The Pelagian Controversy - A portrayal of the main issues involved.

   In what sense are humans sinful, then? Augustine’s answer is that humans are sinful because humanity is, as a result of the Fall, universally blighted with sin. As sure as we descend from our parents and ancestors we inherit sin. Sin is what we are born with; and we have no control over it. This is the concept of original sin—an essentially spiritual form of sin—and Augustine employs it persistently as a vital premise of his argument. Since we all existed ‘potentially’ in Adam, ‘original sin’ affects every human in three essential ways: firstly as a hereditary disease— summoning physical and spiritual death—that infects us, and can in no way be altered or controlled by human power; secondly as a power that restricts and holds captive our whole nature, including our freedom of will; thirdly branding us legally guilty. Man was not created with ‘original sin,’ however; it resulted from an abuse of his free will. Yet essentially, according to Augustine, sin, at least as it concerns us now, is not a moral failure or disobedience; moral failure comes as a result of sin. The origin of ‘original sin’ is then, ostensibly, understood as a ‘turning away’ from the love and grace of God. As a subsequent and necessary outcome of this ‘original sin’ we have an instinctive bias towards sinning, which we cannot help doing by ourselves—without the imputation of God’s grace. One could say (analogously) that, according to the Augustinian view of fallen man’s nature, man is effectively lying dead at the bottom of an ocean, totally helpless in himself—that only a prior initiative of God’s gracious, imputing breath of life can arouse any response in him whatsoever.

   According to Pelagius, on the other hand, man is not lying dead on the bottom of the ocean, he is only struggling to tread water, perhaps even beginning to sink, as a result of wrong moral decisions on his part. Man can swim again by making correct moral decisions, including accepting the help of God’s grace to aid his moral progress. Pelagius did not accept Augustine’s concept of ‘original sin,’ but he did not altogether discard the notion. Man is not sinful by nature in the sense of inheriting an actual sin- sated nature by physical descent (which is tantamount to Manichaeism); sin is only propagated in the societal sense of being conferred and contracted by custom and example. We did not sin in Adam; each soul is created distinctly by God, ‘in the image of God,’ born innocent and faultless, and with an achievable and realistic moral target system to bring glory to their Creator.

   Apart from the detailed exegetical and hermeneutical objections to Pelagius’ concept of human nature and sin, and specifically the relation of Adam’s sin to ours, Augustine simply argued that, for example, since the ‘original sin’ of our first parents incurred the metaphysical implications of mortality for all of humanity, then Adam’s sin was indeed theologically significant. Yet Pelagius insisted that Adam was a mortal, like every person is created, whether he would have sinned or not. Pelagius attracts credibility for such a position by pointing to what he perceives to be many depictions of ‘blameless lives’ in Scripture. The implication logically follows then that, for Pelagius,

‘a man can, if he will, observe God’s commandments without sinning’.

The nature and scope of “free will”

While Augustine’s most powerful weapon in this argument was his concept of ‘original sin,’ Pelagius’ most potent element is to be found in the priority and absolute nature he places on the human trait of freedom of will. In opposition to the invariably deterministic nature of Manichaeism  (which Augustine was initially attracted to), Pelagianism emphasised the absolute freedom of choice inherent in human nature; thus humanity was responsible for its own actions, and therefore its own sins. God, much to the detriment of His much-attributed ‘sovereignty,’ does not intervene to influence or direct human decisions in any way. The freedom of the will is absolute, since if it where otherwise God would have had to create man with imperfections and flaws of some degree, and this, for Pelagius, is unacceptable since it would question God’s goodness. The precepts given by God to humanity are tailored to humanity’s ability to obey them. (After all, why would God require humans to do the impossible?) No independent, ‘external’ antecedent bias can therefore exist to distort, limit or influence in any way the ‘neutrally’ free nature of the human will. Man is in this sense independent, even autonomous. Thus humans have no legitimate ‘excuse’ or justification for failing to live up to the moral standards that God has clearly laid down. And so, Pelagius asserts, ‘since perfection is possible for humanity, it is obligatory.’

   Augustine accepts humanity’s innate “free will” on one level, but denies its absolute and overriding nature. “Free will” as such was once—pre-Fall—an independent and freely operable trait of humans, but now it is distorted, weakened, incapacitated and restricted by the reigns of ‘original sin.’ Humanity is bent towards sinning; it has an intrinsic bias in favour of wrongdoing as a direct result and implication of the Fall. Yet man has never been autonomous. It was, however, his want of absolute autonomy that resulted in his “turning away from God” and ultimately in ‘original sin.’

The role of Grace

If, figuratively, in the Augustinian view, man is lying breathless, dead, at the bottom of an ocean, it follows that nothing except help from outside of himself will ever give life to him again. If we did receive the ‘breath of life’ from some outside entity, it would in no way be caused by us. The ‘gift’ of life would be totally unmerited, because it was acted totally on the part of the giver. In essence, for Augustine, this is how things really are with humanity in relation to God’s grace. Apart from God’s grace we can do nothing! According to Augustine,

‘Grace…is not bestowed as a reward for merits, but is given freely (gratis), which is why it is called grace (gratia).’

This firm concept of grace is reinforced by appeal to the concept of predestination. It is God who predestines; therefore it is independent, and prior to, any meritorious action of man. Not even, in fact, is grace dependant on the merit of its acceptance by the subject, for grace, according to Augustine, is irresistible. Further, it is only the initial power of grace that enables one to make the choice—making the “fallen will” truly free once again.

   Just as Augustine accepted the concept of Pelagius’ “free will” to some extent, so Pelagius accepted the concept of “grace,” at least moderately. Pelagianism limits grace to a purely external aid or reference point, even an incentive, to help us be morally upright. But grace itself does not provide the incentive. In effect, we manipulate grace.  We utilise grace—grace being what God has freely provided for our use, consisting in law and teaching (as in Jesus for example)—as an instrument in our moral perfect. But we are not at all dependent upon grace since the independent and absolute freedom of the will is necessary to the actualisation of moral responsibility and obligation. As McGrath puts it, in depicting the Pelagian position,

‘Grace informs us what our moral duties are (otherwise, we would not know what they were); it does not, however, assist us to perform them.’

However God’s grace is viewed in Pelagianism, it in no way impinges upon the unassailable power it attributes to man’s nature to do what is right. According to Pelagius’ ardent supporter, Caelestius, grace is not absolutely, but only relatively necessary—relative to the disposition of man’s free will. The fact that God gave a law for man to conform to and obey ostensibly automatically rules out the possibility, according to Pelagius, of grace making a rather arbitrary substitution.

How are we made right with God? —The criteria for justification

The Pelagian controversy climaxes at this ultimate question. At issue here is whether man has any significant part to play in his own salvation—whether he can merit salvation—or whether his salvation is solely due to God’s free grace.

   Pelagius reasoned that if salvation was what made us perfect and like Himself, and God commanded us to ‘be perfect,’ as a moral imperative and obligation, then it logically follows that salvation is ultimately achieved by the individual. It is clear that God wants us to live out morally upright and perfect lives, so it’s obvious that it is possible for us to actually become morally upright and perfect, and thus attain salvation.

   Augustine’s answer to this crucial question is at base very straightforward—humanity is justified as an act of God’s grace alone. Good works, moral living, even holiness, come as a result of God’s grace working in human nature, initially remedying the disease of ‘original sin’ and then liberating the will, an act of God’s grace alone. Humanity is passive and relatively external in the whole scheme of justification.

   Augustine’s views on this question not only contrast with the Pelagian views, but also seem to highlight some apparent flaws in the Pelagian way of thinking about this question. Firstly, according to Pelagianism, humanity has nothing to be saved from. The Pelagians probably understood ‘justification’ or ‘salvation’ as something conceptually different from the Augustinians, however (as perhaps merely imitating the example of Christ, for instance). With no ‘original sin’ there was no immediately pressing or serious need for inherent drastic ‘change of heart’ or ‘conversion’ in the radical sense; apparently being no distinction in Pelagianism between ‘salvation’ and ‘sanctification’.

Conclusion

The issues constituting the Pelagian controversy are enormously complex and varied, interrelated and of crucially normative implication. Yet, as Tillich points out, the controversy can be summarised effectively as the question of

‘…whether the moral imperative is dependent on divine grace for its actualisation, or whether divine grace is dependent on the fulfilment of the moral imperative.’

One can appreciate the importance of both these elements in man’s relationship to God. For some—notably the views of so-called “semi-Pelagianism”—it wasn’t a matter of ‘either-or,’ but the right mix of both. It behoves the honest individual or community to weigh up and give fair consideration and equal hearing to both sides of this on-going debate.

Bibliography

Bethune-Baker, J. F.        An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine, London, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1949

Chadwick, Henry        The Early Church, England, Penguin Books, 1993

Heick, Otto W.        A History of Christian Thought, Vol. 1, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1965

Kelly, J. N. D.        Early Christian Doctrines, London, A. And C. Black Ltd., 1959

McGrath, Alister E.        Christian Theology, An Introduction, Third Edition, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2001

Tillich, Paul        A History of Christian Thought, London, SCM Press Ltd., 1968

Wand, W. J. C.        A History of the Early Church to A.D. 500, London, Routledge, 1982 

 

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