Judicial accountability

This view of framers of this Act can be supported by another line of arguments. In a Federal Govt. the first and foremost basic principle of constitutionalism should be independence of judiciary. The legislature or executive should not interfere or dominate in the matter of appointment or termination in the matter of the judges of the High Court (Apex Court of the state) and of Supreme Court (the highest court of the nation). It is necessary because there may be possibility of change of political parties at state or central level. If we give power to executive to take disciplinary action against a judge of High Court or of Supreme Court even on the recommendation of Commission of Inquiry constituted under the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, there would ever be chances of abuse of power based on political affiliations. If we assume a hypothesis that the NDA govt. on the recommendation of the SC appointed 18 judges of different High Courts of BJP ideology then on coming to the power by Congress the govt. may constitute a commission of inquiry and may remove them on one or other pretext. It is because of this reason that the SC and HC judges are immune from any disciplinary action by executive except the constitutional provision of impeachment.

 Thus to researcher it seems that provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 are too far-fetched to appoint any Commission to check on judiciary or to hinder with process of justice delivery.

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Chapter 3        Judicial Accountability & Indian Constitution

“There should be no interference from the executive in such matters. Disciplinary matters should be left to the judiciary.”- Jana Krishnamurthy, Union Law Minister

A crisis of confidence is shaking the very foundation of legal profession today. Accusations have been leveled from all directions against the bench of a serious decline in its standards. The accusers point to a lack of commitment on the part of the judges. There have been far too many cases in recent months when public faith in the creditability of judiciary has gone down. A flurry of high profile cases has underlined that the procedures of appointing and disciplining judges need to be urgently recast. Firstly the case of Justice Arun Madan of Rajasthan High Court, then the judges of Karnataka high court in Mysore Sex Scandal, then case of Sammet Mukherjee of Delhi High Court and some cases from the subordinate judiciary came judiciary to the shame of public. Judges have been in the news of late for acts of moral turpitude.   

Man is a creature of imitation. He is essentially in nature like water, one of the five elements that he is composed of. He is shapeless when born, no form, no hue, and no colour. He comes into being possessing only that which is inherently his, his body. But then he becomes conscious of others around him, he is keen, observant. He watches, he imitates. He learns, he ruminates. He takes the shape of the mould that he sees those closest to him settled in. Of course there are exceptions, like there are to every rule. However exceptions are not the basis for generalizations. We are concerned with generals and not exceptions. Every action of the modern man is imitated. Please do not construe the above statement to be an innuendo. It is not researcher’s intention to insinuate that modern man has not one original bone in his body; the researcher’s implication is merely that man learns by imitating the creatures and things around him. In life as in literature he lives by drawing analogies. The purpose of the above discourse is merely to forward a point, that, if I am only just learning something new, how would I best explain it to someone who has no knowledge of it whatsoever. By drawing parallels between the new unfamiliar concept and an old familiar concept. Like they did in Kindergarten “A FOR APPLE".

For the next few seconds forget whatever it is that your occupation in life is and think of your self as a trained full-fledged gardener. You have been commissioned a new garden to take care of and nurture. You stand at the edge of the garden and survey your territory. It's a tastefully and meticulously architected garden. The choice of plants, herbs, flowers, fruits is stupendous, with a varied variety of flora and fauna. Nothing wrong with the basic structure either. However there are wild outgrowths, innumerable creepers, uncut branches, untrimmed bushes. You know what you have to do. Not plant a new garden, but trim this one. You don't have to make anything new, only garnish what is already made. You know you must regularly weed out creepers, unwanted bushes, bad leaves and infected fruit, anything that threatens the health and prosperity of your botanical extravaganza. You must not interfere with the growth mechanism of plants, but must only stop the rot. You must add sporadically the much-needed fertilizer that boost growth, and then stand by silently to admire. Yours is not the life giving role, but a life garnishing one.

The role of the judges has also undergone a sea-change. Initially the role of judges was to settle disputes mostly of civil nature between private citizens. The judges also determined the question about guilt of the persons charged with offences and punishment to be inflicted upon them. Now, one essential function which has come to the fore, more particularly in the 20th century, is the arbiter of disputes between the state and citizen. A modern state has to arm itself with immense powers in order to bring about socio-economic changes and reforms. It therefore has become essential that the vast powers f the government in the developing society should be cushioned with safeguards with individual’s right. In the very nature of the things, jurisdiction can be exercised only by an independent agency, not under the control of the executive, which is by the Courts.

Another function of judiciary in some of the countries, including India, relates to the power of judicial review. In exercising the power of judicial review, the courts do not and can not go into the question of wisdom behind a legislative measure. The task of courts is to interpret the laws and to adjudicate their validity; they neither approve nor disapprove legislative policy. The office of courts is to ascertain and declare whether the impugned legislation is in consonance with or in violation of the provisions of the constitution.

One of the most important tasks of the judges is that relating to a judicial interpretation. There can be no doubt that the judges by their interpretation can make law sub serve a social purpose. So far as the judges of the higher courts are concerned, their office demands that they be historian and prophet rolled into one, for law is not only as the past has shaped it in judgments already rendered but as the future ought to shape it in cases yet to come.  

But most among all, their role is to maintain the institution of judiciary in society and its higher standards so that there remain the faith and trust of people of India.  The independence of the judiciary from the executive and the legislature as well as independence of each and every judge within the judiciary is considered as necessary condition for a free society and a constitutional democracy. It ensures the rule of law and realization of human rights and also the prosperity and stability of the society. Therefore, constitution provides for independence not only for the Supreme Court but also for the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts. The Supreme Court has held more than once that the independence of judiciary is a basic feature of the constitution and any attempt to curtail it directly or indirectly even by an amendment of the constitution is invalid.

An independent judiciary is a prerequisite for a democracy and it has to ensure that rights of the citizens, as enshrined in the Constitution of India, are given to them honestly. In other words, integrity, impartiality and honesty are the building blocks of an independent judiciary. Needless to mention, there have been instances of alleged corruption and misconduct against judges of higher courts. At present, there is only one provision as per Article 124(4), whereby the issue could be dealt with by way of impeachment under the Constitution. A judge of the Supreme Court can be removed by an order of the president on the ground of proved misbehavior or incapacity. But the president’s power of removal is exercisable only after the address of each house of parliament, supported by a majority of total membership of that house and a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that house present and voting, has been presented to the president in the same session for such removal. Such address can, however, be presented only after the allegations against a judge have been ‘proved’ i.e. after they have been investigated and established by some impartial tribunal. Clause (5) lays down that the procedure for presentation of an address for the investigation and proof of the misbehavior or incapacity of a judge will be determined by parliament by law. Such procedure has been laid down by the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. Although the address of the removal of the judge has to be presented in the same session, the proceedings of the investigation and the proof can be started earlier, i.e. in the previous session or even in the previous parliament. Thus, it has been held that the process of impeachment started in accordance with the provisions of the Judges (Inquiry) Act does not lapse on the dissolution on the house of the people. The process of removal of judge is a parliamentary process, which cannot be subjected to judicial intervention until it has been culminated in removal of the judge. After such culmination the statutory part of the process, by which a finding of guilt is made by the enquiry committee, is subject to judicial review on the permissible grounds and that too only at the instance of the aggrieved judge.

In the researcher’s humble opinion this only process of impeachment to check on judiciary is a cumbersome, unwieldy and unreliable process.  Further according to Subhash C. Kashyap “Contrary to common belief, there is no provision in our constitution for the impeachment of a judge. The impeachment is provided for the president and none else. Also, there is fundamental difference between removal procedure and impeachment procedure and between the impact of adoption of motion for impeachment and passing of a motion for presenting an address to the president seeking orders for the removal of a judge. The grounds for impeachment of the president have to concern ‘violation of constitution’ while an address for removal of a judge has to be on the ground of “misbehavior or incapacity”. In case of impeachment, the moment the motion is passed by the two houses, the president forthwith ceases to be the president. But in case of motion for removal, it is for the President to consider issuing necessary orders.

This is exactly what the concept of judicial review and judicial accountability is. With the 'courts' being the 'gardener', the 'Legislature' being the 'architect of the garden' and 'laws that alter the basic structure of the Constitution' being the 'weeds and the unwanted growth', threatening to disfigure your garden of democracy against which the courts must protect the country at all times, by curbing the rot from corroding the foundations of the Republic.

THE ONLY IMPEACHMENT CASE OF V. RAMASWAMY

How difficult is the process for the removal of a judge under article 124 (4) is sufficiently proved by the only case in which it has been invoked since the commencement of the constitution ended up in the favour of the judge inspite of support of removal of the judge from the bar, media and the parliamentarians. The process was started against judge V. Ramaswamy, a judge of Supreme Court of India. Some 108 members of the Ninth Lok Sabha gave notice to the speaker of a motion for presenting an address to the president for the removal of judge Ramaswamy on the ground of financial irregularities committed by him during his tenure of Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court. The motion was admitted by the speaker on March 12, 1991.The speaker also constituted a committee to investigate the charges on the terms of 3(2) of the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968. Soon after the Ninth Lok Sabha was dissolved and fresh elections were announced. After the constitution of the tenth Lok Sabha, the new government declined to take necessary steps for the functioning of the committee appointed by the previous speaker.

Efforts were made by Justice Ramaswami or on his behalf to challenge the constitution of the committee and delay its proceedings. His wife also filed a petition in the Supreme Court for obtaining a copy of the report of the enquiry committee with a view to challenging it and for withholding from being forwarded to the speaker. After all these legal hurdles were over and the committee presented a unanimous report in support of the charges leveled against the judge, the motion for presenting an address to the president for removal of the judge was taken upon May 10th, 1993 in parliament. After long defense by the counsel for Justice Ramaswami and some debate in the Lok Sabha extending to 2 full days and over sittings of the house the motion failed because the ruling party decided to abstain from voting. There were 196 votes for the motion and none against but the target of requisite minimum votes of 273 for the success of the motion could not be achieved.  

 

We have seen that how far this provision for impeachment has succeeded till now. Researcher feels that Article 124 (4) and 217 (1) (b) are not the sufficient provisions to bring errant judges of the superior judiciary to book in order to remove them.

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Chapter 4                Judicial Independence Vis-À-Vis Judges Inquiry Act, 1968

A transparent and protective procedure to discipline judges will enhance not undermine judicial independence. - Rajeev Dhawan, ‘Justice on trial’, The Hindu, Feb. 07, 2003

On May 21, 1947, the Report of the Ad-hoc Committee on the Supreme Court cursorily dealt with the question of the appointment of judges but was totally silent about their removal. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar proposing a removal procedure by impeachment ineffectively dealt with this lacuna on July 29, 1947. Further details were left to Parliament for a contingency that was expected to arise rarely — if at all. In 1964, it was the judges who wanted a law on impeachment — leading to the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968, which dealt solely with the impeachment procedure. Tested by the Justice Ramaswami case (1989-93) both the parliamentary procedures in Article 124 and 217 of the Constitution as well as this Act of 1968 failed miserably in every conceivable way.

 

This Act was enacted to regulate the procedure for the investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court and for the presentation of an address by Parliament to the President and for matters connected therewith.

We have seen that removal of a Supreme Court or High Court judge is governed by Articles 124 (4) and (5) and 217 (1) (b) and 218 of the Constitution on the ground of proven misbehaviour or incapacity. The words "misbehaviour" or "incapacity" have neither been defined nor clarified in the Constitution. The complaint about misbehaviour or incapacity against a judge has to be probed under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. Section 3 of this Act provides an appointment of a committee to investigate into misbehaviour or incapacity of a judge.

In Krishnaswami’s case it was held that:

“Wilful abuse of judicial office, wilful misconduct in the office, corruption, lack of integrity, or any other offence involving moral turpitude would be misbehaviour. Persistent failure to perform the judicial duties of the judge or wilful abuse of the office doles mains would be misbehaviour. Misbehaviour would extend to conduct of the Judge in or beyond the execution of judicial office.” 

Thus the researcher feels that this Act of 1968 does not anywhere hinder the independence of judiciary and does mot at the same time elucidate on Judicial Accountability. Framers of this Act also intended to do so that judiciary could be untouched with any kind of fear. This argument can further be supplemented by the fact that under s. 3 of the said Act the inquiry committee of 3 members consists of 2 judicial persons (one shall be chosen from among the Chief Justices and other Judges of the Supreme Court and one shall be chosen from among the Chief Justices of the High Courts) so that the decision of committee is not influenced by executive. Further point which creeps into the researcher’s mind is that what if committee under this Act errs in investigating against a judge, can this report of committee be reviewed before the judiciary against the judiciary. In Sarojini Ramaswamy’s case (1992) it was clearly laid that judicial review of the report of the Enquiry committee constituted under s. 3 of the Act, is permissible only on the President passing an order of the removal of a judge concerned.

Researcher feels that no doubt this Act is intra vires the constitution and without hindering process of justice, regulates the procedure for investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a judge but according to researcher on the other hand this Act is not sufficient enough to control over errant and corrupt judges.  Then should this Act be amended or there should be altogether different mechanism (like National Judicial Commission) to deal with such an important issue. Researcher would try to deal will these aspects in further part of this project.

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Chapter 5                Judicial Approach- Justice Arun Madan’s Case

“This is one of the most unfortunate chapters in the judicial annals of Rajasthan where a sitting judge had to face the threat of impeachment proceedings in view of the grave charges of corruption and moral turpitude”

                       Bar Vice Chairman- Praveen Balwada (In letter written to President)

In this shameful case in Rajasthan’s judicial history the charges against Madan, among others, included bargaining for sexual favour from a Jodhpur-based doctor, Sunita Malviya, in exchange for a favorable judicial decision in a case against her. The proposal to her was made through Govind Kalwani, a deputy registrar (record) of the High Court. According to Sunita’s complaint to the anti-corruption bureau, Kalwani met her on October 18 last year and proposed that her case would be disposed of fast and favourably if she agreed to sleep with him and a couple of high court judges. On October 21, Kalwani called her up on her mobile. Sunita promptly called him over to her place and informed husband Ajay — a government doctor — and Jodhpur additional divisional commissioner Prabha Tak of the development. Ajay planted a tape-recorder in the drawing room and lay in wait for Kalwani in an adjoining room with his clinic staff. After landing, the unsuspecting court official repeated his proposal and contacted Madan on his mobile. Making sure his voice had been recorded, Ajay and his staff pinned down Kalwani who tried to get away. He was allowed to leave only after Tak arrived.

The next day, Tak and Sunita briefed divisional commissioner Khem Raj Chowdhary and handed him the tape. Sunita also sent a copy of the tape and a formal complaint to the Rajasthan High Court chief justice. When the matter reached the then Chief Justice of India G.B. Pattanaik, he set up the three-judge panel to probe Sunita’s complaint. In fact, committee held two rounds of inquiry and gave two separate reports, one confirming the sex- related allegation and another corruption charge. Oddly enough, the CJI forced Madan the resign only after the second indictment.

Just after some days one writ-petition named as M.P. Goswami v.  B. K. Rai, J. & other judges including CJI was filed before Rajasthan High Court challenging the constitution of the committee by the then Chief Justice of India. In this case counsel for Justice Arun Madan argued that inquiry of this committee is contrary to Article 217 and 218 of Constitution, because an Hon’ble judge can only be removed by the process provided under Art.124 (4). He further argued that the Parliament has made the Judges Enquiry Act and it is provided in this Act that Judge means both the judge of the Supreme Court and High Court and as such all the judges are coordinate so far as the matter of enquiry is concerned because HC is the constitutional authority and nobody else can inquire into the conduct of a judge or the Chief Justice of India can not direct the coordinate authority of one HC and this amount to hijacking of the constitutional provisions and denuding the judiciary of the protections and as such it is the action against the independence of the judiciary.

It was further argued that only the committee in the manner constituted under the Act is to be the sole authority to inquire into the conduct of judge and Supreme Court has got no authority in any manner to direct any inquiry against any Hon’ble judge of any HC by any coordinate authority and as such the order passed by the Chief Justice directing three Hon’ble judges of different High Court to inquire into the conduct of a judge is null, void and against the Constitutional provisions and also against the independence of Judiciary and this amounts to usurping of the power of the parliament which can not be done by any means.

Relying on the case of C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee & Ors.  Hon’ble Chief Justice M.R.Kalla of Rajasthan High Court wrote that need of an in-house procedure as a self-regulatory measure was emphasized in the above case.  Further judges relied on the Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability Case and said that it is true that SC has neither administrative control over the HC nor power on the judicial side to enquire into the misbehaviour of a Chief Justice or a judge of a HC; but when the Bar of the HC concerned reasonably and honestly doubts the conduct of a judge of HC, necessary the only authority under the constitution that could be tapped is the CJI, who in common parlance is known as the head of the Judiciary of the country. Impeachment is meant to be drastic remedy and needs to be used in serious cases; but there must exist some other means to ensure that judges do not abuse the trust the society has in them. Self- regulation by the judiciary is the only method, which can be tried and adopted. Thus this writ petition was dismissed.

Researcher feels that decision in this case was right as to maintain the transparency in the judiciary. As it has become imperative to check undesirable and unhealthy tendencies in the judiciary and the present procedure of removal is totally inadequate and for various reasons is impractical. So it is necessary to bring out with a mechanism within the judiciary to check on judges and to protect the independence of judiciary as well. In this regard CJI becomes the only authority by the virtue of post and supremacy and superintendence on High Courts.

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Chapter 6                National Judicial Commission and Its Implications

"It has become imperative to check undesirable and unhealthy tendencies in the judiciary. The present procedure of removal is totally inadequate and for various reasons is impractical." M. N. Venkatachaliah

Currently a debate is going on in the country for devising a mechanism to bring errant judges of the superior judiciary to book in order to remove them. In present system problem does not concern the lower judiciary who can be investigated rapidly, placed on suspension, denied work and, if needs be, dismissed. The problem case is the higher judiciary comprising of some 500 or so Supreme Court and High Court judges who cannot be disciplined by anyone and can be removed only by impeachment. As custodians of the Constitution with the power to strike down even legislation or constitutional amendments, the independence of the Judiciary has to be protected. But, to borrow Fali Nariman's phrase, there are black sheep. How are they to be dealt with?

AMERICAN SITUATION

In America, the huge federal judiciary (and not just Supreme Court judges) is protected from removal other than through impeachment by Congress. Certain Judges such as Hastings and Clair borne in the 1980s successfully claimed salaries even when not working or in prison! Between 1804-2002 America impeached only 13 federal judges — of whom seven were removed. But this does not mean over these 200 years, there were no black sheep. There were — but nothing could be done about them. In 1980, America enacted the `Judicial Councils Reform' Act empowering the Judicial Councils to reprimand and impose sanctions against a judge for misbehaviour, which included both acts of corruption and unbecoming conduct on or off the Bench. This Act has come to be tested in the cause celebre case of Justice McBride. The facts were startling. The Special Statutory Committee traversed Justice McBride's entire judicial career, reprimanded him and prevented him from hearing certain classes of cases for certain specified years including those of the 23 lawyers who testified against him. On September 21, 2001, a Federal Court of Appeals decided against the judge — with the U.S. Supreme Court rejecting his appeal on October 8, 2002. In India, the idea of Indian judges scrutinizing the entire judicial career of one of their colleagues is frightening. This is all the more so because of the criticism made of the working of the appointment collegiums which has ignored the Supreme Court's own prescriptions in the matter of appointments but followed personal preferences. What rivalries will be created by an in-house disciplinary procedure can only be left to imagination.

There has to be a statutory procedure, a vetting council to reject frivolous or dubious claims, effective, independent, investigative machinery, a rigorous procedure by a statutorily designated committee, a published report and a final due process. Secret reports compound secret procedures. The reports must be available for public scrutiny. Copying the American solution is not the answer. But, an Indian statutory solution has to be examined.

NATIONAL JUDICIAL COMMISSION:

There is an insistent public demand now that matters connected with appointments and misdemeanours by the higher judiciary need to be dealt with by an independent body using transparent means. Rajinder Sanchar 

In view of some eminent jurists, setting up of a National Judicial Commission is not only essential for the appointment of judges but also to examine and probe the issues like allegations of corruption and misconduct against the judges of higher courts. In researcher’s view a majority of the members of the proposed commission can be chosen and appointed from among the judges of the Supreme Court itself. SC has also stressed the need for an in-house procedure to examine the allegations of corruption and misconduct against High Court judges. Constituting National judicial Commission will be a good step towards eliminating evil practices in judiciary. If we see other countries there is the Canadian Judicial Council, 1971, which has the power to recommend the removal of judges, after holding an enquiry, to the Minister of Justice. In Australia, after a great deal of experimentation, the Constitutional Commission recommended a tribunal capable of taking up cases amounting to misbehaviour or incapacity, warranting the removal of a judge from office. In England, there is almost a revolution in thinking, considering that the country is so tradition-oriented. The appointments are made by the Lord Chancellor, who is head of the Judiciary and also a Cabinet member. In spite of this, though no doubt some kind of personal preferences do seep in, the British judiciary has not been felt to be in danger of suffering in independence because of the Executive's involvement in appointments. But serious apprehensions have been voiced lately. An Enquiry Commission appointed by the Bar Council of England, headed by Iain Glidewell, a former Lord Justice of Appeal, concluded that it was "politically unacceptable for a member of the Government to continue to appoint high-ranking judges."

In researcher’s view, it will be wrong to infer that independence of judges requires that persons other than judges should have nothing to do with appointments, removal and other matters. But that is to misunderstand the role of judges in a republican Constitution such as ours. The issues that judges now have to decide are not the kind of those which arose in the 19th century. This is because the power of the Judiciary under the Constitution is different in terms of quality and extent than it was under the pre-Constitution period. Judges are no longer expected to be experts merely in the technicalities of procedure or evidence. Their role in society has undergone a sea change.

There is an insistent public demand now that matters connected with appointments and misdemeanors by the higher judiciary need to be dealt with by an independent body using transparent means, instead of the present unsatisfactory mechanism shrouded in secrecy. It is for this reason that the National Commission to Review the Constitution also advised that a NJC be established under the Constitution.

Regarding the NJC's composition, one extreme view seems to be that it should consist of retired judges, nominated by the Supreme Court and the High Court Chief Justices. I feel this suggestion is un-workable. Nor is it in keeping with the dignity of Chief Justices. The NJC should have the CJI (chairperson), two senior most Supreme Court judges, the senior most Chief Justice of the High Court, the Law Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition and a senior member of the Bar, to be nominated by other members of the commission. A retired judge of the Supreme Court could be a full-time member. Proposal to give the executive a say in disciplining judges may be potentially mined with danger.

INDIAN JUDICIAL SERVICES:-

There is another alternative proposed by various eminent jurists that there should be Indian judicial services.  Appointing judges should be through an altogether different commission such as National Judicial Commission and there should be no interference at any level of executive or legislature from examination to appointment and from appointment to removal of them. This service will be parallel to Indian Civil Services and by the virtue of position of judiciary in society they would be given preference in all. But there are some practical problems in implementing this service such as:- fear of legislature of losing its command, hindrance by beaurocratic lobby etc.

In researcher’s view whatever be the hurdles, there have to be some mechanism to bring errant judges to picture to maintain the judicial accountability. Today the most credible parts of the Indian Constitution are the people acting as an electorate and the Judiciary which straight-jackets governance within the discipline of the rule of law. But, if the Judiciary congeals a substantial measure of corruption, the Constitution and our democracy are in peril. An immediate planned response in needed to examine issues of corruption to devise effective complaint mechanisms for the Judiciary. This is more important than the many politically motivated constitutional amendments considered by Parliament.

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Chapter 7                                                                Conclusion

        

In conclusion researcher feels that an independent body like National Judicial Commission must be constituted but researcher disagrees with the way of in which present central govt. has kept the bill for the said matter. No doubt the recent Constitutional Review Commission supported the making of such an independent body but it recommended that the President's nominee as a member of the NJC will be on the basis of his consultation with the Chief Justice of India, but the Bill has committed the mischief of providing that the President's nominee will be in consultation with the Prime Minister. All this has been done to execute the government's hidden agenda to denude the Constitution of India of its most cherished basic feature-the independence of the judiciary.

According to researcher when in Article 124 it is given that in the case of appointment of a judge other than the Chief Justice of India, the C.J.I. shall always be consulted (this analogy can be drawn by saying that in article 124(2) the provision speaks of ‘after’ consultation and not ‘in’ consultation) then why not in process of removal of judges by National Judicial Commission.  The C.J.I., who has admittedly no power other than the status and prestige of his office, must be given power by such a constitutional amendment. Thus an immediate planned response in needed to examine issues of corruption to devise effective complaint mechanisms for the Judiciary. This is more important than the many politically motivated constitutional amendments considered by Parliament.

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Bibliography

     BOOKS:-

1. Basu, D.D., Shorter Constitution of India, (Nagpur: Wadhwa & Company., 13th edition, 2002)
2. Kashyap, C. Subhash, Our Constitution, (New Delhi : National Book Trust, 2001)
3. Seervai, H.M., Constitutional Law of India, (Bombay: N.M.Tripathi pvt. Ltd., Vol. 3, Edition IV, 1983) 
4. Shukla, V.N., Constitution of India, (Mahendra P. Singh, Ed., Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 10th edition, 2001)

  ARTICLES AND OTHER READING MATERIALS:-

1. Consultation On Setting Up Of Judicial Panel In Feb., The Hindu, Sunday, Jan 26, 2003
2. Freedom From A Criminal Case, But For A Heavy Price, The Indian Express- Chandigarh issue- p.14 May 18, 2003
3. National Judicial Commission, The Hindu, Friday, March 28,2003
4. Sex Scandal Probe Call Against Judge, The Telegraph, Monday, May 19, 2003
5. Sitting In Judgement, The Indian Express, p.08, May 8, 2003
6. The consultation paper on superior judiciary prepared by the National Commission To Review the Working of the Constitution headed by Chief Justice (Retired) M. N. Venkatachaliah  from Removal of Judges, The Hindu, Tuesday, Jun 11, 2002

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