Why did the Provisional Government fail, and the Bolsheviks succeed, in 1917?

During 1917 the political system of Russia, and the political opinions of its public, began to change. The First World War was deeply taking its toll, with the casualties running into millions, and food shortages were reaching crisis levels across Russia. Presided over by the Provisional Government, who had little support and even less real power, the people of Russia became restless. In October, the animosity between Government and populace came to a head, and a revolution put Lenin’s socialist Bolshevik party in power. This essay will show that, while the Bolshevik party was dedicated and driven in the values they believed in, it was only the seizing of opportunity, and a lot of luck, that they succeeded in taking power.

After the abdication of the Tsar, it was decided that the Russian people should democratically elect a new Constituent Assembly. Until an election could be organised, the Provisional Government, made up partly of ex-Duma members, was placed in control of Russia.

Large delays, however, resulted in the Provisional Government remaining in power for far longer than was originally planned, and by October their failings as a government had resulted in leaving them little real power, and almost no public support.

The largest factor in this public unrest was the Provisional Government’s insistence that Russia should continue fighting in the First World War. Millions of Russians had been killed, a large percentage of them ‘peasants in uniform’ – farmers who were untrained and unprepared for what awaited them. With so many farmers fighting or already dead, coupled with severe inflation due to lack of government control of the economy, huge food shortages swept across Russia.

As well as the lack of public support, the Provisional Government was also almost powerless in political and military terms. The Soviets, elected by workers and peasants and therefore generally against the Government, had almost complete control of the army and many transport links, making military control by the Government practically impossible.

It can be argued that many of the problems that Russia faced over this period were not those of the Provisional Government. The end of autocratic rule brought new hope to millions of Russians, but it also left behind it the problems that had led to its demise in the first place. These factors, particularly the food shortages and the war, were not the fault of the Provisional Government, and therefore they were not entirely accountable for their outcomes. The Government was not, after all, expected to be permanent, and therefore in many ways it did not have the ...

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It can be argued that many of the problems that Russia faced over this period were not those of the Provisional Government. The end of autocratic rule brought new hope to millions of Russians, but it also left behind it the problems that had led to its demise in the first place. These factors, particularly the food shortages and the war, were not the fault of the Provisional Government, and therefore they were not entirely accountable for their outcomes. The Government was not, after all, expected to be permanent, and therefore in many ways it did not have the capabilities to carry out large-scale reform.

However, at the same time the Provisional Government made no real attempt to solve these problems, and created many of their own.

The Kerensky offensive and the Kornilov affair were two of the Provisional Governments worst mistakes. After the Kerensky offensive it became clear that not only was the Government ignoring Russia’s pleas for peace, but that they were making military decisions rashly and incompetently, at the expense of Russian men. Support for the Bolshevik’s dedication to peace grew. Similarly, when Kornilov sent troops as a sign of strength to Petrograd, intending to crush both the Soviets and Bolsheviks, the incident raised huge sympathy for the Bolsheviks, and increased mistrust for the Government.

In an attempt to pacify some of its adversaries, the Provisional Government also made a series of blunders that drastically backfired. The first was the decision to release a large number of political prisoners and to invite Trotsky back from exile, with the view that this would calm those who rallied for free speech and political opinion. However, this (predictably) was not the case. The return of so many Marxist and socialist minds was a sign to many that the time had come to take action, and helped to make political groups more organised and generally more active. The membership of the Bolsheviks rose, and again people lost faith in the Government in the face of its naivety.

Another blunder was part of the Government’s plan to tackle the escalating crime levels in Russian towns, by reorganising the police system. The existing system was disbanded, but a new structure never came into effect, and left many areas of Russia with effectively no organised police presence.

Faced with an incompetent and weak government, increasing food and fuel shortages, and the lack of police or army presence, much of the country turned to desperate crime. In the country, peasants seized land as fast as they could, often looting and burning the large, stately mansions of landowners as they went. In the towns, where daily bread rations for workers had dropped from 675g to 110g in just seven months, the situation was reaching fever pitch. N Sukanov, living in Petrograd at the time, recalls that ‘…destruction of homes and shops…unauthorised arrests, seizures and beatings up were recorded every day.’

Kerensky and his Provisional cabinet were also partly resented by the public for not having been elected into office, and many suspected that the Government members were trying to delay the Constituent Assembly elections for as long as possible, in order to retain their positions.

The Provisional Government therefore had no strength, politically, militarily or publicly, to prevent a revolution. The people of Russia wanted something to change soon, and therefore it can easily be said that the Bolsheviks were

pushing against an already open door.

Although, as the historian Darby highlights, many people were simply ‘turning to the Bolsheviks not because they were…committed to Bolshevism, but because they had become dissatisfied’, the Bolsheviks also strongly appealed to a large proportion of Russia, particularly in the weeks leading up to the revolution as the country became more unsatisfied and unsettled. Support for the party grew from 200,000 members in August to 340,000 in October, and Lenin’s April Theses had become a political bible for many of the party’s Marxist followers.

The situation worsened daily: ‘…robberies and housebreaking increased…Week by week, food became scarcer…towards the end there was a week without bread at all.’ (John Reed, in Ten Days that Shook the World’). The Bolshevik party, with Lenin’s pledge of ‘bread, peace and land’ were one of the few realistic alternatives to the Provisional Government, and they took full advantage of the people’s unrest and the Government’s weaknesses.

Control of the army and soviets allowed the Bolsheviks to be in a position of immense power, particularly with the assumed backing of the public. Lenin also took the opportunity to return to Russia, aided by the German government, with the view to initiate a revolution as soon as possible.

The Bolshevik leadership, including Trotsky, was at first extremely wary of launching into a revolution when the country was so unstable. Zinoviev and Kameneu in particular wanted to see the results of the long-awaited Constituent Assembly elections, believing that both economically and socially Russia was not prepared for a Bolshevik revolution.

However, Lenin urged as immediate a change as possible. The Bolshevik members were greatly outnumbered by the three other main socialist parties in the Congress of Soviets by 638 to 105, and Lenin was realistic about the party’s chances of winning power in the ever-looming Constituent Assembly elections. If the people had voted, then the new party in power would have far more support and power than the Provisional Government, and chances for a successful Bolshevik revolution would be slim. After avidly explaining his opinion, a vote carried out within the Bolshevik leadership decided that ‘an armed rising is inevitable and that the time for it has come’.

The revolution itself was conducted surprisingly quickly and with almost no violence, partly due to Trotsky’s detailed planning, and the provisional Government’s swift abandonment of the Winter Palace, aided by blank warning shots fired from a moored naval ship, the Aurora. Kerensky fled to the American Embassy and then to Europe, and Russia was finally in the hands of the Bolsheviks. By 27th October, after just four days, an all-Bolshevik Council of People’s Commissars was in place, with Lenin as chairman.

Although the Bolsheviks’ public support, Lenin’s appealing manifesto and strong leadership were important factors in the Bolshevik’s success, their main advantage was Lenin’s determination to seize the opportunity that he saw before him. The Bolshevik’s had missed a number of opportunities in the months before, and October may well have been their last chance, if Lenin’s predictions of the election’s outcome was correct. It was the failings of the Provisional Government, rather than solely the appeal of the Bolsheviks, that provided this opportunity – had the Provisional Government not been so appalling in its leadership, the Constituent Assembly elections would have taken place as planned, and the Bolsheviks would have remained a marginal party in the Congress of Soviets.

The Bolsheviks did successfully capitalise on the Government’s waning power and support, and this should not be denied as an achievement. However, as has been shown, their success was due far more to opportunity and luck, and the failings of the Provisional Government, rather than the Bolshevik Party’s power itself. In 1917 every person in Russia knew that change needed to happen quickly. The Bolsheviks were the result of that change because they saw the opportunity to capitalise on the situation.