The UK should completely deregulate embryo research and place no restrictions at all upon what scientists can do to early human embryos. Discuss.

An alternative perspective in which to argue that the UK should completely deregulate embryo research and place no restrictions upon what scientists can do to early human embryos can be seen in the utilitarian argument. This is strongly contended by Julian Savulescu who argues that even if an embryo can be recognised as a ‘person’, scientific progression such as in conducting stem cell research will be of such overwhelming benefit that it would justify killing a few innocent ‘persons’ for the greater good of society. The summary given by the Human Fertilisation Embryology Authority in the polls regarding human admixed embryos can be used to further support Savulescu, in that it was concluded that the public generally opposed to this type of research unless it was likely to lead to medical advances. In this way, in the light of potential medical benefits for the greater good of society, it can be argued that the UK should therefore completely deregulate embryo research and place no restrictions at all upon scientists. However, it is important to note that there is still an obstacle to this argument in which there needs to be likely prospects that research using embryos would lead to medical benefits. For example, Savulescu’s argument can be severely weakened by Soren Holm who has argued that the promise of stem cell therapy may not be as great as is often claimed. The fact that there exists this hurdle of weighing up the potential benefits to embryo research can therefore illustrate again that total deregulation and a complete lack of restrictions upon scientists cannot be a desirable proposal.

In distinct contrast, one may argue that the UK should completely regulate embryo research in not permitting any experimentation with early human embryos at all due to the distinct moral status of embryos deriving from its potential to become a person. This is supported by John Marshall who argues that as the entity has the potential to become a person, it should not be interfered with and that nothing should be done that prevents it realising that potential. In this way, Marshall fully disregards the utilitarian argument in that he does not hold ‘gain to be commensurate with the loss’.  However, it is important to highlight that it may be factually incorrect to say that all embryos have the potential to become babies. For example, in both IVF and natural conception, embryos are commonly created that are chromosomally or morphologically so abnormal that they have absolutely zero chance of implanting in a woman’s womb and developing to term. John Harris further expands upon another difficulty with Marshall’s argument in that in the line of the argument from potential, if the embryo is special because it has the potential to become a human being, then since gametes have the potential to become an embryo, logically they must also have this same potential to become a human being. Although one may argue that an embryo is clearly a significant step further in the process of becoming a person than an individual egg and sperm to thus demonstrate a much more remote connection, Peter Singer and Karen Dawson supports Harris’ argument in seeing little difference between the potential for a sperm and egg in a petri dish immediately before fertilization occurs and that of the newly fertilized egg. In this way, those who wish to use the potential of the embryo as a ground for protecting it cannot seemingly appeal to this notion of natural development. An alternate sort of problem with the argument from potential is that if the early human embryo’s potential to become a human being thus justifies its destruction, this would place doubt on the legitimacy of certain types of contraception such as the morning after pill or the intrauterine device which prevent the implantation of newly fertilized eggs. Following on it can be argued, those who accept sexual reproduction, which involves the creation and destruction of embryos, should thus accept research on human embryos. Hence, although the argument of potential in according them with the same status as people is quite weak, the need to treat it with a degree of ‘respect’ and reach a compromise position seems most desirable.

Instead, it can be therefore argued that the UK should reach a middle ground in regulating embryo research and placing restrictions upon scientists who use early human embryos through weighing up the unique status of embryos and the social benefits in conducting embryo research as embodied in the 1984 Warnock Report. A compromise position arises from the fact that an embryo is clearly a member of our species, but this should not necessarily mean that it should have the same rights and entitlements as a person. Instead, embryo research should be permitted provided that the embryo is not simply treated instrumentally as a resource, but is instead accorded proper ‘respect’ as further strengthened by Karen Lebacqz who argues that it is perfectly plausible to do so in embryo research. This may be further streamlined to argue that the compromise position is not concerned with protecting individual human embryos, but is instead directed towards protecting the symbolic value of early human life. Like primates, while not human persons, there is no doubt that society regards primates as deserving of some special consideration. In this way, although it is possible to use non-human primates in medical research, there exist requirements in that it is permitted only if the research serves an important scientific purpose which could not have been done on creatures with lower neurophysiological sensitivity. As contended by Dan Brock, embryos like primates should thus be regulated and given added protection as they have an intermediate moral status not to be used and destroyed for trivial purposes.

This position is well reflected in our current and amended HFE Act whereby it lays down a number of restrictions on the use of embryos for research. For example, no research can be carried out on an embryo after 14 days, the research must be necessary or desirable for one of the statutory purposes listed in Schedule 2 and the use of embryos must be necessary in the sense that it would not be possible to obtain a licence for a given type of research if it would be possible to carry out research on tissue from adults. This Act thus arguably encapsulates the compromise and middle position in the sense that although medical research using early human embryos has not been outrightly prohibited, there exist a number of provisions and thus obstacles which lay down restrictions upon the use of embryos for research to thus recognise the need to treat it with a degree of ‘respect’.  This middle ground therefore arguably allows for medical advancement and progression to facilitate new developments such as admixed embryos and CNR, yet simultaneously protects early human embryos in regulating upon its use. It can be instead argued that it is due to other external factors such as a lack of funding which have meant that research on admixed embryos in 2009 have not been able to go ahead, as opposed to the mandatory restrictions within the UK legislation.

In conclusion, whilst there are strong arguments on both ends of the spectrum to either completely deregulate the use of early human embryos in the light of utilitarianism, to the other end of the scale in which embryos should never be used in research at all, the middle ‘compromise’ position is ultimately the most desirable in offering the key advantages of both. As embodied in the Human Fertilization Act and its additional amendments, it can be seen that one can pursue the goals of medical advancement yet maintain a respect for the embryos, through placing a number of restrictions and regulations on its usage. It may perhaps be significant to note that developments towards regulation and restriction of early human embryo research will inevitably be subject to change in the near future. Given that when the original 1990 Act was passed, fertility treatment and embryo research were seen as both novel and controversial, the reality now is very different. Whilst IVF treatment has become a routine medical procedure, there exists a gap in that public confidence towards embryo research still relies upon the drawing of stringent lines, restriction upon the licensing of procedures and the ongoing monitoring of individual research projects. As an increasing number of new medical developments becomes available such as the possibility of human cloning in being able to potentially replicate any human body cell to thus consequently confer special moral status upon these cells’ potential, combined with the enlarged transparency and greater public understanding of much of the science used in early human embryos, it will not be long before there is a much more liberal approach towards the adequacy of the current rules and regulations.  

Bibliography

Jackson, E (2010). Medical Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press

The role of 'public opinion' in the UK animal research debate. J. Med. Ethics 2010; 36:46-49