case analysis: Brown (Uriah) v The Queen [2006] 1 AC 1

In the trial of Privy Council, the appellant alleged that 1) the meaning of recklessness in the context of motor manslaughter given to the jury should include the appellant’s state of mind; 2) causing death by reckless driving should also be left to the jury besides causing death by dangerous driving as an alternative. The Privy Council accepted both of the appellant’s arguments, and held that according to the principle set by R v Lawrence (Stephen), the appellant’s state of mind ought to be directed to the jury in the meaning of recklessness. Privy Council distinguished R v Adomakobecause it can only be applied in those jurisdictions which causing death by reckless driving has been abolished. Besides, causing death by reckless driving should be left to the jury since all lesser offences should always be left to the jury as alternatives if they are available.

History

Issue of Meaning of Recklessness in Motor Manslaughter

The first issue raised by the appellant was that the meaning of recklessness in the trial judge’s direction was wrong. The respondent argued that in R v Adomako, the House of Lords held that R v Lawrence should no longer be applied, thus there was no need for the trial judge to follow the Lawrence formulation.

Both recklessness and gross negligence can be the mens rea of manslaughter, and in the trial judge’s direction, he told the jury that manslaughter is “gross reckless”, and “If he drove with a very high degree of negligence; if he drove and showed a reckless, wanton and total disregard for life and safety for someone on the road, the prosecution is saying they would have satisfied you to the extent that you feel sure that his accused man is guilty of manslaughter.”

Caldwell recklessness was applied in this case. The Caldwell recklessness was founded in R v Caldwell, in which Lord Diplock said that a person was reckless:

“If (1) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property would be destroyed or damaged and (2) when he does the act he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or has recognized that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it.”

The Caldwell reckless was affirmed by House of Lords in the R v Lawrence, which was a motor manslaughter case. In Lawrence, Lord Diplock formulated a standard direction to a jury of motor manslaughter base on the Caldwell recklessness:

“First, that the defendant was in fact driving the vehicle in such a manner as to create an obvious and serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person who might happen to be using the road or of doing substantial damage to property;

Second, that in driving in that manner the defendant did so without having given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or, having recognized that there was some risk involved, had none the less gone on to take it.”

According to the formulation given by Lord Diplock, it is clear that the defendant’s state of mind should be included in the direction. The same idea was also mentioned in R v Seymour and Kong Cheuk Wan v The Queen, and the Lawrence formulation was followed by courts of United Kingdom before Adomako.

However, in R v Adomako, the House of Lords changed its mind. Lord Mackay stated in his judgment that:

“In my opinion it is quite unnecessary in the context of gross negligence to give the detailed directions with regards to the meaning of the word ‘reckless’ associate with R v Lawrence….a charge of involuntary manslaughter may apply are so various that it is unwise to attempt to categorize or detail specimen directions.”

The House of Lords held that R v Bateman and Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions would be applied, and “it is not necessary to refer to the definition of recklessness in R v Lawrence”. 

Although Adomako is a specific case of manslaughter, its decision can be applied in all kinds of involuntary manslaughters, including motor manslaughter. Therefore, after Adomako, the Lawrence formulation is no longer applied in UK. However, it leaves to be a question that whether the Lawrence formulation is still in effect in other jurisdictions.

Issue of Leaving a Lesser Offence as an Alternative

Another issue raised by the appellant was that the trial judge should leave causing death by reckless driving to the jury as an alternative but the he failed to do so. Road Traffic Act of Jamaica Section 30(1) states that:

“A person who causes the death of another person by the driving of a motor vehicle on a road recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use of the road, and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time, or which might reasonably expected to be, on the road, shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding five years.”

This Section defines the statuary offences causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by reckless driving, which is almost the same, except punishment, as these offences defined in the Road Traffic Act of UK before 1991. However, this act in UK has been changed several times since 1956 while the Jamaican version remains the same. In 1977, the statutory offence dangerous driving and causing death by dangerous driving was abolished in UK, but in the Road Traffic Act 1991, following the report of the Road Traffic Law Review in 1988, dangerous driving and causing death by dangerous driving were restored and reckless driving and causing death by reckless driving were omitted from the criminal calendar. 

In R v Seymour, House of Lords held that the recklessness of the statutory offence causing death by reckless driving and the common law offence motor manslaughter were the same except degree. Therefore, if manslaughter cannot be convicted, causing death by reckless driving can be an alternative. However, since causing death by reckless driving had been abolished in UK and Seymour was overruled by Adomako, the respondent alleged that the principle set out in Seymour should no longer be applied.

Reasoning of the Court

Issue of Meaning of Recklessness in Motor Manslaughter

It was held that the Lawrence should still be applied in the jurisdiction of Jamaica and the jury should be directed under the standard formulated in Lawrence. Adomako was regarded as good law in its relation to motor manslaughter in UK, and both the Adomako and Seymour test contained a very high degree of risk of the defendant’s act before the accused’s act classed as manslaughter. However, Adomako cannot be applied in those jurisdictions in which causing death by reckless driving is a possible alternative offence, such as Jamaica because “its application to motor manslaughter was predicated upon the disappearance of the statutory offences of reckless driving and causing death by reckless driving.” In those jurisdictions where the statutory offence remains, there should be some difference between involuntary motor manslaughter and causing death by reckless driving, otherwise it will be meaningless to have two different offences. The meaning of recklessness in motor manslaughter should be directed to the jury under the Lawrence and Seymour formulation in order to distinguish these two offences, and the prosecution should prove something more than causing death by reckless driving in the trial of manslaughter.

Therefore, the accused’s state of mind, which is an essential element of the Lawrence formulation, should be mentioned in the direction but the trial judge failed to do so, and his misdirection might affect the jury’s decision in the present case, thus, this appeal should be allowed.

Issue of Leaving a Lesser Offence as an Alternative

It was held that the jury should always be aware of the existence of the lesser offence if it is available. Since causing death by reckless driving is a statutory offence in Jamaica and a lesser offence of motor manslaughter, it is essential to direct the jury that if they find the accused is not suitable for manslaughter, causing death by reckless driving can be an alternative. This decision is supported by Seymour, in which case Lord Fraser said:

“…that a person who is accused only of manslaughter or culpable homicide may be acquitted of the charge and may then go unpunished, although he would have been convicted of the statutory offence if it had been charged as an alternative. Such a result would not, in my view, be in the interests of justice…” 

Although the trial judge had left another statutory offence causing death by dangerous driving to the jury in his direction, it is not enough because “causing death by reckless driving…is generally regarded as a more serious offence than causing death by dangerous driving, though the maximum penalties are the same for each.”. Besides, if this offence was left to the jury, the jury might find it was more suitable to convict this offence rather than manslaughter. Therefore, the Privy Council thought it was unjust to convict manslaughter without leaving causing death by reckless driving to the jury, and the conviction should be quashed.

Analysis

In this case, Privy Council clarified a significant legal issue. Instead of simply following the latest precedent developed in UK, Privy Council took the different situations between Jamaica and UK into account, and tried to find out the most suitable precedent for the present case in its judgment. Though the House of Lords is normally bound by itself, the Privy Council does not bind itself, nor is it bound by the House of Lords. Therefore, the Council can make a different decision with the decision made by the House of Lords in Adomako.

In my opinion, it is just for Privy Council to distinguish the Adomako case and apply the Lawrence. According to the declaratory theory of common law, judges do not make law but “the depositories of the laws, the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt”, and the law is assumed to be already existent before the judge’s decision. What the judge needs to do is to find out the law in each circumstance, and interpret it in a right way. Although law is eternal, the interpretation of it may change since the circumstance of each case is different. A judgment is overruled not because the law is wrong but the interpretation of the law is wrong or no longer suitable for the circumstance. Besides, in Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), the House of Lords also said that “too adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict proper development of the law.” Moreover, since the judgment of Privy Council will become a part of law in the original jurisdiction, its judgment must base on the circumstances of the original jurisdiction, otherwise it won’t be able to apply in that jurisdiction and become a piece of waste paper. Lastly, if the Privy Council simply followed the decisions made by House of Lords without considering the different jurisdiction and circumstances, its decisions are arbitrary. In accordance with AV Dicey’s definition of rule of law, if the court makes its decisions arbitrary, rule of law will be seriously damaged.

In the present case, the Lawrence case was decided before the abolition of causing death by reckless driving in UK while the Adomako case was decided after abolition. As mentioned, causing death by reckless driving is still a statutory offence in the Jamaican jurisdiction, and obviously the circumstance of Lawrence is much more similar to the present case than the Adomako. Base on the reasons given in the previous paragraph, it is just and correct for the Privy Council to apply Lawrence and distinguish Adomako in the present case.

The present case becomes a precedent of motor manslaughter in those jurisdictions which reckless driving and causing death by reckless driving have not yet been abolished. It also can be inferred from this judgment, in my opinion, that the Privy Council also decides the authorities made before law reform in UK should be followed when the law in UK has been reformed while the appeal jurisdiction has not. Although the Privy Council’s decision is not bound to itself, the Council will normally follow its previous decision. It is presumable the Privy Council will follow the present case if it deals with some similar cases in future, therefore, the present case will be regarded as a significant precedent and a guideline to the other courts when they face some similar cases. Besides, thought the courts of Hong Kong is no longer bound by Privy Council’s decisions after the reunion on 1st July 1997, these decisions can still be considered by courts of Hong Kong and, in practice, Privy Council’s decision are strongly persuasive in courts of Hong Kong. Thus, it is very likely that the present case will be followed by courts of Hong Kong if some similar cases come to them.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Privy Council dealt with the issue that how the jury should be directed in cases of motor manslaughter, especially in the jurisdictions which causing death by reckless driving has not been abolished in this case. Based on this issue, the appellant raised two arguments that (1) The judge’s direction failed to follow the Lawrence formulation; and (2) The judge failed to leave one of the alternative lesser offences in motor manslaughter to the jury.

The Privy Council held that the jury should be directed under the Lawrence formulation in motor manslaughter, and distinguished Adomako because Adomako could only be applied in the jurisdictions in which the statutory offence causing death by reckless driving had been abolished. Therefore, both of the arguments were accepted by Privy Council and the conviction was quashed.

I personally think this decision is just and correct because it takes the different circumstances between the jurisdictions into account. Besides, this decision is also a significant precedent and strongly persuasive (although it is not binding) when other courts, including courts of Hong Kong, deal with similar cases.

---