As in the Cur deus homo, so also in his other treatises Anselm proceeds insofar as he deems possible, sola ratione (by recourse to rational considerations alone). Accordingly, he is acknowledged to be the ‘Father of Scholasticism’. Anselm endeavours to show that revealed truths can be established on an independent rational basis, understanding “ratio” in a broad sense, broad enough to encompass appeals to experience as well as to conceptual intelligibility.
Philosophical Works
Anselm wrote his philosophical dialogue, De grammatico (On [an] Expert in Grammar) during his time at Bec. The central question raised within the dialogue is utrum grammaticus sit substantia an qualitas (whether an expert-in-grammar is a substance or a quality). Aristotle, as well as medieval textbooks, cited grammaticus as an example of quality because the word itself signifies a quality. However, in the work, Anselm’s fictional interlocutor, the Student, points out that in customary parlance grammaticus is spoken of as a substance and not as either a quality or an accident. Anselm resolves the question by showing the Student that grammaticus signifies both a quality and a substance, for it signifies both expertise in grammar and man, in different ways. Principally and per se and substantially it signifies expertise in grammar; and, because expertise in grammar is a quality, being expert in grammar is also a quality. Improperly and per aliud and accidentally it signifies man; and because man is a substance, being an expert in grammar is also a substance.
Anselm’s philosophical dialogues; De veritate, De libertate arbitrii and De casu diaboli, centre around the notion of rectitudo (rectitude, rightness, uprightness). ‘Truth’, says Anselm, is definable as ‘rectitude perceptible to the mind alone’. Justice is rectitude kept for its own sake, and freedom is, also by definition, rectitude of will kept for its own sake. In eliciting his definition of ‘truth’, Anselm examines truth insofar as it is found in statements, thoughts, acts of will, actions, the senses and in the very being of things. A statement is true when it signifies what it ought to, that is, when it signifies correctly; and it signifies correctly when it either signifies to be the case that which actually is the case, or signifies not to be the case that which really is not the case. Thus, a statement’s truth is its rightness, correctness or rectitude.
After working on these early dialogues, Anselm wrote his first major philosophical treatise, Monologion in 1071. In this work Anselm offers a ‘proof’ for the existence of God. Briefly, Anselm asserts that the fact that we can discern degrees of goodness in the world means that there is an absolute good by which we can measure it. This absolute good is supremely good and, therefore, supremely great. Thus, there exists a supremely great entity; which we call God.
‘...since the reasoning [that], necessarily, again, all things, whether useful or honourable, if they are truly good, are good through the same being through which all goods exist, whatever that being is. It follows, therefore, that all other goods are good through another being than that which they themselves are, and this being alone is good through itself. For it is supreme, in that it so surpasses other beings, that it is neither equalled nor excelled.’
Anselm’s argument is not original, St Augustine having argued similarly. It rests on the Platonic assumption that the Ideal is more ‘real’ than the real, just as Plato believed that the Form of the Good was more real than particular instances of good in the world. At an age when Platonic realism was widely accepted Anselm’s Monologion would have carried considerable force, although his arguments hold little conviction today. Nevertheless, Anselm’s use of Plato really underpins his entire Ontological Argument, put forward a year after the Monologion in the Proslogion.
The Ontological Argument
The Ontological Argument, ontology being that branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature of being, purports to prove from an analysis of the concept of God, that God’s existence cannot be rationally doubted by any individual who entertains the concept of God. It is thus a purely a priori argument; that is to say, it does not make appeal to any facts of experience, but is concerned solely with the implications of concepts, in this case, the concept of God as the Supreme Being. It is also deductive and analytic; that is to say, the premises of the argument contain the conclusion that it reaches, and the argument is structured in such a way that the conclusion that it reaches is the only one that may be derived from its premises.
Anselm’s main arguments are to be found in the second and third chapters of the Proslogion. Anselm begins his exposition by a consideration of what God is. His answer is that God is ‘something than which a greater cannot be thought of’ (aliquid quo nihil maius cogitai posit). Next, Anselm considers the view of someone who says that there is no God. Such a person, Anselm says, ‘understands what he hears and what he understands is in his intellect (in intellectu)’. From this Anselm concludes that God exists even in the intellect of one denying his existence. Thus, ‘Even the Fool (insipiens) [of Psalms 13 and 52], then, is forced to agree that something than which a greater cannot be thought can be conceived in the intellect, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood is in the intellect’ (Proslogion, 2).
This, however, does not provide us with a complete proof for the existence of God as there appears to be nothing exceptional in the observation that God exists in the understanding (in intellectu). Surely if we want God to ‘exist’ in any tangible sense of that term, we want God’s existence to have much the same ‘reality’ as other objects in the world. In this sense we will want God to exist not only in intellectu but also in re; that is, in reality. Anselm is aware of this requirement. He asks, ‘Does God exist in any other sense?’ His answer to this question is ‘yes’. God exists not only in the understanding but also in reality. His reasoning is as follows:
‘And surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater (quod maius est). If then, that than which a greater cannot be thought exists in the mind alone, this same that than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But this is clearly impossible (Sed certe hoc esse non potest). Therefore, there is absolutely no doubt that something than which a greater cannot be thought exists both in the mind and in reality.’ (Proslogion, 2)
Anselm’s point can be summarised as follows: something can be thought as being greater than something existing only in intellectu and that something therefore does not just exist in intellectu. In other words, if to think of the concept of ‘God’ is to entertain the concept ‘something than which a greater cannot be thought of’, then it follows that God has existence in all spheres; God’s greatness necessitates his existing in re as well as in intellectu.
The argument continues in Proslogion 3. Suppose I understand that a certain person, Fred, exists. Then, by Anselm’s lights, Fred exists in my intellect, and if Fred exists outside my intellect, then Fred exists both in my intellect and outside it. But Fred is not such that he cannot be thought not to exist. In other words I can perfectly well acknowledge Fred’s existence without supposing that there is no possibility of him not existing. By the same token, Anselm assumes, even if we know that God exists both in re and in intellectu, it does not follow that there is no possibility of God not existing. If we think that God is such that there is no possibility of him not existing, we need to know more of him than that he exists both in the intellect and outside it. The aim of Proslogion 3 is to show that we know this of God.
The obvious retort to this is to ask ‘How do we know this of God?’ Anselm argues that it can be thought that there is something which cannot be thought not to exist and because God must be such a being, God is something than which nothing greater can be thought of. The reason we come to think this way is determined, Anselm argues, by the fact that it can be thought that there exists something that cannot be thought not to exist. If this is so, such a thing would be greater than something which can be thought not to exist. ‘For something can be thought to exist that cannot be thought not to exist, and this is greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Thus, if something than which a greater cannot be thought of can be thought not to exist, then something than which a greater cannot be thought of is not that than which a greater cannot be thought of, which is impossible (a reductio ad absurdum)’ (Proslogion, 3). On these grounds Anselm claims to have shown that God ‘exists’ on the basis of analysing what it is to entertain the concept of ‘God’ and then demonstrating what follows from this.
Early Critics
One of the earliest criticisms of the Proslogion arguments was put by the monk Gaunilo, a contemporary of Anselm. In his delightfully acerbic A Reply to the Forgoing by a Certain Writer on Behalf of the Fool (Quid ad haec Respondeat quidam pro Insipiente), Gaunilo takes issue with Anselm’s claims about existence. For Gaunilo, if Anselm is correct, then it is not only God’s existence that can be established by use of the patterns of reasoning defended in the Proslogion. The point is illustrated by the famous ‘Lost Island’ example. Gaunilo writes:
‘For example: they say that there is in the ocean somewhere a lost island which, because of the difficulty (or rather the impossibility) of finding that which does not exist, some have called ‘Lost Island’. And the story goes that it is blessed with all manner of priceless riches and delights in abundance...and having no owner...it is superior everywhere in abundance of riches to all those islands that men inhabit. Now, if anyone should tell me that it is like this, I shall easily understand what is said, since nothing is difficult about it. But if he should then go on to say, as though it were a logical consequence of this: You cannot anymore doubt that this island that is more excellent than all other lands exists somewhere in reality than you can doubt that it is in your mind; and since it is more excellent to exist in not only the mind alone but also in reality, therefore it must needs be that it exists. For if it did not exist, any other land existing in reality would be more excellent than it, and so this island, already thought by you to be more excellent than others, will not be more excellent. If, I say, someone wishes thus to persuade me that this island really exists beyond all doubt, I should either think that he was joking, or I should find it hard to decide which of us I ought to judge the bigger fool.’ (Pro Insipiente, 6).
Gaunilo’s point is that if Anselm’s arguments were valid, we could prove the existence of this lost island that surpasses the attractions of all inhabited countries, for an actual existence is an essential element in any understanding of such superiority. To be fair to Anselm, however, one could say that he is not concerned with the idea of something that is in fact greater than anything else of the same kind. Rather, his point is that God is something than which a greater cannot be thought of; which is to say that whatever the concept ‘God’ refers to cannot be surpassed in any respect whatsoever. Gaunilo, on the other hand, is concerned with something, an island, which is better than any other island.
The supporter of Gaunilo might accept this point and yet still try to preserve the locus of their complaint. What if, they might say, we construe it as holding that if Anselm’s argument is successful, then it is possible to establish the existence not only of the island which is better than all other islands, but also of the island than which no more perfect island can be thought of. This last move has seduced many, but it might be thought to fall short of refuting Anselm. For it crucially depends on the assumption that the concept ‘an island which no more perfect can be thought of’ is coherent. Here we run into difficulties for no matter what description of an island is produced, it is always possible that human imagination can enhance the potential voluptuousness or desirability. For this reason some conclude that Anselm’s argument survives Gaunilo’s attack.
Gaunilo aside, other lines of criticism surfaced in medieval discussions of Anselm’s Proslogion arguments. Some philosophers, such as Duns Scotus and Nicholas of Cusa, thought that the arguments were in need of further clarification and extension. Of the major scholastics, Aquinas and Occam thought the proof in error. What is interesting about Aquinas’ criticisms of what the scholastics referred to as the ratio Anselmi is the contrast it invites with modern criticisms of the proof. Aquinas thought Anselm’s arguments invalid not for the reason that they treated existence as a predicate, but because the Anselmian formula expressing the concept of God as ‘something than which a greater cannot be thought of’ does not provide any insight into God’s nature. For this reason, Aquinas contends, the formula cannot be self-evidently true. Aquinas’ discussion of the ratio Anselmi provides a paradigm of an enduring line of criticism of the Ontological Argument, namely that an a priori argument that attempts to draw conclusions based on the implications of entertaining certain concepts is too thin to prove the existence of a God.
Supporters
While Anselm’s arguments had its detractors, it also had its supporters. Philosophers, such as William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales, were prepared to accept the basic insights of Anselm’s arguments, but perhaps the most willing advocate of the ratio Anselmi was Bonaventure. At two places Bonaventure (in his The Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard and De Mysterio Trinitatis) quotes and states Anselm’s arguments at great length before pointing out that the argument is subject to doubt only if someone has an erroneous notion of what God is; that is, if one fails that to realise that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived. Bonaventure’s defence of the proof reflects an understanding of Anselm’s arguments which persisted throughout the medieval and early modern periods. Bonaventure espied in Anselm’s argument a way of preserving an innate conception of the perfect, which can be nothing else but God’s imprint on the soul, not in the sense that the soul is perfect, but in the sense that the soul or the mind receives the idea or the perfect through divine illumination. According to this view, we might say the very concept of ‘God’ affirms the concrete existence of God himself, for it is the presence in the mind of the idea or concept of God that necessarily implies God’s existence.
Recent Analysis
We can terminate our survey of Anselm’s arguments by briefly examining more recent discussions of it. Central to these discussions is the view that Anselm’s argument is a modal argument, that is, it attempts to infer God’s actuality from his mere possibility. Both defenders and detractors of Anselm’s argument have argued for this interpretation. One of the more interesting attempts to expose new fallacies in Anselm’s argument which builds upon modal interpretation is made by David Lewis (in his Anselm and Actuality). Lewis’s objection is based on the following thoughts: A crucial step in the argument is the idea that since we can conceive of God, God exists in our understanding. Anselm concludes that God’s perfection entails that he exists in reality as well. But, asks Lewis, what does it mean to say that a perfect being exists in the understanding? He offers two answers to this question. It might mean (1) that there is a being in our understanding which is, in some possible world in which it exists, greater than any possible being in any possible world; or (2) that there is a being in our understanding which is, in our actual world, greater than any possible being in any possible world. Lewis argues that if it means (1), the conclusion of Anselm’s argument does not follow, but if it means (2), there is no reason to suppose that God exists in our understanding just because we can conceive of him. Thus Anselm’s argument is thought to fail.
Despite the interest of Lewis’s claims, his analysis of Anselm’s argument is nevertheless parasitic upon a modal interpretation. Some commentators, such as Barnes, Oppenheimer and Zalta, have objected to this reading. They argued that even if we choose to understand the word ‘can’ in the description ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought of’ in terms of metaphysical possibility, the logic of Anselm’s argument itself does not include inferences based on this type of modality. In order to make this point clear some recent commentators, such as Edgar Morscher and Ricken argue that it is possible to develop a reading of the Proslogion that contains no modal inferences. Rather the argument is thought to turn on the difference between saying that there is such a thing as x and saying x has the property of existence. This new reading, then, attempts to exploit the difference between quantifying over x and predicating existence of x. Thus, instead of interpreting the argument as having inferred God’s actuality from his mere possibility, Anselm is now read as offering a way of inferring God’s existence from his mere being. As with all new interpretations, this reading has provoked a further stream of objections. It has also focussed criticism on a different part of Anselm’s argument.
Finally, it is worth noting that some critics have insisted that Anselm never intended his Ontological Argument to be anything more than a prayer; a devotional meditation expressing the greatness and worth of God.
“I do not attempt, O Lord, to attain Your lofty heights, because my understanding is in no way equal to it. But I do desire to understand Your truth a little, that truth that my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand, in order that I may believe; but believe that I may understand. For I believe this too, that unless I believe, I should not understand...” (Proslogion, 2)
Conclusion
Anselm’s paramount publications, though only eleven in number, have had a significant (though never major) impact upon the history of Western philosophy. His aim in his writings was perhaps to show how reasonable faith is, rather than to offer a strict proof of it. The beauty of the inner harmony of the Christian faith gives joy to the believer, who sees the accord of faith and reason. The unbeliever’s objections are met, and he is pointed to the truth of the Christian message. By nature a scholar and a monk, Anselm’s sense of duty is nowhere more clearly shown than in his willingness to surrender the life which he loved and to plunge into public affairs which he must have found most uncongenial. For this, if for nothing else, Anselm has earned his place amongst the saints.
