Gladstone’s skilled attack on Disraeli centred on the belief that Disraeli’s territorial expansionism was morally wrong, causing more harm than good to the soon to be British colonies. Gladstone famously said, “Remember the rights of the savage as we call him. Remember that ... the sanctity of human life in the hill villages of Afghanistan among the winter snows, is as inviolable in the eye of Almighty God as can be your own”. Historians such as Watts and Lowe belief that Gladstone saw Disraeli’s expansionism as part of a ‘the Great Game' and the race for territory between England Russia. This suggests that Disraeli was more concerned in trying to Britain the most powerful negotiating matters of peace in preference for quick and decisive intervention. But, He was a strong supporter of empire and of English nationalism. This was a traditional Conservative mantra and though Disraeli was all for cutting a dash as in the Suez Canal shares and in 1876 when dealing with the Queen. Disraeli's flattering Royal Titles Bill made her Empress of India and Empress-Queen of Britain. The celebrations of her Golden and Diamond Jubilees in 1887 and 1897 demonstrated her great popularity. She won particular esteem for defending the popular imperialist policies of Benjamin Disraeli, who flattered her relentlessly and made her Empress of India in 1876. Conversely, she had an intense dislike for William Gladstone, the Liberal prime minister, whom she blamed for weakening the empire. Gladstone's fear that Disraeli might distract public attention from domestic problems by and follow his passion for imperialism by `a great Asiatic feat'; this was realised in November 1878, when the Indian government declared war on Afghanistan and sent its troops across the border.
In the case of India Disraeli acted without consulting parliament and used troops and money to solve the situation decisively, rather than spending ‘valuable time, contesting the choice of action in the Common’s and Lord’s. In another incident, the invasion of Afghanistan; Gladstone perceived it as `war with dishonour' in stark contrast to Disraeli's claim to have achieved `peace with honour' at the Congress of Berlin a few months before. Afghanistan was another incident where one of Disraeli’s ‘expansionist’ colleagues showed more disobedience as a result of local initiatives rather than Whitehall direction, another minor war in Southern Africa was initiated. Disraeli’s appointment of Lord Lytton as the Viceroy of India was yet another calculated placement of an expansionist minded player in a seat of power, as in Afghanistan he had employed expansionistic minded people. This either suggests naivety of political guile as he sought to protect the jewel of the British Empire. Gladstone often felt that Disraeli had paid inadequate heed to the Bulgarian massacres perpetrated by Turkish forces and had backed Turkey when its quarrel with Russia threatened to involve Britain in a re-run of the Crimean war. Although the Congress of Berlin in 1878 averted this wider war, Gladstone had not forgiven Beaconsfield’s cynical realpolitik. We are able to see the Gladstone detested Disraeli on a number of levels, personal and political and therefore than leads us to believe that his criticism of Disraeli could have been instigated on a personal level rather than inadequacies in Disraeli’s successful, or unsuccessful action in Foreign Policy.
At the Berlin Conference, Blake interprets it as “perhaps Disraeli’s greatest personal achievement” and credits his performance at the Congress with the following 30 years of peace. There is no doubt that Disraeli and his foreign secretary Lord Salisbury dominated the Congress and Lowe suggests that it maybe been Gladstone’s jealous, but it was widely know that Salisbury was the main tactician and revisionists believe that Disraeli has employed his well crafted skill of “delegation”. This heady mixture in foreign politics, compounded of Christian humanity, dislike of administrative inefficiency and hatred of fiscal extravagance, kindled in Gladstone a moral indignation and detestation of ‘Beaconsfieldism’. Gladstone’s can be attributed to a speech he made at West Calder on what he believed to be “the right principles of foreign policy”; and in brief they followed his ideas of Peace, Retrenchment and Reform. Firstly he wanted foster the strength of the Empire by just legislation and economy at home; also Gladstone carried on by saying how all countries should have equal rights and Britain and to not get into entangling engagements. AJP Taylor believed that Disraeli seriously miscalculated on the ‘long term effects in many of his activities and though in the short term he achieved a huge victory through cunning diplomacy and intervention, we cannot deduce this to be a great period of foreign policy’
In 1877, South Africa was allied with the British. The Boers wanted protection from the Capetown colony, due to fear of the Zulus. Sir Bartle Frere, English High Commissioner for South Africa, believed South Africa could not be secure until Britain had control over all of the native tribes, and had destroyed the Zulu system. Disraeli and the rest of the cabinet, especially during the Eastern Crisis, did not want war. In 1879 the Zulus attacked at Isandhlwana, and wiped out the British troops, so Disraeli ordered in more troops under the command of Lord Chelmsford whom ignored orders to be replaced, conquered the Zulus, and resigned, knowing he would be in trouble. Many hailed Chelmsford as a hero, though it’s apparent that this reckless actions were relatively dismissed as Disraeli knew the Queen thought that his annoyance with Chelmsford and the orders to ignore Chelmsford in parliament didn’t go down well, so therefore he didn’t reprimand Chelmsford anymore. Gladstone felt that this only incited more of Disraeli’s ‘expansionist colleagues to follow suit’. Robert Blake believes that it was often Gladstone who acted recklessly in an attempt to counter Disraeli’s imperialism; with the Question of the East and the Bulgarian Horrors where Gladstone even went so far as to encourage Russia to expel Turkey from Bulgaria. In this instance perhaps it was Gladstone who acted recklessly, with Russia taking heed of his words invading Turkey. Disraeli hurriedly secured assurances that Russia would leave Constantinople and the Dardanelles alone. This suggests to me that it was Disraeli intervening after Gladstone’s mistake, though he had to make concessions to the Russian’s, which were debated at the Berlin Conference were Disraeli was quipped as the ‘Lion’.
In conclusion I feel that a large part of the criticism towards Disraeli was instigated by the personal hatred of the two men. It’s apparent that the two could never agree on anything and Gladstone spent most of his time trying ‘to stab Disraeli in the back’. We can suggest the Disraeli’s tactics in foreign policy were dubious and somewhat underhanded, but they were not really expansionist and reckless due to the fact that the majority of things were done in interests of British prestige and trade issues. Highlighting the Suez Canal as a major economic success rather than a lucky investment. I feel that Disraeli had a blueprint of what he wanted to achieve and was not willing to let Gladstone interfere which accounts for his failure to account for all his actions within parliament. But, we can say that his shrewd methods of employing expansionist ministers did somewhat backfire; but overall Gladstone’s criticisms of him as a leader and in foreign policy were misguided due to the intense distrust and hatred of Disraeli, the dandy "Der alte Jude, das ist der Mann."
