Apart from the institutional weakness, the failure of the party government in solving the socio-economic problems in Japan also caused the rise of militarism in the 1930s. This inability could clearly be shown after the Great Depression in 1929. This affected Japan in 1930, and it was said, “When New York catches a cold, Japan sneeze”. This shows the close relationship between the economies of United States and Japan. As the American economy was badly hit by the Wallstreet clash in 1929, Japan’s economy was also badly hit because foreign countries set up protectionist measures like tariff to protect their own economy. As a result of these protective measures, the value of Japan export fall by 50% and many manufactures in Japan became insolvent. Unemployment problem was growing more and more serious at that time also, and a total of 3 million Japanese were unemployed at that time. However, the party government failed to solve these socio-economic problems. Hamaguchi, the primer minister at that time, wrongly put the Japanese Yen back on the gold standard; this caused the exchange rate of Japanese Yen to be far higher than other currencies and so as Japanese exports. As a result, Japan’s export decreased further. Moreover, he started a retrenchment policy at that time to cut down the government budget. Without government stimulation, Japan’s economy became even more depressed and the socio-economic problems grew. This inability of the party government in solving the socio-economic problems made more and more Japanese to distrust the party politics. However, the failure of the party politics left no alternative leadership besides militarists. Thus, it was the weakness of the government in solving the socio-economic problems in Japan that caused the coming of the militarists.
Added to the above was the weakness of the foreign policy of the party government. The party government at that time used the policy of peaceful economic expansion, in which Japan tried not to commit any aggressive act, but cooperate with other powers. However, the policy left the soldiers idle because there was no war for them and a myriad of soldiers became increasingly concentrated with internal problems of Japan and spread militarists’ ideas through the Reservist society, which set up many branches in the countryside and was able to get a wide and solid social support. Another weakness of this party rule was that because of their policies, this made Japan difficult to revise the unequal treaties with the west. As a result, nationalists accused the party government of treason because the party politicians sacrifice Japan’s sign of international prestige, for example, accepting extraterritority of the west in Japan. Worse still, this policy was not able to build up the trust of other countries. For instance, there were still anti-Japanese protest and boycotts in China in the 1920s. Nationalists therefore argued that the policy of peaceful economic policy was not doing Japan any good, since this message was widespread, most, if not all, Japanese supported the militarists when they came to the power in 1930s.
Without doubt, the weakness of the party government in the 1920s did contribute to the coming of militarists in the 1930s. However, this is only true in the sense that the weakness of the government was only the immediate causes, without the deep-rooted underlying causes; there might not be the coming of militarists in 1930s. It is therefore to a large extent that the weakness of the Japanese government did not contribute the coming of the militarists.
There was a multitude of underlying causes that contributed to the rise of militarism in the 1930s. Firstly, the tradition of Japan had already set the backcloth of the Reishauer, after hundred years of rule by men with swords, Japan was not yet free from its traditions. This shows us that Japan was still deeply influenced by its traditions. As early as in the 16th century, there were already ideas of military aggression in Japan. People at that time had been calling for expansion to the North and Korea. Moreover, the Tokugawa Shogunate, who ruled Japan for over 3 hundred years, was military men and military men, i.e. the samurai, built up even the Meiji government. This tradition of being ruled had contributed to the rise of militarism because it made it easier for Japanese to accept the rule under militarists.
Apart from the traditional reasons, the Meiji Reform also set up the backcloth of the rise of the militarism in the 1930s. As according to historians, Spaulling, the root of militarism had already been built in the Meiji Era as shown in the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, “the ideal of educational was not for individual self-betterment, but individual service to the state”. Moreover, education was made compulsory in the 1870s and government controlled education strictly, For example, the Meiji government was responsible in printing textbooks at that time and this made it easier for the government to indoctrinate ideas into the minds of the Japanese. Books at that time stressed much on moral teaching and glorified at that time to believe that death on battlefield for the emperor was most glorious think for a man. Many of the adults in the 1920s and 1930s were brought up in this education system and their nationalist feeling towards the country was very strong. This fanatic nationalism, which was brought about by the Meiji Reform, also helped to bring the coming of militarists in the 1930s because as an ultra-nationalists, they wanted their country to be strong and was able to extent her influence over other places, and so a myriad of Japanese supported the militarists when they came to power in 1930s.
To conclude, the weakness of the party government in 1920s did contribute to the coming of the militarism, but it was only the immediate cause. Without the deep-rooted underlying causes, militarists might not be able to gain control in the 1930s. Therefore, it was only to a small extent that the weakness of the government contributed to the coming of the militarists.
