His relationship with Andrew Bonar Law was vital in helping him to ride out the storm. Bonar Law was known as the ‘lynch –pin’ of the coalition. Baldwin believed that LG and Bonar Law formed ‘the most perfect relationship in political history’. Bonar Law was very effective in informing LG of the Conservative backbencher’s opinions; he was an effective mediator between the two wings. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1916 – 18, a man of great ability and industry. He was able to act as a brake for LG’s wilder schemes; one scheme which he taught of was the ‘fusion’ of the coalition government into one political party. However this idea failed, mainly due to the coalition Liberal’s foiled his plans. This failure had an effect on his moral and personal bankruptcy and left him vulnerable. The failure of this scheme showed how he had little control over his one-time colleagues, and also proved that he had limited powers in persuading colleagues into merging into a ‘Centre Party’.
In May 1921 disaster struck for LG, Law resigned from cabinet and as leader of his party due to ill health. He was replaced by Austen Chamberlain, who was no substitute for Bonar Law. His resignation could be seen as speeding up rather than actually causing the downfall of Lloyd George. I personally believe that if Bonar Law didn’t resign the coalition would have had an easier passage over the next few years and also Lloyd George will have had less pressure from the Conservatives.
Britain faced serious problems in undertaking post-war reconstruction. The Prime Minister had to make a move, and build a ‘land fit for heroes’. The basic problem was the effect of the war on the British economy. Many markets were lost to Britain during the war, and debts were incurred especially from USA. Britain was owed more by other countries; however they failed to pay up. The staple industries produced over-investment, which caused a short term boom at the end of the war, however this give way to depression as interest rates were raised. 745,000 Britons were killed, an influenza epidemic killed another 150,000 people in 1918-9. War pensions or allowance was being given out to 3.5 million people including widows and orphans. To add to the misery by December 1920, unemployment climbed from 300,000 to 700,000 and by June 1921 it was over 2 million.
Something had to be done, and all eyes were on the government, especially the Prime Minister. How would they respond? What was to follow showed how LG was unable to control or direct the coalition. His leadership lacked flair and effectiveness. Majority of the Conservatives were against spending money and believed in ‘self help’, and didn’t want the government to become a ‘nanny state’. As the economy was damaged after the war to fund these social reforms a healthy economy was required. However for the time bring Lloyd George succeeded in running these reforms as they averted revolution in Britain. Pensions were increased, Unemployment Insurance Act was extended to cover almost all workers, and this policy was a success.
The proposal was to call on ministers to reduce their budgets by £175 million; however a cut of only £75 million could be agreed. LG set up a meeting with Eric Geddes to find the remaining £100 million. Only £64 million was pruned from the ‘Geddes Axe’. Housing was an issue that had to be addressed, the housing programme by Addison was a qualified success however, and it did not live up to people’s hopes or expectations. Addison had spent too much. He was unable to build ‘homes fit for heroes’; instead it was now referred to ‘homes only heroes would agree to live in’. Addison failed to look into the future and predict a rapid fall in prices during the slump. However he had done much to ensure that in future housing needs were looked upon as a government responsibility instead of being left to market forces. Once again the finger of blame was pointed at Lloyd George he had appointed a man who was unable to deliver a land fit for heroes the promise had been broken.
Lloyd George lost many working class supporters due to his ill handling of the industrial situation after the war. The rise of unemployment after the war made him an electoral liability. Success or failure of an industry depended on the economy, and after the war the British economy suffered. There was a new militancy from the trade unions after the war, there was a sense of ‘red revolution’ growing in Britain leading on from the success of the Bolshevik revolution. Between 1918 and 1922 the most menacing incident happened in Glasgow where 70,000 workers came out on strike, for a shorter working week.
LG reputation was further harmed as he refused to nationalise coal mines. In 1919 Sankey Commission was set up to head off a national miners strike., however he refused to accept, being the ‘Conservative puppet’ this questions his dependence on the Conservative as the Tory backbenchers gave him no choice, as nationalisation wasn’t politically practical. This incensed the workers and strikes increased in frequency as coal, mines, railways were returned to private ownership.
Foreign Policy was a constant concern for Lloyd George and the coalition. Britain as a world power couldn’t be left out in world affairs. LG was essentially a moderating influence, when the Versailles settlement was being drawn up. People wanted ‘Germany to be squeezed like a lemon’. LG was to be seen as a ‘peacemaker’, however people saw things differently. Contemporary opinion was divided. Maynard Keynes analysis on the settlement was that the ‘economic problem of a Europe was starving and disintegrating before their eyes…’ He commented on how he believed LG’s intentions were to ‘do a deal and bring home something which would pass muster for a week’.
Lloyd George’s policies did not work, or neither did they do anything to improve his popularity the Conservatives believed the treaty wasn’t harsh enough which left LG open to vulnerability. He failed to deliver a treaty which would please the people of Britain, it could be said that if the Versailles settlement wasn’t as harsh as it was, WWII would have been delayed or there wouldn’t have been a second world war.
Chanak could be seen as the last straw, which eventually ended the ‘marriage with the Conservatives. His outspoken support for the Greeks in the Greece-Turkish war was enough to convince the Conservatives that LG’s time as coalition leader had ended. As the traditional pro-Turk stance was rejected, this offended many Conservatives. LG seemed to be whipping up a war scare in order to create a right atmosphere for a successful election. Britain was alarmed and wary of what lied ahead. The Daily Mail read ‘Get Out of Chanak, public was outraged at LG’s leadership and this was summed up by Bonar Law, ‘We cannot act alone as policeman of the world’. Chanak was a complete disaster which caused harm to the coalition, and thus it was time to ‘ditch the goat’.
Lloyd George’s political decline in my opinion was defiantly linked with the scandal that surrounded him, which showed the moral bankruptcy of the LG regime. It was said that in order to establish a personal political fund he was virtually selling honours. He had never enjoyed a reputation for orthodoxy or absolute honesty, for example it was said he was introducing a presidential style of government in place of Britain’s political cabinet system. He didn’t portray the professionalism of Prime Minister this could be seen in 1921 where he summoned a meeting in Inverness town hall to suit the convenience of his holiday. This annoyed many ministers and Chamberlain believed this was ‘outrageous’. Therefore his political decline could be down to his own mistakes, which tarnished his reputation.
Irish nationalists posed a political problem to the coalition, who wanted independence for Ireland. Many Tories believed that the loss of Ireland would encourage nationalists elsewhere, including those in India and would thus eventually lead to break up of the British Empire. To them Ireland was an integral part of Great Britain. On the other hand the Liberals including Lloyd George tended to be more sympathetic to the nationalist cause. The way LG handled the Irish crisis didn’t help his cause, it was the short-term consequences of the Anglo-Irish treaty signed in December 1921 which harmed him the most and thus was an event that eventually led to his exit. His handling of the affair proved at the time to be very costly, as he disgusted Conservative MPs who for decades had been committed to retaining the union with the whole of Ireland. It could be said this episode proved to be vital as all confidence was lost in Lloyd George.
The policies he pursued were anything but consistent. He was out of place in ‘no mans land’. He was unable to take the initiative and come to a resolution which showed to the British public and the Conservatives his weak leadership style. He had initiated the Anglo – Irish war by sending the ‘Black and Tans’ to burn down the city of Cork, the press overage for this however was appalling as they were against self-determinism. Almost 1,000 people were killed between January 1919 and July 1921. Liberal and humanitarian feeling in Britain was outraged. Asquith commented the violence in Ireland would ‘disgrace the blackest annals of the lowest despotism in Europe’. This in due course tarnished his reputation and played a factor form him being ‘ditched out’.
The Irish question was eventually answered to but not ‘solved’. On 6th December 1921 the Anglo – Irish treaty was signed, the PM in my opinion succeeded in coming to a resolution whilst the cloud of intricacies of the problem hanging over him. Some Conservatives were disgusted with the idea of partition, questions arose from this settlement, was this a sign that the British Empire disintegrating? However majority of the Conservatives voted for the treaty. The aftermath of the treaty caused outrage in Ireland, Michael Collins and many others were killed, a virtual civil war began in the new self-governing state. The finger was pointed at Lloyd George.
To answer the question, to what extent were Lloyd George’s own policies, rather than his dependence on the Conservatives, responsible for his political decline, it is fair to say that his fall from office was of his own making, as the years passed on he was indecisive, ineffective, and as a result confidence factor grew into the Conservatives that they could succeed without him and they could make decisions or choices must better than him. On the 19th October, Stanley Baldwin’s speech did play a part as it expressed simply and clearly what many Tory MPs were thinking. At the Carlton Club meeting in 1922 the Conservatives voted to end the coalition and this ditch Lloyd George as Prime Minister.
