We are not provided with any more details of what has happened between Lucia and Captian Puffin.
Lets assume that Lucia did not accept the offer. If no acceptance is made than there is on contract and no need to look for consideration. According to the case of Payne v Cave Lucia is able to revoke her advertised “offer” at any time until there is an explicit acceptance of the offer made to her by Captian Puffin. Lucia must however inform Captian Puffin of any revocation made. This could be done by phone call or by meeting in person. Mail would also be perfectly acceptable as this is how the offeror choice to make a communication to her. So far Lucia is not liable or bound to anything essentially because there has been no acceptance by her of the offer.
On the other hand, had there been evidence provided showing that Lucia had accepted Captian Puffins offer then one would have to analyse and examine any consideration. In this case there would be what is known as executory consideration with promises being made by Captain Puffin and Lucia for payment in exchange for the supply and fitting of double glazed units. This is echoed in the case of Stilk v Myrick.
Following the establishment of consideration it is necessary to judge whether or not there was an intention to create legal relations. Carlil v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company shows that if Lucia’s advertisement had been considered an offer then by acceptance by conduct a legally binding contract would have been formed. The only exception to this could be shown through the case of Jones v Vernons Pools where a contract was not formed due to litigation. In the case of Carlil v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company6 Lindley LJ says “We must first consider whether this was intended to be a promise at all or whether it was a mere puff which meant nothing. Was it a mere puff? My answer to that question is no, and I base my answer upon this passage: “10001 is deposited with the Alliance bank, showing our sincerity in the matter””. Regardless of whether Lucia would have considered there to be any legal relations between Captian Puffin and herself, she would still be bound to carry out the contract. Pleading negligence to the postal rule would not help her case either.
Lucia v Georgie
Georgie is probably going to want the same remedy as Captain Puffin did. Lucia supplying and fitting the double glazed units at the 50% price advertised. This is a non-monetary remedy and the act that Captain Puffin desires Lucia to perform is specific performance.
Once again Lucia is not bound to anything, as the advertisement leaflets are only an invitation to treat. Placing double glazed units in her show room is also only an invitation to treat by Lucia.
A collateral contract is often in the form of “If you will enter in the main contract then I will …(do something)”. The case here between Lucia and Georgie is a collateral offer with president set by Routledge v Grant.
Georgie makes the first offer saying that he wanted to buy double glazed units from Lucia and that he would confirm this with her the next day. We do not know whether Lucia accepted this offer or not.
Lets assume that Lucia did not accept georgie's offer. Since a binding contract requires clear offer and acceptance, and since there is no acceptance by Lucia, this would not be a binding contract. Lucia would be totally within the law to revoke her special offer when she is discussing the matter with Georgie on the phone. Revoking the offer over the phone is also acceptable as this was the chosen method of communication by Georgie. If Lucia did revoke the offer she would be making a counter offer by saying that Georgie would have to pay for the double glazed units in full.
We can assume that Georgie got the necessary funding from his bank since he called Lucia on Monday to confirm his offer. The fact that he has called Lucia on the 16th of July could be a possible indication that Lucia might have agreed to his initial offer. On analysing this situation one will c that there is once again executory consideration as they are both making promises to each other. Georgie gets back to Lucia on the 16th (having not approached any other window companies) and buys the double glazed units and Lucia only charges 50%. This case is similar to Pitt v PHH Asset Management Ltd.
If there were a dispute regarding when the offer would be open till on the 16th the courts would settle this using the reasonable person test. It is most likely that the result would be all business hours on the 16th.
The intention to create legal relations must now be judged. Georgie could claim that there was an intention to create legal relations because he was permitted by Lucia to enter the showroom. He could also claim there was intention to create legal relations by way of conduct (again see Carlil v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company6). Also, since this is a commercial situation, it is assumed there is always an intention to create legal relations.
So finally, assuming that Lucia accepted Georgie's offer, she would indeed be bound to sell him the services at the reduced price.
Lucia v Elizabeth
Elizabeth is Lucia’s cousin. Lucia promised to fit a third party’s windows for Elizabeth free of charge.
Elizabeth wants a non-monetary remedy that is somewhat different to Lucia’s other two customers. She just wants the specific performance of Lucia fitting the windows free of charge.
There is clear offer and acceptance here with Lucia offering to fit the windows for free and Elizabeth accepting this offer. On to consideration. There is executory consideration on Lucia’s behalf as she is fitting the windows for Elizabeth. However, from the info we are provided with, it doesn’t appear that as though Elizabeth is providing anything in return and therefore there is no consideration on Elizabeth’s behalf. Had Elizabeth provided consideration, the case of Stilk v Myrick5 could have been referred to.
In the case of Currie v Misa, consideration is defined in the following way “ A valuable consideration, in the eyes of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other”.
Due to the lack of consideration on Elizabeth’s behalf, on must consider whether there is any practical benefit to Lucia. A good case to refer to here is the Williams v Roffey case. Although there are many differences between this case and the Williams v Roffey case, they r similar in terms of commercial and business aspects. It appears that there is no practical benefit to Lucia other than the maintaining of a civilised relationship with her cousin, I doubt this would hold strong in court though.
As Lucia and Elizabeth are cousins i.e. family, one may assume that Lucia’s offer could have been offered as a gift, if you will.
According to Beale, any “gratuitous promises are not enforceable in court unless they are made by deed”. Hudson seems to support the idea that Lucia will not be held liable, and will not be bound to perform any act.
Had Keeping of good relations with her cousin been seen as satisfactory practical benefit to Lucia then one would investigate the intention to create legal relations. As mentioned earlier, courts do not like to dabble in domestic affairs (see Lord Atkins judgment in Balfour v Balfour). A better-suited case to refer to here would be Parker v Clark perhaps or even Merritt v Merritt.
I believe that Elizabeth will have a very week argument if she relies on the practical benefit of good family relations argument. I doubt the court will hold Lucia to the promise.
Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 2 All ER 421, [1968] 1WLR1204 (DC), 132 JP 367, 112 Sol Jo 582
See The Law of Contract by L Koffman and E Macdonald 4th Edition, p28, para2
Adams v Lindsell (1881) 1B & Ald 681, 106 ER 250
Payne v Cave (1789) 3 Term Rep 148
Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317, 6 Esp 129, 170 ER 851
Carlil v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 QB 256, 57 JP 325, 62 LJQB257, 4 R 176, 41WR 210, 67 LT 837, 9 TLR 124 (CA)
Jones v Vernons Pools [1938] 2 All ER 626
Extract from Westlaw, Carlil v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 QB 256 CA, Lindley LJ, para3
See The Law of Contract by L Koffman and E Macdonald 4th Edition, p97, para4
Routledge v Grant (1828) 130 ER 920
Pitt v PHH Asset Management Ltd [1993] 4 All ER 961, [1994]1 WLR 327, 68 P&CR 269, [1993] 2 EGLR 217, [1993] NLJR 1187, [1993] 40 EG 149, [1994] Conv 58 (CA)
Currie v Misa (1875)LR 10 EX 153
Williams v Roffey & Nicholls (contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1, [1990] 1 All ER 512, [1990] 2 WLR 1153 (CA), [1990] 12 LS Gaz r 36, [1989] NLJR 1712, 48 BLR 75
See Contract Cases and Materials by HG Beale, WD Bishop and MP Furmston, 4th Edition, p104, para1
Hudson, Re, Creed v Henderson (1885) 54 LJ Ch 811, 33 WR 319, 1 TLR 447
Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571, 88 LJKB 1054, [1918-1919] All ER Rep 860, 63 Sol Jo 661, 121 LT 346,35 TLR 609 (CA)
Parker v Clark [1960] 1 All ER 93, [1960]WLR 286
Merritt v Merritt [1970] 2 All ER 760, [1970] 1 WLR 1211 (CA), 114 Sol Jo 455, 214 Estates Gazette 1355