British FPTP system has been its inability to adequately represent the nation along lines of gender and ethnicity. Up until 1997 fewer than ten percent of British MPs were women, although Labour's vigorous promotion of women parliamentary candidates and their subsequent landslide victory did nearly double the number of women MPs to 18.1 percent in the 1997 parliament. Ethnic minorities in Britain have been similarly under-represented. Most parliaments preceding the 1987 election were all white, and the four Black and Indian-English MPs elected in that year represented less than 0.5 percent of the total. While Black and Asian representation has increased over the last three elections their numbers in parliament remain substantially below their proportion of the UK population as a whole.

Opponents of FPTP have also cited destabilizing swings in economic policy which arose from the alternation of Conservative and Labour governments between 1945-1979, but the Conservatives 18 unbroken years in office (1979-1997) and Labour's drift toward the fiscally moderate centre has tended to weaken this argument. Finally, some PR advocates have disputed the fact that FPTP creates a strong geographical link between elector and representative in the UK, arguing that many safe Conservative and Labour seats are effectively "rotten boroughs" where MPs have little incentive to make themselves accessible, and that the urban centres of the UK are now so totally dominated by Labour MPs that all other party supporters are effectively disenfranchised.

In contrast FPTP in Britain is defended particular because of its single-member districts and encouragement of a "dominant two-party system". Supporters of the status quo find the single constituency member sacrosanct and argue that this relationship of accountability between a voter and their MP is the bedrock of British democracy. Opponents of PR also point to the fact that all, bar one, UK governments in the post-war period have been single party governments and predict that the coalition governments, which would most likely result from a PR system, would be destabilizing to the country as a whole. Related to the previous point is the argument that FPTP provides a barrier against the fragmentation of the party system, which might involve the break up of the major parties (for example, a split in the Conservative Party between "pro-" and "anti-" European wings). Finally, FPTP is praised for denying a platform to extremist parties such as the National Front and British National Party.

The prospects for reform of Britain's FPTP system for parliamentary elections remain uncertain. While it now seems increasingly likely that a referendum will be held it is unclear whether the British electorate would support a switch to PR. Opinion polls between 1992 and 1997 have been inconsistent. At times they have shown great support for change while at other times a majority of voters have expressed the desire to keep FPTP. If a referendum is held the stance taken by the Labour government is likely to be key. A vigorous campaign against change (joined by the Conservatives) would probably condemn the PR alternative to failure, while a strong Labour campaign for change (in harness with the Liberal Democrats) might ensure that electoral reform carried the day. If Britain does change its electoral system, and goes through with the establishment of the Scottish and Welsh assemblies, then there could be up to six different electoral systems operating at the national, local, and European parliamentary levels come the end of this century.

First Past the Post - Advantages

 

First Past the Post (FPTP), like other plurality-majority electoral systems, is defended primarily on the grounds of simplicity and its tendency to produce representatives beholden to defined geographic areas. The most often cited advantages of FPTP are that:

• It provides a clear cut choice for voters between two main parties. The built-in disadvantages faced by third and fragmented minority parties under FPTP in many cases makes the party system gravitate towards a party of the "left" and a party of the "right", alternating in power. Third parties often wither away, and almost never reach a threshold of popular support where their national vote achieves a comparable percentage of parliamentary seats.
• It gives rise to single party governments. The "seat bonuses" for the largest party common under FPTP (i.e., where one party wins, for example, 45 percent of the national vote but 55 percent of the seats) means that coalition governments are the exception rather than the rule. This state of affairs is praised for providing cabinets unshackled from the restraints of having to bargain with a minority coalition partner.
• It gives rise to a coherent parliamentary opposition. In theory, the flip side of a strong single-party government is that the opposition is also given enough seats to perform a critical checking role, and present itself as a realistic alternative to the government of the day.
• It benefits broadly-based political parties. In severely ethnically or regionally-divided societies, FPTP is praised for encouraging political parties to be "broad churches", encompassing many elements of society, particularly when there are only two major parties and many different societal groups. These parties can then field a diverse array of candidates for election. In FPTP Malaysia, for example, the governing coalition is a broad-based movement, and fields Chinese candidates in Malay areas and vice versa.
• It excludes extremist parties from parliamentary representation. Unless an extremist minority party's electoral support is geographically concentrated, it is unlikely to win any seats under FPTP. This contrasts with the situation under straight PR systems, where a fraction of one per cent of the national vote can ensure parliamentary representation.
• It retains the link between constituents and their Member of Parliament (MP). Perhaps the most often quoted advantage of FPTP systems is that they give rise to a parliament of geographical representatives: MPs represent defined areas of cities, towns, or regions rather than just party labels. Many proponents of FPTP argue that true representative accountability depends upon the voters of one area knowing who their own representative is, and having the ability to re-elect, or throw them out, at election time. Some analysts have argued that this "geographic accountability" is particularly important in agrarian societies and developing countries (see ).
• It allows voters to choose between people, rather than just between parties. At the same time, voters can assess the performance of individual candidates, rather than just having to accept a list of candidates presented by a party, as can happen under some List PR electoral systems.
• It gives a chance for popular independent candidates to be elected. This is particularly important in developing party systems, where politics revolves more around extended family ties, clan, or kinship, and is not based on strong party-political organizations.
• Finally, FPTP systems are particularly praised for being simple to use and understand. A valid vote requires only one mark beside the name or symbol of one candidate, and the number of candidates on the ballot paper is usually small, making the count easy to administer for electoral officials.

First Past the Post - Disadvantages

 

l plurality-majority systems, with First Past the Post (FPTP) being the chief culprit, have been criticized for the reasons outlined below.

Excluding Minority Parties from Fair Representation 

Here we take the word  to mean that a party which wins approximately ten percent of the votes should win approximately ten percent of the parliamentary seats. In the 1983 British general election, the Liberal-Social Democratic Party Alliance won twenty-five percent of the votes, but only three percent of the seats. In the 1981 New Zealand election the Social Credit Party won twenty-one percent of the vote, but only two percent of the seats. In the 1989 Botswana general election the Botswana National Front won twenty-seven percent of the votes, but only nine percent of the seats. This pattern is repeated time and time again under FPTP (see  and ).

Excluding Minorities from Fair Representation 

As a rule, under FPTP, parties put up the most broadly acceptable candidate in a particular district so as to avoid alienating the majority of electors. Thus it is rare, for example, for a black candidate to be given a major party's nomination in a majority white district in Britain or the USA. There is strong evidence that ethnic and racial minorities across the world are far less likely to be represented in parliaments elected by FPTP. In consequence, if voting behaviour does dovetail with ethnic divisions, then the exclusion from parliamentary representation of ethnic minority group members can be destabilizing for the political system as a whole (see ).

Excluding Women from Parliament 

The "most broadly acceptable candidate" syndrome also affects the ability of women to be elected to parliamentary office, because they are often less likely to be selected as candidates by male-dominated party structures. Evidence across the world suggests that women are less likely to be elected to parliament under plurality-majority systems than under PR ones. The Inter-Parliamentary Union's annual study of "Women in Parliament" in 1995 found that on average women made up eleven percent of the parliamentarians in established democracies using FPTP, but the figure almost doubled to twenty percent in those countries using some form of Proportional Representation. This pattern has been mirrored in new democracies, especially in Africa.

Encouraging the Development of Ethnic Parties 

In some situations, FPTP can encourage parties to base their campaigns and policy platforms on hostile conceptions of clan, ethnicity, race, or regionalism. In the Malawi multi-party elections of 1994, a history of colonial rule, missionary activity, and Hastings Banda's "Chewa-ization" of national culture combined to plant the seeds of regional conflict which both dovetailed with, and cut across, pre-conceived ethnic boundaries. The South voted for the United Democratic Front of Bakili Muluzi, the Centre for the Malawi Congress Party of Hastings Banda, and the North for the Alliance for Democracy led by Chakufwa Chihana. There was no incentive for parties to make appeals outside their home region and cultural-political base.

Exaggerating "Regional Fiefdoms"

This is where one party wins all the seats in a province or district. In some situations, FPTP tends to create regions where one party, through winning a majority of votes in the region, wins all, or nearly all, of the parliamentary seats. This both excludes regional minorities from representation and reinforces the perception the politics is a battleground defined by who you are and where you live, rather than what you believe in. This has long been put forward as an argument against FPTP in Canada (see ).

Leaving a Large Number of "Wasted Votes" 

Votes which do not go towards the election of any candidate are often referred to as 'wasted votes.' Related to "regional fiefdoms" above is the prevalence of wasted votes, when minority party supporters begin to feel that they have no realistic hope of ever electing a candidate of their choice. This can be a particular danger in nascent democracies, where alienation from the political system increases the likelihood that extremists will be able to mobilize anti-system movements.

Being Unresponsive to Changes in Public Opinion 

A pattern of geographically-concentrated electoral support in a country means that one party can maintain exclusive executive control in the face of a substantial drop in popular support. In some democracies under FPTP, a fall from sixty percent to forty percent of a party's popular vote nationally, may represent a fall from eighty percent to sixty percent in the number of seats held, which does not affect its overall dominant position. Unless seats are highly competitive, the system can be insensitive to swings in public opinion.

Open to the Manipulation of Electoral Boundaries 

Any system with single-member districts is susceptible to boundary manipulation, such as unfair gerrymandering or malapportionment of district boundaries (see ). This was particularly apparent in the Kenyan elections of 1993 when huge disparities between the sizes of electoral districts - the largest had 23 times the number of voters as the smallest - contributed to the ruling Kenyan African National Union party's winning a large parliamentary majority with only thirty percent of the popular vote.