Yet, the challenges before Bismarck did not result solely from external forces like Austria, France or Russia, but also from the complex social structure of Germany. The early 1850s became known as the “new era.” Its coming was heralded by scattered but distinct indications that the days of the reaction were numbered. In 1859 the defeat of Austria in the war against France and Piedmont had a heavy effect on popularising the new German states. The national sentiment in Germany quickly awoke. Patriotic organizations like the Nationalverein (National Union) and the Reformverein (Reform Union) built strong popular pressure in favour of a new federal union with the Prussians under the leadership of Austria. Liberal writers and politicians started to write plans for the reform of the German Confederation, which suggests that by this stage Bismarck had still made no efforts toward the unification of Germany. It is only in the beginning of 1862 that the liberal ministers of Prussia who had been elected a few years ago were discharged and a conservative cabinet took their place. William I who was at that time Kaiser of Germany began to think about abdicating in favor of his son, yet power slowly shifted in the direction of Otto Von Bismarck who had bigger and stronger political ambitions.
Argumentation
a. Gaining the loyalty of all Germans
Not long after Bismarck was appointed prime minister of Prussian the new leading german state rapidly established itself as a leading world industrial and military power. The ensuing unification of Germany allowed Bismarck to fortify his political power and earn people’s trust by joining the national idea especially after 1866.[2] By inspiring zealous nationalism within the already prosperous and industrializing Germany Bismarck promoted not only Prussianism but he created the Germans and established their national pride and self-determination. Bismarck’s purpose of nationalism had its own peculiar nature. It was more related to religious, dynastic or political actions than to language and common culture. This allowed him to make uncommon people live as one.
Still, Germany was not fully integrated since the southern and the eastern parts kept a prevailingly rural character, while the north and west rapidly increased their industry and urbanisation. There was big discrepancy between the local populations. In the entire German-speaking space, near 60 percent were Protestant, the rest being Roman Catholic, yet the Catholics became a pronounced minority when Austria was excluded from Bismarck’s “little German” (kleindeutsche) national project.
As industrialization started to gain pace in Germany the economy was soon propelled by the skyrocket growth of the German industrial potential. Soon, Germany started to catch up with the industrial leader Great Britain. This increased the income per capita of the German people, making them richer, yet the money did not stay idle, since the ordinary German was not used to make big savings and the population was stimulated to invest in the growth of the economy. The industrialization turned Prussia from a secondary power into the leader of Central Europe.[3]
The reason for Germany’s transformation into a modern industrial economy was her social structure. The new thing in German society was the rise of two new classes – the industrial bourgeoisie and the proletariat. At the same time, it is the landowning aristocracy that enjoyed complete social domination by the middle of the nineteenth century, its strong economic and political positions supported with the help of the state. In the early 1870s the middle-class workers were untypically poor. For example 40 percent of the workers’s families in Hamburg lived in one room in 1875, and because of that almost 9.000 people died in a cholera epidemic. The death ratio rose to 210 per 1.000 live births. Until 1895, which is the end of the Great Depression of the late nineteenth century, conditions continued to worsen.[4] Still, regardless of the economic difficulties of the period and the initial period of massive emigration to the United States, Germany found a way to stop that trend under Bismarck. Social legislation during the 1880s implemented played a key role in slowing down the process of migration. Even if the “direct wages” (labor earnings) in the United States were much higher than those in Germany, the differential in “indirect wages,” that is, social benefits, worked much in favour of the latter. In that way, Bismarck's insurance system partly offset low wage rates in Germany and furthered the fall of the emigration rate.[5] Overall, however, living standards did not significantly improve during Bismarck’s time, no matter that this was one of his aims. Emigration figures peaked around 1880 and although they declined later, the improvement of workers' living standards and working conditions were far from meeting the expectations.[6]
Unable to cope successfully with the economic difficulties before the larger social classes, Bismarck looked in a different direction for increasing and ensuring the support of the German people: awakening the pan-Germanic feeling among the citizens of the newly-incorporated territories. The unification of Germany was a long struggle between the two centres of Germanic culture – Austria and Prussia. The Austro-Prussian war of 1866 signalled the end of this Kampf. This way the unification of Germany was a triumph for Bismarck’s foreign and internal policy, while the military potential of the newly created Germany caused a major shift of power in Europe.
b. Foundations of national identity
Germany was already a unified state, yet the German nation was still in the making. National identity and self-determination was still to be enforced on, and embraced by, the vast majority of the German population. This could be achieved through mass propaganda. During the 1870s education in Germany was under the control of the Catholic Church. The church itself might represent a conductor of foreign influence, since it was submitted to the Papacy in Rome. In order for Bismarck to achieve his goal of uniting Germany, he had to use the educational system as a source of pan-Germanic propaganda, which sought to boost the German national identity. The economic advantages of a lively, and liberal, German market slowly brought down the reserves of German states like Hanover, Baden-Wurtemberg or even Bavaria against the creation of a Unitarian German state. Bismarck combined economic pressure with diplomatic prudence by suggesting, and successfully implementing, the creation of a German confederation (1866) in which the smaller states would keep their local governments, much of their local taxes and would keep hold of most important domestic institutions like police and education. Thus, they were misled into thinking that they were not giving up on any important privilege, but instead would only profit from the economic integration of the various German areas.
Still, the Catholics were a stain on Bismarck’s unification clause because they followed the Pope rather than the Kaiser. The German Prime minister needed a way to reduce their numbers so he came up with the Kulturkampf. Literally meaning “culture struggle” these new laws limited many of the religious rituals of the German Catholics, the laws stayed in power from 1871 to 1878. It limited like a disregard of their clerical freedom of speech, completely banning Catholic schools and teachers. Many priests were arrested and either sent to prison or exiled for preaching, their numbers are estimated to be around 1800. The people strongly resisted Bismarck’s laws and created the Centre Party, a Catholic political party, with which they opposed Bismarck in the German parliament. They gathered many supporters effectively becoming a majority and an ally that Bismarck needed in order to be able to maintain control. The official ending of the problem was 1878 but not all regulations against Catholics were removed. The conflict continued until 1887 when the laws were completely dropped. As a result of the Kulturkampf Bismarck gains control over the education system, which was a natural conductor of German propaganda.
c. Eliminating trouble-makers
Bismarck’s political system was extremely complicated. He wanted to make the new German empire state a powerful, fearful and respected for the other countries. He wanted all great powers, except France, to enjoy Germany’s friendship, so the perfect balance may be maintained.[7] During that time France was isolated and vetoed. It was said that she had the right to conquer only African territories and no right to have interest in export and import and European politics. After 1871 Bismarck supported the republican regime in France. Germany took the senior place among the five great powers in Europe without making too much effort.
The victory over Austria in 1866 solved the national problem in ways that the liberal parties had failed to, so it increased Bismarck’s power and prestige amongst the political parties. In consequence the liberals split into two groups: Progressive liberals and National liberals. While the former opposed Bismarck’s policies until the end, the latter welcomed and supported him in his economic and national goals. On the other hand, “The essence of the Bismarckian constitution was the conservation, by the use of revolutionary means, of the Prussian aristocratic-monarchial order in a century of increasingly dynamic economic and social change.”[8]
Another reason, in addition to curbing down emigration, why Bismarck introduced social reforms in Germany was to dissolve socialist groups, shut down their newspapers, and ban their meetings. All of this was in fact a way of eliminating the Socialists as possible political opponents. Bismarck worried about the growth of the leftist movements—in particular, that of the Social Democratic Party. In 1878, he instituted the Anti-Socialist Laws: socialist organizations and meetings were forbidden, as was the circulation of socialist literature. Police officers could stop, search, and arrest socialist party members; socialist leaders were arrested and tried by police courts. But despite these efforts, the movement steadily gained supporters and seats in the Reichstag. Socialists won seats in the Reichstag by running as independent candidates, unaffiliated with any party, which was allowed by the German Constitution.
Long-term consequences
Most important of Bismarck’s political achievements was the unification of twenty-five German states into a centralized constitutional monarchy with strong centralized institutions and impressive industrial growth. In the eyes of contemporaries, Bismarck’s main achievements were in the field of diplomacy where he solved two major challenges: the isolation of the Habsburg Empire from the processes of unification, at the expense of the so-called grossdeutsch idea, and the military defeat over the traditional continental power France and the resulting prevention of French interference with domestic German affairs. His cunning, sense of Realpolitik, and lack of scruples, built him the image of a successful and formidable diplomat. Yet the road towards German unification did not pass through wars and diplomatic intrigue alone: no less important for the creation of the German empire was the economic advantage that the abolition of internal boundaries offered to the various German areas. Bismarck’s ultimate success in achieving unification was the result, in equal measure, of diplomacy, economic actions, and war. The swift and decisive victory of Prussia over the French in the fall of 1870, and the proclamation of the Second German Empire, in the Mirror Hall of the royal palace at Versailles, was the pinnacle of Bismarck’s success in foreign policy. Germany was unified along the lines Prussia had wanted to set since the second quarter of the nineteenth century, Austria and France were eliminated as major factors in the German space, Germany’s unification was supported by a tangible economic growth and a well-functioning German market, while the economic and social interests of Prussian’s nobility were perfectly intact and the foundations of a conservative monarchy – just what Bismarck wanted – made solid.
In order for Bismarck’s Germany to thrive and prosper in Europe the German leader had to secure a long-lasting piece on the old continent. After 1871 Germany’s foreign policy aimed at restraining French revanchism. Bismarck diplomatically isolated France from Europe’s politics, while not engaged in colonialism Germany kept a good relationship with Great Britain. The decisive victory in the Austro-Prussian war 1866 turned the Austrian Empire into a pretty much of a puppet-state of Bismarck’s Germany. For the sake of weakening Austria-Hungary’s influence on the Appenine peninsula Bismarck sought to maintain proper and good relations with Italy and could be seen as a major contributor to the Italian unification. After the end of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 Bismarck emphasised his international influence by having the post-war settlement of the Treaty of San Stefano revised at the Congress of Berlin.[9] Not only did Bismarck ruin the triumph of the Russians but he also proved his absolute and arbitrary rule over Europe. As the League of the Three Emperors dissolved, Bismarck negotiated a dual alliance with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The main clause of the treaty was mutual defense against Russia. Bismarck’s successful foreign policy resulted in a long period of peace, which was the necessary political factor for the future development and prosperity of Germany.[10]
Alternative solutions
After Bismarck, Europe was no longer the same. Germany was a fact. Emperors were trapped in the new circumstances and lost their earlier independence of action. A way to illustrate the extent of the success of Baron Otto von Bismarck, the son of an insignificant German imperial cadet from Brandenburg, is an anecdote related by British historian A. J. P. Taylor: during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, when united Germany had almost triumphed, Adolphe Thiers – a veteran of French politics and diplomacy - took a tour of European courts to seek the intervention of other powers and prevent the French defeat. He relied on the old diplomatic principles, established with the Vienna Congress of 1815, of all powers trying to keep a balance, the so-called “Concert of Nations” which would not allow any single power to “play” on its own. Alas, to no avail. Europe was no longer the same. The “European concert" no longer existed. The English counterpart of Thiers bluntly claimed: "I cannot see Europe anymore."[11]
What is the role of Bismarck for this change? If we have to summarize the main result of the work of Bismarck's life - the unification of Germany, it must be said that the moment the powerful German state was created, the very idea of Europe changed. Europe of the 1870s and 1880s was no longer the same continent as that of the first half of the century. Who is Baron Otto von Bismarck? What is his role in this dramatic change in European diplomacy and policy in the second half of the nineteenth century? Can we speak of a personal contribution by Bismarck for the overall historical process?
United Germany as it was could not exist without the presence of Bismarck. There were different German national projects: some were conceived on liberal grounds, others – on even bigger centralisation. That Bismarck’s project was the really successful one will show in a small exercise in falsification: could Germany be the same power if it had chosen a different road to national unification and social cohesion? If we find a single parameter in Bismarck’s policies that could be open to variables, and if the equation still remains the same, regardless of the variables, then we could really argue in favour of his personal success. It is quite possible to conceive that in case of a failure Germany would revert to the loose federation which existed until 1866; or perhaps she could become a parliamentary republic of the French model, or into a typical authoritarian dictatorship. That this did not happen can be explained only with the stable equation of Bismarck’s policies, which would work even if particular variables in his political scheming proved wrong. A single failure could have caused such a rupture in the walls of Bismarck’s Germany that they could have crumbled down. So a failure might in fact falsify the statement and prove that Bismarck was just an option.
In fact there was at least one big failure in Bismarck’s policies – the Kulturkampf which he pursued over more than a decade because he was afraid Catholicism might destroy the walls of united Germany. A book by Rebecca Ayako Bennette, however, demonstrates that from the very moment in 1871 when Wilhelm I was proclaimed Kaiser of the newly unified Germany, Catholics vigorously defended the German national identity of the new Reich.[12] In the years before the unification, the main struggle in German politics had been how to define the new nation and how to achieve its unification through military means. It comes easily to mind that when the Kulturkampf was launched, the Catholics would be afraid that it could damage forever their political and social positions. Yet, Bismarck’s anti-Catholic policies did not destroy in the least the Catholics’ belief in new Germany. Bennett’s main point is to make people reconsider the connection between religious and national identity but what she argued helps us argue in favour of Bismarck’s historical significance: with or without Catholic minority, with or without the Kulturkampf, which in fact led to nothing, since Catholics did not give up their confessional identity and created one of the most influential political parties in Germany – Zentrum, Bismarck’s Germany was strong and undivided.
Conclusion
Otto Von Bismarck’s role in European history can mislead. On first glance it seems limited to his role in German reunification, which changed the balance of power, destroyed the old alliances, and disrupt the status quo not only in Central Europe but in the Balkan peninsula and the Mediterranean as well. Bismarck dealt a death blow to the Congress of Vienna. His foreign policy caused a historical shift of power in the European continent and the colonial world. Bismarck’s Germany defeated the Habsburg Empire reducing it to a mere satellite state. The swift victory of the German army during the Franco-Prussian war and the system of alliances created by Bismarck quickly isolated France from the continental politics. This created a long-lasting peace which was greatly beneficial for the development, the unification and the germanisation of the young German state. This long period of stability, in combination with the ever-growing rate of industrialisation fuelled the German economy. Conversely, the process of rapid growth turned Germany into a major industrial power. Regardless of some failures in his domestic policies, Bismarck achieved so much through the awakening of German nationalism that the social profile of Germany changed once for all and in fact stood at the basis of social and public policies all over Europe over the later decades.
Bibliography
Abrams, Lynn.2006. Bismarck and the German empire 1871-1918. Second Edition [1995]. Abington: Routledge.
Bennette, Rebecca Ayako. 2012. Fighting for the Soul of Germany: The Catholic Struggle for Inclusion after Unification. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Gross, Michael B. 2004. The war against Catholicism: Liberalism and the Anti-Catholic Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Germany. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Hennock, E.P. 2003. “Social Policy in the Bismarck Era: A Progress Report”. German History 21, Issue 2 (June). pp. 229-238.
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Kent, George O. 1978. Bismarck and his times. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
Khoudour-Castéras, David. 2008. “Welfare State and Labor Mobility: The Impact of Bismarck's Social Legislation on German Emigration before World War I”, Journal of Economic History 68, Issue 1 (March). pp. 211-243.
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Palier, Bruno. 2010. A long goodbye to Bismarck: The Politics of welfare reform in continental Europe. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Paur, Philip. 1981. “The Corporatist Character of Bismarck's Social Policy”. European History Quarterly 11, Issue 4 (October). pp. 427-460.
Pflanze, Otto. 1973. Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification 1815-1871. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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[1] Kennedy, Paul. 1987. The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers. New York: Random House. pp. 200-201.
[2] Abrams, Lynn.2006. Bismarck and the German empire 1871-1918. Second Edition [1995]. Abington: Routledge. pp. 5-6.
[3] Kennedy, Paul. op. cit. p. 203.
[4] Abrams, Lynn. op. cit. pp.6-11
[5] Khoudour-Castéras, David. 2008. “Welfare State and Labor Mobility: The Impact of Bismarck's Social Legislation on German Emigration before World War I.” Journal of Economic History 68, Issue 1 (March). pp. 211-243.
[6] Hennock, E.P. 2003. “Social Policy in the Bismarck Era: A Progress Report”. German History 21, Issue 2 (June). pp. 229-238.
[7] Kent, George O. 1978. Bismarck and his times. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. p. 104 ff.
[8] Pflanze, Otto. 1963. Bismarck and the development of Germany 1815-1871. Princeton, NJL Princeton University Press, p.168.
[9] Kosev, Konstantin. 1996. Bismark: suzdateliat na Germanskata imperiia. Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Bulgarskata akademiia na naukite. p. 124.
[10] Kennedy, Paul. op cit. p.204.
[11] Taylor, A. J. P. 1967. Bismarck: The Man and The Statesman. New York: Vintage. p. 267.
[12] Bennette, Rebecca Ayako. 2012. Fighting for the Soul of Germany: The Catholic Struggle for Inclusion after Unification. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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