The Role of Ultra in the Allied Victory in Europein World War II.

        

        In the Battle of Britain, July 1940 to May 1942, the Germans were looking to exterminate the British Air Force in order to gain the air superiority needed to invade Britain. Ultra’s importance in the fight against the Luftwaffe, and the protection of the British people has been argued by numerous historians. Ultra can be considered valuable because in the case of communicating with airplanes, the radio was essential; which is why at the height of the battle, between August and October 1940, Ultra was in high the figures of approximately 300 a day.   This priceless information was able to supply the Allies with an accurate depiction about the strength of the German force and they were soon aware that they were “facing an enemy with perhaps a three to one balance in their favor”. Additionally, Ultra “gave an invaluable overall picture of the enemy offensive and the strategy behind it.” The generals had the advantage of learning the speed, direction, height, and size of enemy formations before these formations had even been made in the air. This allowed the British fighters to be sent up to meet the Germans before they had even arrived halfway over the English Channel. The largest of contributions Ultra made was supplying the information on when and where each German attack would take place. This allowed them to prepare by evacuating the targets, alerting firefighters, and preparing defensively. An example where Ultra proved itself was when information was received that the Germans were practicing landing on narrow runways to simulate roads. The generals then took this information and were able to generate a solution to the problem by constructing barriers along some of the long straight roads.

        On the other hand, many historians agree that “the role of Ultra in the Battle has been overrated.” They argue that Ultra was by no means the only factor that was keeping the Luftwaffe from succeeding in the Battle of Britain. In the early days of Ultra, it could take a long time for the information to make an impact, since it had to be decoded, translated, and then given to the generals. Historians such as David Johnson have gone to the point of saying that the Allied generals “did not actually begin receiving Ultra signals until… the battle was almost over.” The British development of the radar enabled the generals to get an instant idea of the whereabouts of the enemy aircrafts as well as giving very early warnings of Luftwaffe attacks. This can be considered a major edge over the time-consuming Ultra. As well, the British had developed several countermeasures to the many German systems for guiding bombers at night, known as “beam systems”. For example, "jammers", were used to create interference with the navigation system, also decoy fires were used to lure away mass bombers. “By March 1941 all beam systems had been rendered ineffective and Royal Air Force night fighters, equipped with airborne radar were downing bombers in significant numbers.”

        Both sides of the argument present very conflicting views on the significance of Ultra during the Battle of Britain. On one side Ultra is presented as providing the Allied generals with valuable information on the enemy, as well as an early warning system to any attacks. In contrast, The Battle of Britain is thought to have been won by other developments that contributed more that the lethargic Ultra. Taking into consideration both points of view, it can be seen that although Ultra did provide the generals with intelligence on the enemy, this was not sufficient involvement to be considered a decisive roll in winning of The Battle of Britain. There had been other developments in the radar, and other countermeasures that were able to provide a better defense system to Britain. As well, Ultra could not have compensated for the extremely unbalanced British to German aircraft ratio. Instead, it was the courageous British pilots that fought against the odds and won the battle. “The battle was not won by Ultra. It was won, primarily, by the 900 pilots killed and wounded.”

Britain was not only under the threat of the German fighter pilots, but as well the German U-boats were making a large impact during the early parts of the Battle of the Atlantic, July 1940 to May 1943. The convoys and independent ships were unable to get their supplies to the desperate British coast because they were being sunk at will. Many authors have made a good case that Ultra was responsible for decreasing the amount of Allied shipping losses. As the naval Ultra developed, they were able to get accurate knowledge of the U-boat positions. This information was then passed onto the Naval Intelligence Division, who were able to warn their ships of the U-boats location and could therefore avoid them. As well, the information of the U-boat positions was passed onto the battleships so that they could destroy the subs. From the table it can be seen that between November 1940 and May 1941, the Allies were loosing a considerable amount of shipping each year. It was during this time period when the British were having no luck in solving the German naval codes.

                                                                                                                         

                                                                                                                         

However, in mid May, 1941, the British captured a German submarine, the U-110, with its cipher machine and all accompanying material, and were soon after able to break the submarine message traffic.

                                                                                                                         

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

The dramatic decline in sinkings, from 61 in June 1941 to thirteen in November 1941, as Dr. Williamson Murray points out, can have no other explanation, than the Ultra information gave the British a decisive edge over the Germans. Further proof of the involvement of Ultra can be seen when in 1941 only       50 000 tons of shipping was lost, however in February, the Germans updated their naval enigma, and Bletchley Park was unable to decode U-boat messages for the next ten months. The monthly total of shipping lost for March rocketed to 500 000 tons. Ultra’s largest influence in the crushing of German U-boats was when the German headquarters radioed to the U-boats and supply ship where to meet for refueling. This information was then decoded at Bletchley Park, passed onto the appropriate generals, who would take advantage of the information by sending British battleships to the meeting place for an assault. According to Harry Hinsley, thanks to Ultra “some 1.5 million tons of shipping was saved.”

        Historians that disagree with the previous views, suggest that Ultra was at this point underdeveloped, and could only give a general picture of the U-boat fleet size, location and methods. They believe that Ultra was of little use for operational and tactical direction, and attribute the success of the Allies against the subs to other factors. Bill Momsen argues that the cause for the decrease in U-boat numbers was the 1.5 meter radar developed by the British, which was fitted to night fighters and allowed them to pick up surfaced submarines five miles away. “U-boats were sunk in significant numbers as they traversed the Bay of Biscay.” Geoffrey Till accredits three other factors to the decrease in Allied shipping goods. Firstly, the change in the Admiralty’s policy, “from 18 June 1941, it raised the speed limit for independently routed ships from thirteen to fifteen knots.” This would allow the independent ships to travel faster, and thus would decrease the chances of being caught by the U-boats. Secondly, he credits the expansion of the convoy system to take in the faster ships, thus allowing the convoys to travel faster. And lastly, he argues that the Germans decision to concentrate on “wolf pack” operations, of surrounding the enemy, tended to improve the survival chances of independent ships. However, Till does recognize Ultra for allowing for evasive routing, making convoys safer.  

        During the Battle of the Atlantic, the two key issues were providing a safe passage for merchant ships, and destroying the German U-boats. Because sea battles are moving much slower than air battles, Ultra was able to make a larger contribution. The intelligence provided through decoding the German messages of the positioning of their ships, enabled Allied generals to be alerted with enough time to exploit the weaknesses of the enemy. However, there were other factors, such as the changes to the Admiralty’s policy, which affected the outcome of the battle as well. Nonetheless, the evidence shown from the tables, of the dramatic decrease in Allied shipping as soon as naval Ultra was achieved, cannot be explained by any other rationale, other than Ultra. Although the ability of the Allied navy was essential to winning the battle, it was Ultra that was able to give the Allies an edge over the Axis. In this case, Ultra intelligence played a crucial roll in the victory of the Battle of the Atlantic. “The Battle of the Atlantic is the battle Hitler could have won and nearly won, but which he lost because of Ultra.”

        As soon as the British had deterred the major German offensives in both the Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic, it was time to begin a western desert offensive in North Africa against the Axis, December 1940 to May 1943. The historians that argue Ultra was vital to the operations in North Africa, suggest this for two reasons; Ultra supplied the generals with information on the opponent, and Ultra provided the locations of any supply ships headed for the German general in Africa, Rommel. As soon as Rommel took over the African Axis army, Afrika Korps, in Tripoli, Ultra was able to forewarn the British forces located nearby that Afrika Korps was building up and would be attacking immediately. This warning was just in time to allow for the withdrawal of British forces to be carried out “without complete disaster.” Throughout the war in North Africa, Rommel’s constant pleas and complaints transmitted to German headquarters, which were conveyed to the Allies through Ultra, provided British General Montgomery with evidence of low morale’s and dwindling supplies. After the British were defeated in first battle of El Alamein, Ultra was able to help the Allies gain back what they had just lost. General Montgomery had originally planned to attack Rommel in the North by the sea. However, he was persuaded to change his plan to attacking at the centre, where it was believed, through Ultra information, that the resistance would be weaker. Utilizing this information, Britain outwitted Rommel and won the second Battle of El Alamein. The factor that ultimately deteriorated Rommel’s troops was the lack of supplies. Ultra was essential each time the Germans attempted to supply Rommel with fuel and ammunition. With each attempt, the signals would be translated, and the positioning of the German convoys would be given to the navy. The Navy would first send an airplane to be seen by the convoy, and then the battleships would come in and destroy them. This maintained the secret of Ultra. “It was Ultra which denied all seaborne supplies to Rommel’s retreating army.”

        In contrast to this argument, many historians agree that even with Ultra providing the generals with information on their enemy, the information was of no use if the generals could not take advantage of it. Rommel was able to survive so long because although the British had all the strategic advantages, the Germans had all the tactical ones. Afrika Korps had better equipment, better training, and superior battlefield communication. Even if the Allies knew exactly what Rommel’s next moves would be, without sufficient supplies, this knowledge was useless. Before the Battle El Alamein, Churchill was pressing General Montgomery to attack, based on the knowledge Ultra had presented him of the weak state of the Afrika Korps. Montgomery decided to wait until he was fully ready to launch the attack according to the plans he had drawn up. However, this six week delay gave Rommel the time to construct a good defense line, and when the attack was over the Allies had suffered considerable life loss. Ultra was not always very reliable. If the plans of an attack were not made over the radio, then there would be no Ultra information to aid the generals. In the first Battle of El Alamein, Ultra failed to provide any warning that the attack was coming, and it was easily won by the Axis. At this point in the war, Allied generals had become almost dependant on Ultra information. They were not using adequate air reconnaissance because they figured they had Ultra to bail them out. After the British defeated Afrika Korps in the second Battle of El Alamein, the British could not finish off Rommel’s forces. Even with the help of Ultra, portraying every detail of the plans of Rommel, the low morale’s, and the shortage of supplies, Afrika Korps was able to stand their ground. The strategic boost that Ultra provided was obviously not enough to overcome Rommel’s forces. The Allies would have to wait for reinforcements until they could overpower Afrika Korps.

        Both positions on the impact of Ultra in the North African campaign offer credible arguments. On one hand, Ultra was very valuable in providing information on the enemy, as well as cutting off any supplies headed for Rommel’s forces. On the other hand, because generals had become dependent on Ultra, once this source of information was taken away, the Allies were terribly defeated. Furthermore, even with Ultra intelligence, the Allies lacked the equipment, training and communication to defeat the Afrika Korps, on a few occasions. This proves that with or without Ultra, it is impossible to win a battle unless you have the proper military strength to do so. However, Ultra was responsible for severely limiting the supplies that reached Rommel; giving the Allies a opportunity against his depleted force. Even so, Ultra cannot be considered decisive in this battle because even after supplying the Allied generals with knowledge of the enemy’s weaknesses, the generals were unable to exploit them. It would take a vast force to finally drive Rommel’s forces into Enfidaville, Tunisia.

        Once the Allies were victorious in the North African campaign, and had overwhelmed the Germans in the air and naval wars in the Battle of Britain and Atlantic, they controlled the momentum needed for a final thrust into German occupied territories to end the war. According to various historians, Ultra’s role in the planning of the Normandy campaign, June 1944 to the end of the war, was vital to its eventual success. This success depended on three things; Allied air and naval supremacy, and the dispersal of German troops throughout Western Europe. As stated earlier, the Allies had already achieved air and naval supremacy, however they needed to find a way of thinning out the German troops, so that they would not all be concentrated in the area the Allies would land. The Allies would have to force the Germans into thinking that they would land somewhere where they really would not. Using Ultra information, the Allied generals were informed that Hitler, and all his generals, believed that the Allied attack would come at Pas de Calais since it was the closest to Britain and had the best weather. Therefore, the Germans would need to be convinced that the invasion would occur in the Pas de Calais area. In 1941, Bletchley Park broke the German secret service code, and was able to capture German agents. These agents were turned into double agents, who would send Germany misleading information that was accepted by Hitler as being accurate. The Allies also manipulated the Germans by simulating wireless traffic near the Pas de Calais area so that the Germans would think there was an army there. Ultra was constantly used throughout the preparations to make sure that the Germans believed everything, and that the plan was not compromised. On June 6 1944, the Allies invaded Normandy, and it was made obvious that the deceptions had succeeded when Hitler refused to move his northern army to encounter the Allied forces, in Normandy. He was convinced that the landings were only a diversion, and that the real invasion would take place later in the Pas de Calais area. Without Ultra, planning the assault would have been a complete guess on the location of the enemy, strength, and equipment. As well, once ashore, valuable time and lives might have been lost in probing attacks to find out where and how strong the enemy was. As Ronald Lewis stated, “Normandy was a triumph, which in retrospect, seems scarcely possible without the aid of Ultra.”

        Conversely, numerous historians have discarded the previous argument because they believe that Ultra’s role cannot be considered decisive since it was only responsible for assuring the generals that their plan was working. Although without Ultra’s contribution the planning for the Allies would have been more difficult, this involvement cannot be considered crucial to the Allied victory. Ultra was also ineffective during the invasion. It could only provide small bits of information on the enemy, which were of no use to Allied generals because the information usually came too late, or was irrelevant. Furthermore, since at this point in the war Germany had lost a large proportion of their navy and air force, Hitler had little reason to continue using the radio. At many points during the battle Hitler deliberately imposed wireless silence, for security reasons. Without radio, there was no Ultra. Without Ultra, the Allies were not warned of the December 1944 German offensive in Ardennes. Because generals and the intelligence staff had begun to rely almost entirely on Ultra, the Allies were surprised, and suffered many casualties. “The Allies had grown complacent. Ultra had spoiled our generals.” 

        The principal reason the Normandy Campaign was such a success was that the original plans were followed through with precision. As several historians have pointed out, Ultra played a large role in supplying the information for the plans to be assembled. The Allies were able to find out exactly where the Germans expected the attack, and whether the deceptions were successful in manipulating them. However, was Ultra’s contribution really that important to the planning? If there had not been Ultra, it would have been obvious to the Allies where the Germans expected the attack, since Pas de Calais was the ideal location. Ultra did not contribute to any of the manipulation, and furthermore did not contribute much during the campaign, besides basic knowledge of German operational strength. If anything, Ultra had tainted the Allied generals, who had become so reliant on Ultra, they no longer felt the need for routine intelligence gathering. Ultra had simply served as a reassurance to the Allies, reassuring them that they were not headed in the wrong direction. A reassurance definitely cannot be considered decisive to the campaign that eventually won the war in Europe for the Allies.

        The turning point for the Allies, after being quickly defeated in France, was the Battle of Britain, Battle of the Atlantic, and the North African campaign. These three battlefields turned the war around, and gave the Allies the momentum to go ahead with the invasion of Normandy, ultimately ending World War II. In all four battles, the Allies had the advantage all army generals yearn for; knowledge of the enemies weaknesses. Ultra provided this advantage throughout the war, supplying generals with intelligence on the enemy’s strength, command structure and strategy. However, this information was by no means decisive in the Allied victory in Europe. Nevertheless, Ultra was not useless, but played a supplementary role, which provided the intelligence necessary for the generals to plan their next move. Ultra could only show the way to go, the Allies would have to get their by themselves. This was true apart from with the exception of the Battle of the Atlantic. During this battle, Ultra provided crucial information on the whereabouts of U-boats, so that Allied convoys could evade them. This was Ultra’s most important involvement; however, in relation to other war efforts, it was still supplementary to the Allied victory. In the end, Ultra only provided behind the scenes knowledge that could only contribute to the decisions made. Ultra was not the war winner, “the men carrying rifles, driving tanks, fighting off U-boats, aiming bombs – these were the war winners.”

Word Count: 4 035

---